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ABSTRACT
Two of the major claims of the cognitivist approach to metaphor, the
paradigm which has emerged as dominant over the last three decades, are
1) that metaphor is a conceptual, rather than strictly linguistic,
phenomenon, and 2) that metaphor exemplifies processes which are at
work in cognition more generally. This view of metaphor is here placed
within the context of the functionalist approach to language, which asserts
that linguistic structure is emergent in nature, the use of language directly
influencing the storage and representation thereof. The dissertation argues
that metaphors, as conventionalized cognitive structures, are themselves
highly influenced by frequency effects, and that metaphorical crossdomain mappings exist in the mind as conceptual schemata.
Two corpus-based methods for assessing the frequency of overall
metaphorical mappings are presented, both based on the use of key terms,
attained using a survey method, for metaphorical source domains. These
findings inform the hypotheses of a series of three experiments which test
vi

three key predictions of the view that metaphors are affected by
frequency: that frequent metaphors should be more productive, accessible,
and acceptable than infrequent ones. Both the corpus and experimental
approaches, as well as data from previous research on metaphor at varying
levels of conventionalization, support the view that metaphors are a usagebased phenomenon. The properties of various types of metaphorical
utterances (e.g., idioms and novel metaphors) are best accounted for as
arising from the interaction of the conceptual schemata that license crossdomain mappings, and syntactic schemata that link meanings to syntactic
templates.
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Chapter 1: Introduction & Literature review
The popularity of metaphor research among those who view language as arising out of
general cognitive processes is best explained by the fact that metaphor so ideally
exemplifies the cognitivist approach to language: metaphor is a linguistic phenomenon
that isn’t, strictly speaking, a linguistic phenomenon at all. Linguistic metaphor, rather, is
simply the outermost expression of a more general system which serves, at its core, to
structure our view of the world, a cognitive system allowing for the conceptualization of
abstract domains of thought to benefit from the clearer, more defined structure associated
with more concrete ones. Utterances such as she blew up at me or the time weighed heavy
on his mind don’t just describe one thing in terms of another, they evidence a system
whereby the speakers of a language conceptualize nebulous domains of thought (here,
emotion and time). A thesis central to the field of metaphor research has been that
metaphor, while deeply important to cognition and highly worthy of study, isn’t special:
metaphor isn’t anomalous, operating outside of the rules and principles which govern
‘normal’ speech, but is rather at the core of the conceptual systems which govern thought
and (accordingly) language, inextricably tied up with language at the lexical, phrasal,
syntactic, and discourse levels.
As many times as this assertion has been made, however, it’s unclear that it has been
taken all that seriously in guiding research enterprises. If it is the case that metaphor is an
essential structuring feature of language, then it ought to be demonstrably true not only
that metaphor has an effect on linguistic structure (as has been repeatedly and
convincingly demonstrated), but that metaphors will themselves be subject to principles
that govern language more generally.
1

Out of the functionalist tradition, meanwhile, has emerged a deeply empirical
understanding of one such principle: that frequency plays a major role in the storage, use,
expression and overall structure of language. “The frequency with which certain items
and strings of items are used,” write Bybee & Hopper (2001: 3), “has a profound
influence on the way language is broken up into chunks in memory storage, the way such
chunks are related to other stored material and the ease with which they are accessed.”
One of the strengths of the frequency-based approach to language lies in the fact that, as
with metaphor, frequency is not a strictly linguistic phenomenon, but operates rather on
cognitive structures in general. The phonological reduction of a frequent word has the
same underlying causes as, for example, the streamlining, for experienced drivers, of the
process of putting a key into the ignition of a vehicle (J. Bybee, personal communication,
February 8, 2007).
Metaphors are cognitive entities, their psychological reality repeatedly attested in
three decades of research, and as such should be subject to frequency effects. Linguistic
metaphors, moreover, should be in particular operated on by those frequency effects to
which language is especially subject. At the levels, then, both of linguistic expressions
(e.g. ‘he churns out ideas’) and of the underlying cognitive structures which sanction
them (e.g. THE MIND IS A MACHINE)—concepts that will be outlined in detail in
subsequent chapters—metaphor should be affected by frequency.
The goal of this dissertation is to explore the role of frequency in affecting the
storage, representation, production, and diachronic change of metaphors, and will be
driven by the following research question(s):
·

In what way are linguistic metaphors operated upon by frequency effects?
2

·

What are the domain-general effects of frequency, which operate on both
metaphor and on more well-researched levels of structure such as morphology?

·

Specifically, how does frequency affect metaphor at the level of underlying
cognitive structures, and how does it affect metaphor at the level of surface
expressions?

·

How do these two levels of frequency interact with one another?

It is hypothesized that metaphor is operated upon by frequency effects in a manner
analogous to that which has been repeatedly observed to take place in phonological,
morphological, syntactic and lexical phenomena: representations of patterns to which
speakers are frequently exposed are ‘strong’—easily accessed & productive—in
proportion to their frequency. Specific instantiations of such patterns, as a result of the
high frequency of the instantiation relative to the pattern overall, can themselves gain in
strength, independently of the overall pattern.
The research questions and hypothesis are addressed using a corpus method that
makes use of automated searches for similes in a large (385+ million word) corpus for the
purpose of ascertaining quantitative data for underlying conceptual metaphors. The
approach is predicated on the use of basic terminology, for a given source domain, as
search terms. A preliminary study, based on the timed survey method used by Rosch in
classic prototype theory experiments (Rosch & Mervis 1975, Rosch 1978), is used to
establish basic terminology for ten separate cognitive domains which are of recurrent use
as metaphorical sources: WAR, RACING, LIGHT, CHILDREN, FOOD, WRITING, PLANTS,
BATTERIES, MACHINES, and THE BODY.

The method provides frequency data for

metaphorical mappings, which informs the experimental portion of the study. This
3

method, as well as a related method that makes use of a smaller corpus, are presented as
exploratory towards best practices in establishing the overall frequency of metaphorical
mappings. The methods and results of both methods contribute significantly to the field
of corpus-based research on metaphor.
A series of three experiments directly assesses specific claims relating to how
frequency affects metaphor, with sub-hypotheses informed by existing literature on
frequency effects in language. For all three experiments, the variable manipulated is the
overall frequency of the cross-domain mappings instantiated in the stimuli. A survey
method, in which participants rate the acceptability of metaphorically predicated stimuli,
is used to assess the relationship between the frequency of an underlying mapping and the
acceptability of utterances that instantiate the metaphor. A computer-based reaction time
experiment is used to gauge how the accessibility of metaphorical utterances follows
from metaphorical frequency. A sentence completion task analyzes how the frequency of
a metaphorical mapping bears on the productivity of the mapping.
The overarching goal of the dissertation is a model for understanding metaphors as
emergent structures which arise out of frequency, providing a framework whereby
metaphor can be approached in future research from a functionalist, as opposed to strictly
cognitivist, perspective.
1.1: Review of the Literature
1.1.0 Introduction
This section presents an overview of the existing literature that is directly relevant to the
research presented here, bearing either directly or indirectly on the argument that
metaphors are cognitive entities which are operated on by frequency effects.
4

§1.1.1 presents an overview of the major theoretical approaches to metaphor which
have arisen out of the tradition of cognitive linguistics, and which provide the basic
framework and terminology for the approach to metaphor taken here. §1.1.2 provides an
introduction to the use of corpora as a tool for researching metaphor, surveying the major
authors and projects of this relatively new field.
§s 1.1.3 – 1.1.5 outline the usage-based model of language (whereby the frequency of
linguistic units and patterns is seen as effecting important changes in language storage
and processing), extant experimental approaches to demonstrating the effect of frequency
on the processing and storage of language, and an overview of network/exemplar
cognitive models (the most generally accepted approach for modeling frequency effects,
and the model here applied to metaphor).
§1.1.6 provides a synthesis of these two approaches, presenting approaches to
metaphor (primarily from psychology) which have attempted to account for the role of
conventionalization (hypothesized here to correspond to frequency) in the processing of
metaphor, and of initial forays towards applying schema-based models of language to
metaphor.
1.1.1 Metaphor
The topic of metaphor has been approached from a few different disciplines, and from
rather more than a few theoretical perspectives. The project outlined here, while aiming
not to associate itself with any one particular extant theory of metaphor, will repeatedly
draw on concepts and terminology from the existing literature. An overview of the major
approaches from cognitive linguistics follows, with relevant approaches from psychology
reported in §1.2.3.
5

It is with George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s seminal work on metaphor that the
modern field of metaphor research begins, research which still frames the debate on the
relationship between underlying conceptual metaphors, and their instantiations as
linguistic metaphors. Within conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson
1980, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff 1993), metaphor is seen as a system whereby one cognitive
domain (the target domain) is structured according to our knowledge about another (the
source domain), with metaphorical entailments carrying “certain patterns of reasoning…
from the source domain to the target domain” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 197). A crossdomain mapping which has become conventionalized is a conceptual metaphor, which
can be instantiated in any number of utterances. One of the key insights of CMT over
earlier theories of metaphor is the observation and explanation of entire families of
linguistic metaphors predicated on a single conceptual metaphor: for example, the
utterances our relationship has hit a dead-end street, look how far we’ve come, and we
have to go our separate ways all instantiate the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY,
while We were made for each other and She is my other half are sanctioned by the
conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A UNITY (OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS). Within this or
any other metaphor, every instantiation is predicated on the same mapping of source
domain to target domain (with the title of the conceptual metaphor labeling the two
domains involved, e.g., ‘love’ and ‘journeys’).
Set correspondences hold between the two domains, taking the form of inferences
about the target based on the conceptual structure of the source. Constraining these
correspondences is the Invariance Principle, according to which those aspects of the
systematicity of the source domain which are mapped to the target domain maintain the
6

‘cognitive typology’—inferences, salient aspects, thematic roles, etc.—of the source
domain, provided that these don’t conflict with the target domain. In LOVE IS A JOURNEY,
for example, certain inferences about journeys (that they have a starting point, that they
can end at any point before reaching their destination, that companions can part ways at
any point, etc.) hold in their application to love and relationships. The incongruity of our
love turned back for home would come from its incompatibility with the target domain:
the metaphor maps physical distance on to time, and while distances can be retreaded,
time can’t be undone.
Croft & Cruse (2004) note that CMT errs in drawing a sharp line between the roles of
the source domain, which provides structure, and the target domain, which receives it.
Blending theory (Turner & Fauconnier 1995, Fauconnier 1997, Sweetser 1992,
Fauconnier & Turner 2008), conversely, see metaphorical meaning as drawing structure
out of both (or, often, many) domains. Conceptual blending is an extremely robust
account of metaphor in that it is not, strictly, a theory of metaphor: it accounts for
metaphor using more general cognitive tools which apply wherever a cognitive operation
requires input from two or more mental spaces, these being “conceptual packet[s] built up
for the purposes of local understanding and action” (Turner & Fauconnier 1995: 184).
For metaphor, the theory replaces the simple source-to-target mapping of CMT with an
integration network, which involves many spaces and many mappings between them. The
resulting structure bears elements from all contributing domains, with systematicity and
inferences having their origin not in either the source or target domain, but arising out of
the integration network in staggeringly complex ways. In three hours went by, for
example, certain aspects of the intended meaning are understandable as arising from the
7

application of the source domain SPACE to the target domain TIME. The inference that
units of time are moving objects, however, has it source in neither domain, but rather
arises out of the blend of the two (Fauconnier & Turner 2008).
The project proposed here, while not situating itself within either CMT or blending
theory, will make repeated use of terminology from both theories which have become the
standard for referring to metaphor: conceptual metaphor, domain, source domain, and
target domain. In addition, the project will use generally recognized source and target
domain labels, using the Lakoff, Espenson, & Schwartz (1991) ‘Master Metaphor List’ as
a source (see §4.1).
1.1.2 Corpus Work on Metaphor
Any work purporting to shed light on the role of metaphor in actual discourse must, of
necessity, take actual discourse (as opposed to elicited data, the metalanguage of
contrived sentences, or the intuition of linguists as native speakers) as its source of
information. Metaphor research from Lakoff & Johnson’s seminal work onwards,
however, has tended towards a reliance on sentences that ‘seem’ like natural metaphors,
something that any speaker of English would say, but are composed by researchers rather
than pulled from natural data. It’s reliably the case that corpus data flies in the face of
researchers’ intuitions and assumptions about language (Labov 1975), and this is as true
for metaphor as for any other area of linguistic inquiry (Sanford 2008a). A sound theory
of metaphor (or any other aspect of language) must account for, and can only arise out of,
actual, as opposed to imagined, language use.
As Chafe (1998: 96) points out, “ordinary conversational talk… occupies a special
place as the kind of language that is most natural in both form and function, the kind of
8

language humans must be designed by evolution to produce and comprehend. It requires
no special training or skill to be able to talk casually with others, and every normal
person acquires this ability as a natural part of maturation. Because conversation is the
form of language least influenced by acquired skills, it provides us with the most direct
and uncontaminated access to natural mental processes.” Metaphor, like all aspects of
language, occurs in its most natural form in spontaneous, conversational speech. Corpora
of spoken discourse provide ready access to spontaneous speech, and thus to the natural
environment of spontaneous metaphor.
The relatively new field of corpus work on metaphor has already demonstrated
convincingly how frequency-based studies can provide important insight into metaphor,
both shedding light on claims made in previous theoretical approaches and leading to
new ones. Such research has fleshed out how particular domains of discourse use
conceptual metaphors (Boers 1999, Charteris-Black 2004, Koller 2005, Musolff 2006) as
well as how individual words activate metaphorical meanings (Deignan 1999a, Tissari
2001, Musolff 2004, Shank 2007) and, perhaps most importantly, have provided
empirical feedback for some of the key claims regarding metaphor which have been
advanced within cognitive linguistics (Deignan 1999b, Stefanowitsch 2005, Sanford
2008a). Each of these approaches are based to some extent on frequency, indicating the
variety of findings which can arise out of the application of corpus-based frequency to
our understanding of metaphor.
1.1.3 The Usage-Based Theory of Language
In a usage-based account of language (Greenberg 1966, Bybee 1985, Langacker 1987,
Croft & Cruse 2004, Givón 1984, Hawkins 1994, Lindblom, MacNeilage, & Studdert9

Kennedy 1983), linguistic performance isn’t a byproduct of underlying abstractions, a
priori constructs which comprise Language and of which utterances are merely
indicative. Linguistic representations, rather, are seen as directly operated upon by tokens
of linguistic expression, with frequency the engine whereby expression dictates
representation. The traditional units of linguistic analysis (segments, syllables,
morphemes, words, constructions, etc.) aren’t the building blocks of language. They are,
rather, entities which emerge as generalizations, abstracted away from sequences to
which language users are repeatedly exposed, leading to the emergence of organizational
schemata1 and categories. An experienced linguistic event is stored as a mental
representation of the event, and for any given category, those units which are most
frequently experienced become strengthened, with a concomitant increase in productivity
for patterns they instantiate, while infrequently experienced tokens are correspondingly
weak.
Frequency can be counted in two ways: token and type. Token frequency is the raw
frequency of a given unit: given a particular unit (at any level of linguistic structure), the
frequency with which it occurs in a corpus (as a measure of how frequently it is
1

In Langacker (1987) schemata are presented as abstractions over semantic,

phonological, or otherwise symbolic units, which can in turn sanction specific
instantiations of the schema (as, for example, the word ‘tip’ instantiates the phonological
CVC schema). Bybee (1995), who restricts her discussion of schemata to morphological
analysis, defines schemata as “emergent generalizations” over “words having similar
patterns of semantic and phonological connections” (p. 430).

10

experienced by a language user) is its token frequency. Type frequency, on the other
hand, refers to the frequency of a pattern, or more specifically, the number of items
within a language that instantiate the pattern in question. Bybee (2001) gives, for
example, the case of break. The number of times that the form broke, the past tense of
break, occurs in a corpus would be the token frequency (as indicated by the corpus) of
broke. A relevant measure of type frequency, on the other hand, would be to assess the
number of verbs that form the past tense using the same vowel alternation as that used in
broke (e.g., spoke, awoke). The type frequency of this form of the past tense would be
considerably lower than that of forms which use the –ed ending—that is to say, the
pattern applies to a much smaller set of words.
Strengthening of representations (referring to an increase in their cognitive salience)
can take place at either the type- or token-frequency level. High token frequency for a
particular item causes the representation of the item to be strengthened, while high type
frequency causes a pattern (or schema) to be strengthened. The past tense pattern –ed, for
example, is high in type frequency. The form weeped is increasing in usage because of
the low token frequency of wept relative to the high type frequency of the
-ed past tense. The form kept remains prevalent, on the other hand, because of its high
token frequency (Bybee 1985). The relationship between token frequency, type
frequency, and productivity is such that a schema of high type frequency is a strong, and
therefore, productive, schema. The openness of a schema—the amount of specificity
imposed—also plays a role in the strength of the schema, such that open schemata tend to
be higher in productivity than more restrictive ones. High frequency tokens within a
schema do not contribute to the frequency of the schema, because they tend to become
11

independent (autonomous) from it, forming their own representations rather than
reinforcing the pattern (as is the case for kept, for example) (Bybee 1995). Thus,
generally, type frequency correlates positively with productivity, but high token
frequency will effect an inverse correlation between the two.
1.1.4 Experimental Approaches to Frequency
Various experimental approaches have borne out several of the key claims of the
frequency-based approach to linguistic structure—namely, that grammatical knowledge
is probabilistic, that frequency increases accessibility, and that type frequency influences
productivity. The great majority of such studies have focused on phonotactics,
morphology, and (less commonly) constructions. The first such prediction is that
grammatical judgments aren’t absolute, but probabilistic, based on a speakers’ previous
experience with the language. In Pierrehumbert (1994), subjects were presented with
pairs of nonsense words and asked questions which assessed their acceptability to a
native speaker. Each pair contained one word with a low-frequency and another with a
high-frequency tri-syllabic sequence (based on its frequency of occurrence in a
pronouncing dictionary- a reasonable approximation, the author assumes, of a speaker’s
previous language experience). The author’s hypothesis that the more probable a
consonant cluster, the more likely it will be to be judged as acceptable by a native
speaker, was supported, indicating that speakers have statistical knowledge of
phonological structure which is based on their previous experience, and that they use this
knowledge to evaluate novel forms, indicating that such knowledge has a place in their
mental grammars. Vitevich et al. (1997) uses, in an initial experiment, a method similar
to that used in Pierrehumbert (1994), but incorporating stress placement as well as
12

phonotactic probability and asking subjects to rate items on a scale of 1 to 10 with respect
to their acceptability rather than having them pick one item out of a pair. This experiment
was followed up by a second one in which processing times (as measured by recognition
time, the time from the presentation of the stimuli to subjects’ pressing of a button
indicating that they understood it) were measured for the same stimuli. Acceptability was
demonstrated to increase, and processing time to decrease, as phonotactic probability
increased. In addition, then, to indicating that a word’s phonotactic probability, which for
any individual speaker is a function of their previous language experience, has a clear
effect on their intuitions about language, the study also indicated a direct effect on
processing.
The claim that frequency has a direct effect on processing speed (accessibility) is
more directly assessed in Hare et al. (2001), which builds on earlier studies such as
Morton (1969) and Rubenstein et al. (1970), which have indicated that access is faster for
frequent than for infrequent words. Hare et al. extend these relatively uncontroversial
findings to morphologically complex words in two experiments which assess processing
time by having subjects write sentences in which particular verbs occur, and then by
having subjects perform a lexical decision task on a past-tense verb after it has been
primed by its base form (e.g., having been exposed to the sentence ‘Let’s run to the
store’, subjects were timed in deciding whether or not ran is an English word). They
show that not only are irregular verbs subject to frequency effects which ease their
access, but regular verbs are as well, corroborating the usage-based account’s assertion
that the units of use in language are also the units of storage: morphemes which co-occur
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regularly come to be stored together, regardless of whether or not their co-occurrence can
be predicted a by a regular rule (Bybee 1985, 1995).
The third of the three key claims regarding frequency with which this study will be
primarily concerned is that the frequency of a pattern has a direct effect on its
productivity. Studies such as Dabrowska & Szczerbinski (2006), which examined the
effect of several variables on the productivity of genitive, dative, and accusative
inflections of varying stages of diachronic development, Wang & Derwing (1994), which
examined how speakers of English formed the past tense of nonce ablaut verbs, and
others (Baayen & Lieber 1991, Moder 1992) have all lent support to the prediction that
type frequency has the effect of strengthening a pattern/schema, a major factor in causing
the pattern to be more likely to be applied to new items.
The experiments reported in Chapter 5 are based directly on experimental methods
that have demonstrated the role of frequency in affecting how language is stored and
processed, indicating that, at the level of metaphor as at other levels of linguistic
structure, the frequency of a schema causes instantiating tokens to be more acceptable
and accessible to speakers, and the schema itself more productive.
1.1.5 The Network/Exemplar Model
Exemplar Theory is one of a number of theories which have emerged out of psychology
in the last three decades which take as central the view that categories are not discrete
entities, comprising sets defined by criteria of membership, but rather are structured
around a ‘core’ at which resides the best example(s) of the category. Exemplar Theory
(Brooks 1978, Estes 1986, Hintzman 1986, Medin & Edelson 1988, Nosofsky 1986)
differs most notably from prototype theory (Berlin & Kay 1969, Dirven & Taylor 1988,
14

Lakoff 1987b, Rosch 1973), with which it nonetheless shares many of its central
assumptions, in that while prototypically defined categories are structured around a single
central member which may or may not be an actual, experienced instantiation of the
category, categories in the exemplar model are “cloud[s] of remembered tokens of that
category” (Pierrehumbert 2001: 140). All members of a given category correspond to
experienced events, and the group of remembered tokens which has the highest
frequency, and is therefore strongest (with a corresponding effect on productivity), is at
the core of the category.
The theory captures, then, many of the predictions of prototype theory while
providing more explicitly for the role of frequency in mental storage. Graded category
structure is essential to the representation of categories: language users’ mental
representations of phonetic units are considerably more fine-grained than would be
predicted by classical or generative views of categories. Categories are structured around
central members, comprising remembered tokens of use, rather an abstracted prototype.
Multiple best examples exist, falling within a set of parameter values upon which context
has an affect. The core of a category, functionally analogous to a prototype, consists of
those items which have been most reinforced by frequency.
An exemplar model departs from a prototype model in that “all perceived tokens are
categorized and stored, creating categories that directly represent the variation
encountered” (Pierrehumbert 2001, p.51), The gradient nature, then of linguistic
categories, such that a particular segment can have many possible phonetic expressions,
and the internal structure of categories such that certain ranges of parameters correspond
to what individuals deem ‘best’ members of a category, aren’t incidental features of
15

language. They are, rather, natural results of the way in which language is experienced,
perceived, and learned.
In the application of exemplar theory to language processing and storage
(Pierrehumbert 2001, Croft 2007), categories emerge from the repetition of units in the
continuous stream of linguistic data to which we are exposed in daily life—segments,
morphemes, words, and constructions (as well as, it’s argued here, metaphors). For any
given category, those units which are most frequently experienced become strengthened,
with a concomitant increase in productivity for schemata they instantiate, while
infrequently experienced tokens are correspondingly weak.
Several types of evidence have emerged for exemplar representation of the phonetic
shapes of words. Miller (1994) reports a series of experiments that attest to the internal
complexity of phonetic categories. In contrast to studies on categorical perception, which
focus on subjects’ ability to make distinctions between categories, Millers’ experiments
focus on participants’ ‘goodness judgments’ for specific instantiations of phonetic
categories corresponding to phonemes. A core experiment in the series, for example,
presented subjects with syllables containing instantiations of [p], asking subjects to rate
the goodness of each instantiation as an example of /p/. She finds that not only are
participants able to note differences between stimuli within a given category, they exhibit
clear and consistent preferences, choosing certain stimuli as more acceptable than others
based on an acoustic parameter, or on a set of acoustic parameters, relevant to the
category in question (for example, subjects made clear and consistent goodness ratings
for [æ] along the parameter of vowel duration). Millers’ work demonstrates that graded
structure is essential to the representation of phonetic categories, indicating that language
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users’ mental representations of phonetic units are considerably more fine-grained than
would be predicted by generative theories. Her work demonstrates, as well, that
categories are structured around central members, with those examples that participants
label as ‘best’ falling within a narrow window of parameter values, and points as well to
the existence of multiple ‘best’ examples, with the choice dependent on context—for
example, rate of speech affects participants’ judgments as to at what point, along the
parameter of voice onset timing, the best examples of [b] and [p] are located. As the
author notes, however, these findings can be explained with either prototypes or
exemplars.
Bybee (2001) notes several forms of evidence for exemplar representations in the
phonetic shapes of words. An exemplar model departs from a prototype model in that “all
perceived tokens are categorized and stored, creating categories that directly represent the
variation encountered” (2001: 51), and several experimental approaches have directly
supported this claim. K. Johnson (1997), presenting the findings that individuals are able
not only to identify words and utterances when they are uttered by speakers who have
notably different vocalizations, but also to identify the individual voices of these
speakers, argues for the storage of tokens of use, containing information at various levels,
as opposed to storage only of an abstracted category or prototype. Both Palmeri et al.
(1993) and Schacter & Church (1992) indicate that memories for individual tokens of
words are notably strong, as well as persistent across time. All of these approaches
indicate sufficient storage capacity for individual tokens of use (in particular, for these
studies, for words), as well as that such tokens contain information (including phonetic
detail) at various levels: they are not simply ‘filed’ according to an abstracted category or
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prototype, but remembered in full detail. Finally, Pierrehumbert (2001), citing studies
such as Bybee (2000) which point to the direct effect of word frequency on phonological
variables such as deletion, presents the view that the phonetic detail associated with a
word doesn’t arise as a result of phonological rules in articulation. If ‘rules’ are being
applied, with regularity, more frequently to some words than to others, even when the
phonetic environment is the same, then the phonetic forms of words would seem to be
stored along with the word, not derived from rules.
The exemplar model deals with higher order abstractions such as segments and
features as emergent properties of the system. A generative methodology takes what
might be referred to as a ‘top down’ approach, according to which abstractions such as
segments and features are fundamental properties of the system, the organizing units
which individual, experienced tokens of use merely instantiate. An exemplar model, on
the other hand, adopts a ‘bottom up’ approach: at the core of language are tokens of use,
with language as it exists in the world (and therefore, as it is experienced by individuals)
directly bringing about linguistic structure. In phonology, units such as segments,
syllables, and features “emerge from the inherent nature of the organization of gestures
for articulation” (Bybee 2001: 85). In production, language can be reduced to an (in
principle) finite number of articulatory gestures, specific movements of the articulators in
speech. Ohala (1992) describes how the co-occurrence of such gestures, causing an
increase in acoustic effect, can lead to salience. Places in the stream of speech where
gestures co-occur in high numbers correspond to consonants, places where gestures cooccur in low numbers, vowels. The patterning of these units leads to syllable structure,
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and as repeating units corresponding to specific co-occurrences of gestures emerge, so
too do segments.
The exemplar model provides the mechanism by which emergence takes place: every
token of use is stored, its proximity to other tokens determined by its similarity to them.
The strength of an exemplar increases as frequency increases. It is, therefore, those units
which tend to repeat themselves in speech which get stored most effectively, and units of
different sizes (features, segments, syllables, words) emerge as a result of redundant
storage: both relatively smaller and relatively larger units repeat themselves, with smaller
units occurring within larger ones. The gradient nature, then of linguistic categories, such
that a particular segment can have many possible phonetic expressions, and the internal
structure of categories such that certain ranges of parameters correspond to what
individuals deem ‘best’ members of a category, aren’t incidental features of language.
They are, rather, natural results of the way in which language is experienced, perceived,
and learned.
1.1.6 Synthesis: Metaphor and frequency
One of the central assumptions of the field of contemporary metaphor research is that
individual metaphors can exist anywhere along a continuum which runs between highly
innovative metaphors (metaphors which set up a new, and generally ‘one-shot’ mapping
between a source and target domain, e.g., he’s like really expensive paint: he covers
everything) at one end, and highly conventional ones (e.g., he’s a lion, or let the cat out of
the bag) at the other. There are two ways in which a metaphor can be conventional.
First, a metaphor can be conventional at the level of the underlying conceptual
mapping. It is this type of conventionalization on which CMT has focused, elaborating
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families of linguistic metaphors which all instantiate the same underlying (conceptual)
metaphors. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) offer he attacked the weakness of my argument, her
arguments were right on target, and I retreated before her verbal onslaught as examples
of an underlying metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR. The metaphor is conventional not
because any of its linguistic instantiations are especially frequent, but because, Lakoff &
Johnson argue, of the conventionalization of the metaphor itself: for speakers of English,
the terminology of warfare is a default mode for referring to argumentation. The authors
assert that hearers are able to process such utterances with little or no effort relative to
literal speech, which attests to the highly conventional nature of the metaphor.
The second way in which a metaphor can be conventional is at the level of its surface
expression. This type of conventionalization has been the focus of inquiry into
metaphorically motivated idioms (expressions the meaning of which are not wholly
predictable based on knowledge of the individual words which comprise them) such as
let the cat out of the bag or spill the beans. In the case of these examples, there is nothing
especially conventional about the source-domain mappings whereby secrets are
understood (respectively) as cats or as beans. The utterances, themselves, though, are
highly conventionalized, belonging to the canon of set expressions in the language (as
evidenced by their lexical fixedness—precluding, for example, replacing let with allow or
beans with peas).
It is argued here that conventionalization at the level of the underlying metaphor is
the result of type frequency, with any two linguistic metaphors which are predicated on
the same cross-domain mapping being of the same type (see also Clausner & Croft 1997).
Conventionalization at the level of the surface expression corresponds to token
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frequency, a token being a linguistic expression which is predicated on a metaphor. This
assertion opens up for review a body of literature which has, while not directly
addressing frequency, made explicit claims about metaphorical conventionalization and
entrenchment.
Some of the most concrete claims made to date regarding how previous experience
with metaphor directly affects the way that metaphor is stored and processed have come
from psychology. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that metaphorical idioms (such as
‘he spilled the beans’) and so-called ‘formulaic metaphors’ (such as ‘the surgeon is a
butcher’, for which there is a standard interpretation) are processed more rapidly than
innovative metaphors (such ‘the surgeon is a woodworker’, for which there is no standard
interpretation), indicating that repeated exposure streamlines processing (Hoffman 1984)a basic, domain-general frequency effect. The existence of a standard interpretation
suggests repeated prior exposure. Blank (1988), in a study comparing processing speeds
for literal vs. metaphorical speech, compared reaction times for words that completed
sentences with either a literal or metaphorical meaning. The study found longer
processing speeds for metaphorical than literal speech, but also that more familiar
metaphors are processed more quickly than less familiar ones. Gentner & Wolff (1997)
demonstrate that comprehension time for novel metaphors is decreased equally by the
priming of either the source or target term, whereas for conventional metaphors priming
for the source term speeds comprehension more than priming for the target. For the
conventional metaphor a job is a jail, for example, prior exposure to either jail or job
speeds comprehension for the entire metaphor. For Johnny is a rocket, on the other hand,
previous exposure to rocket, with its highly conventionalized figurative meaning
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referring to speed, primed the metaphor as a whole far more effectively than Johnny.
They argue that these results indicate that metaphorical conventionalization arises as
abstractions from source terms are repeatedly projected to target-domain terms, resulting
in source-domain terms taking on easily accessible metaphorical meanings.
An ongoing debate among metaphor researchers has been whether metaphors are
processed as comparisons, with speakers drawing connections between the source and
target in the same way done for comparative statements such as whales are like fish, or
whether metaphors are processed as categories, with speakers processing metaphors by
revising their conception of the source as a category which incorporates the target, in the
same way that is done for a statement like Cheerleaders are athletes. In Bowdle &
Gentner (2005), the claim is advanced that, as a metaphor becomes conventionalized, it
undergoes a processing shift such that while novel metaphors (to Bowdle & Gentner,
metaphors in which a speaker is using a word in such a way as to innovate a new crossdomain connection) are processed as comparisons, increasing entrenchment is
accompanied by a shift towards the processing of metaphors as categorization statements.
Conventionalization, for Bowdle and Gentner, refers strictly to the source term in a
metaphor, which, they assert, takes on a domain-general meaning, prompting processing
via categorization, over time. Their research is limited in its applicability to the current
study by its focus on single metaphors rather than on families of metaphors, and on
source terms as the sole carriers of conventionalized metaphorical meaning. Their
experimental findings, however, that the more conventionalized the metaphorical
meaning of a source term, the more subjects tend to prefer categorization-type
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processing, is directly relevant to, and will be explored within the context of, the view of
metaphor advanced here.
Another highly relevant debate within metaphor research has concerned whether
metaphorically motivated idioms are in fact processed as metaphors, or whether the role
of metaphor is purely historical in acting on idiomatic meanings, with idioms accessed on
a lexical level. Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs 1994, Gibbs et al. 1997, Gibbs & O’Brien
1990), based in large part on a methodology of analyzing experimental subjects’ mental
images for idioms, spearheaded the movement for understanding figurative idioms as
being underpinned by metaphors which, while highly entrenched, are active in on-line
processing. The traditional view to which such research is a reaction (Aitchision 1987,
Cooper 1986, Cruse 1986, Strassler 1982) is that metaphorical idioms are not processed
metaphorically, but are rather linked to stored meanings which are retrieved wholesale
from the lexicon (so that, for example, the meaning of the string ‘let the cat out of the
bag’ is simply stored as ‘reveal a secret’ rather than being motivated by an understanding
of cats as secrets and bags as minds). The metaphor-based view of idioms has found
experimental support more recently in work such as Keysar et al. (2000), which gauges
whether or not metaphors are activated in on-line processing of idioms by seeking a
priming effect from the metaphor, and by Sanford 2008b, which finds a phonological
reduction effect on the main verbs in figurative idioms due to a predictability which
follows from their metaphorical underpinnings. Chapter 3 addresses the metaphorical
status of idioms, arguing that idioms are instances of metaphor which have become
largely independent of the sanctioning schema due to their high token frequency (for
example, the relatively high frequency of ‘let the cat out of the bag’ leads to a degree of
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autonomy from the sanctioning metaphor whereby secrets are understood as entities
being let out of containers).
Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig (1995: 614) make a critical step towards a
frequency-based view of metaphor in suggesting that “conceptual metaphors can provide
a schema-like structure for organizing information about a topic.” Building on Gibbs and
associates’ research on the active role of metaphor in motivating the meaning of common
idioms, they report a series of experiments in which “word and sentence recognition
priming” were used to “assess the degree to which elements of a text representation were
associated with one another in memory” (p. 613). Associations between items related by
a metaphorical schema (and otherwise semantically unrelated) caused subjects to
recognize words and sentences faster when the metaphorical schema motivating their
figurative meaning had been previously activated. Thus, for example, “the sentence
‘Public officials desperately searched for a cure’ would be interpreted as being related to
the Crime is a disease schema when presented after sentences about an increase in crime
… but not if it followed a sentence about police officers contracting pneumonia” (p. 613).
According to this line of research, pre-existing metaphorical schemata are activated by
utterances instantiating the schema, and activation of the schema spreads across the
semantic domains related by the schema. The operation of priming effects across
domains that are semantically related only by a metaphorical mapping (for example,
crime and disease) provides dramatic evidence for schemata that operate across
conceptual domains.
Clausner & Croft (1997), developing the idea of metaphorical cross-domain
mappings as schemata, assert that schematicity, defined by Langacker (1987) as the
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extent to which precision and detail are characterized for a given schema, is an essential
parameter for understanding a given metaphor, and prerequisite to assessing said
metaphor’s productivity. In their application of schemata to metaphor, Clausner & Croft
define a metaphor’s degree of schematicity as “The range of concepts characterized by a
domain mapping schema” (p. 257). The proper statement, then, of the schema which
sanctions a given family of linguistic metaphors will be maximally productive, while
being as specific as possible. Only once schematicity has been assessed can a metaphor’s
productivity—“the proportion of a schema’s range which can be instantiated as
expressions” (p.257), and effectively the range of expressions that can be licensed by the
metaphor (i.e., its type frequency, as per Bybee 1985)—be addressed, a claim in keeping
with Bybee’s (1995) view of a schema’s productivity as dependent on its defining
properties and strength. Individual metaphors can exist anywhere along a continuum of
productivity, marked at one end by Lakovian conceptual metaphors and at the other by
opaque idioms. Clausner & Croft (1997) offer the examples of this argument is sound,
instantiating a conventional evaluation of arguments in terms of structural soundness, and
the opaque kick the bucket, respectively). The gradient productivity of metaphors is
offered as the primary form of evidence for conceptual schema, and for metaphorical
cross-domain mappings as generalizations arising over metaphorical utterances.
Another perspective on the productivity of metaphors comes from Svanlund (2007),
who breaks from CMT in asserting that the conventionality of linguistic metaphors is
properly attributed not to cross-domain mappings, but to words themselves. Lexical
metaphors are metaphors for which a single word carries the metaphorical meaning. The
conventionalization of metaphorical meanings for individual words commonly leads to
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metaphorically motivated polysemy. Deignan (1999a), for example, gives the example of
deep. Svanlund asserts that metaphors, and in particular lexical metaphors, vary in their
strength, that is, their ability to evoke concepts from the source domain.
While a metaphor’s strength is not the same as its degree of conventionalization, he
asserts that a metaphor’s strength is itself a conventionalized property, attached to
individual words at the lexical level. Stressing the social nature of metaphor (as
conventionalized by social behavior) rather than, as CMT does, the bodily, emergent
nature of metaphor (as arising, directly or indirectly, out of embodied experience),
Svanlund gives a metaphor’s degree of conventionalization as a combination of how
widespread it is in a community, and how deeply entrenched it is within an individual’s
mind within the community. Both are assessed using corpus methods, the latter using a
technique of collocational analysis which assumes that a high degree of collocation
between a metaphorical term and other terms from the same source domain—for
example, weigh with scale—corresponds to high degree of activation for the metaphor.
Adding a new layer to the notion of productivity, Svanlund acknowledges that a proper
understanding of a metaphor’s productivity involves both an understanding of the range
of concepts from the source domain that are conventionally mapped to the target, and the
number of linguistic expressions that denote these concepts. He adds, however, that since
words vary in the extent to which they activate concepts from the source domain, this is
itself another important factor in a given metaphor’s productivity. The productivity of a
mapping does not itself dictate a given word’s lexical strength, because different words
sanctioned by the same metaphor can differ in their metaphorical strength.
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Just as metaphor evidences language’s inseparability from more general cognitive
processes—in this case, our ability to draw connections between disparate domains—
metaphor is itself subject to more general cognitive processes such as frequency effects.
The effect of frequency on shaping linguistic structure has the potential to provide
fundamental insight into metaphorical processing and the careers of metaphors if it can
be demonstrated that metaphorical representations are entities upon which frequency
effects operate. Such an approach promises, moreover, both to corroborate and provide
unity for various lines of research that have converged on the conventionality of certain
metaphors, and the effect of such conventionality on processing.
1.2 Conclusion
Bybee (2001: 6) writes that
Experience affects representation. The use of forms and patterns both in
production and perception affects their representation in memory. High- [token]
frequency words and phrases have stronger representations in the sense that they
are more easily accessed and less likely to undergo analogical change. Low[token] frequency words are more difficult to access and may even become so
weak as to be forgotten. The lexical strength of words may change as they are
used more or less in different contexts. Patterns (represented as schemata…) that
apply to more items are also stronger and more accessible, and thus more
productive than those applying to fewer items.
This dissertation asserts that metaphors are such patterns, and as such are subject to
frequency effects. These effects operate on metaphor both at a conceptual level,
pertaining to the source-target mapping itself, and at the level of linguistic realization,
pertaining to individual metaphorically predicated utterances. As claims relating to
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source-target mappings are stronger and have less precedence in the literature, this
dissertation focuses on providing experimental evidence for frequency effects at this
level. Chapter 2 outlines the usage-based approach to metaphor. While it reviews findings
on the entrenchment of metaphorical meanings for idioms, lexical metaphors, and
formulaic metaphors, arguing that each of these is a case of metaphorical meaning being
crystallized due to high token frequency, the focus of Chapter 2 is metaphorical mappings
at the conceptual level. Chapter 3 addresses the conventionalization of metaphorical
meaning in idiomatic expressions, and the interaction of frequency effects at conceptual
and syntactic levels. Chapter 4 addresses the issue of assessing the frequency of
metaphorical mappings, presenting two corpus-based approached to doing so. Chapter 5
presents a series of experiments that assess the claims made in Chapter 2 relating to the
entrenchment of metaphorical schemata overall, testing the hypothesis that the
acceptability, accessibility, and productivity of metaphorical utterances are all, to at least
some extent, determined by the frequency of the schema which they instantiate. An area
of particular inquiry throughout will be the interaction of frequency effects at the level of
conceptual mappings with effects at the level of utterances themselves. It is asserted here
that a usage-based view of language, and the tools of an approach whereby language
processing and storage are seen as driven by frequency effects, provide the best lens for
understanding the properties of metaphor in all of its types.
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Chapter 2: Outline of the Theory
2.0 Introduction
Theories of metaphor which have arisen out of both cognitive linguistics and psychology
have been highly successful in describing important properties of metaphor and
metaphorical systems with respect to conventionalization. It’s striking, however, that
they’ve largely failed to describe the mechanisms motivating such properties. Why does
metaphorical meaning tend to become conventionalized over time? Why do some
metaphors seem to fade over time, so that speakers of a language come to think of
metaphorically motivated senses of a word such as illuminate merely as additional literal
senses? Why do idioms seem to ‘lose touch’ with the metaphors that underlie them
(George Orwell, for example, in the 1946 essay Politics and the English Language,
famously pointed to expressions to such as ring the changes on, take up the cudgel for,
and toe the line as expressions which once vividly evoked a mental image, but are no
longer capable of ‘evocative power’)? Why do metaphors vary in their ‘strength’: their
ability to evoke concepts from the relevant source domain? While many theories of
metaphor have described these properties, a vanishingly small subset attempt to account
for them.
The gap follows from the generative assumption that underlying structures, with selfevident and self-justifying properties, account for the properties of linguistic utterances.
The field of metaphor research, while developing out of the cognitive tradition, has been
largely constrained by a generative approach to thinking about how rules license
expressions. As understood within Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) in particular, the
connection between underlying metaphors and specific, metaphorically predicated
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utterances equates precisely to the connection between competence and performance
(Chomsky 1965, 1980): underlying metaphors are ‘deep’ structures from which the
surface-level properties of metaphor are derived. A primary goal within such research
(Reddy 1979, Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff & Kovecses 1987) is to enumerate the
underlying rules (metaphors) that account for metaphorical utterances that seem like
natural sentences to language researchers, whether or not they are attested in natural
discourse (to take one favorite example of CMT, Her arguments were right on target, as
well as any simple variation thereof with respect to pronoun, number and tense, is
unattested in the 365+-million-word Corpus of Contemporary American English {Davies
2008}). An underlying metaphor, once posited, is ascribed a sort of primacy, such that a
major aspect of inquiry into metaphorical systems is head-scratching over areas where
speakers’ intuitions depart from the posited metaphor (why, for example, if THEORIES
ARE BUILDINGS,

is ‘His ideas have a strong foundation’ acceptable, but ‘His ideas have

many windows’ semantically odd?). Generative approaches stress the unfathomable
number of sentences and meanings that language is capable of expressing. Corpus
methods, however, have given linguists insight into the fact that humans don’t say
anything and everything: they repeat the same things, the same chunks and phrases and
constructions and sequences, over and over again (Renouf & Sinclair 1991, Renouf 1992,
Erman & Warren 2000, Wray & Perkins 2000). The same is true for metaphor. When
corpus methods are brought to bear, the striking feature of metaphor is not the
productivity of conceptual metaphors—far from it. Rather, the same words and
expressions, with the same figurative meanings, are repeated over and over (Sanford
2008a).
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While the approach has yielded countless extremely valuable insights into the nature
of metaphorical systems that can and should inform subsequent iterations of metaphor
theory, such insights have tended towards cataloguing the properties of metaphor, rather
than explaining them. The properties of metaphor and of metaphorical systems are best
understood as emergent phenomena, products of fundamental aspects of human
cognition. Individual metaphors, and their roles within groups of related metaphors, are
best understood as entities that arise out of language in use. And the properties of
metaphor can be not only enumerated, but accounted for, when the facts of language use,
rather than underlying structures, are viewed as basic.
Within this chapter, the reader is presented with the outline for a usage-based view of
metaphor, and the argument is presented that this theory accounts directly for key
properties of metaphor with respect to conventionalization. Other properties of metaphor,
including ‘families’ of metaphors, are not only compatible with this view, but can be
viewed as emergent phenomena, arising out of a view of metaphorical structure as
deriving from usage. This chapter will focus on conceptual, innovative, formulaic, and
lexical metaphors; idiomaticity and idiomatic metaphors are briefly addressed here (in
§2.3.4) but will be given a fuller treatment in Chapter 3. §2.1 lays out a form-based
typology of metaphor, while §2.2 and §2.3 outline, respectively, the usage-based
approach, and how the approach accounts for key features of metaphor.
2.1 A Typology of Metaphor
A staggeringly wide variety of utterances are sanctioned by the term metaphor. The
typology outlined below (in which metaphors, wholly for the purpose of approaching the
relevant phenomena in an orderly fashion, are divided into lexical, idiomatic, formulaic,
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conceptual, and novel members of the category) reflects a useful division in terms of how
the literature on metaphor has tended to divide up the phenomena at hand into
approachable areas of inquiry.
The typology outlined here is a form-based typology. This is in contrast to typologies
based on the nature of the relationship between the source and target domain. A prime
example of the latter is Kovecses’ (2002) division between structural metaphors (in
which target domains are strictly structured according to source domains), ontological
metaphors (which attribute to target concepts little more than status as a thing that has
discrete existence), and orientational metaphors, which make use of basic, embodied
concepts such as up/down to provide coherence to target domains. Typologies such as
these are complementary with form-based typologies like the one offered here, such that
we might discuss, for example, orientational lexical metaphors (e.g., the conventionalized
use of ‘higher’ to mean ‘numerically greater’), or structurally predicated idioms (e.g.,
‘time flies when you’re having fun,’ which depends on TIME IS MOTION for much of its
meaning). The typology outlined here is also quite different from the typology offered in
Sanford 2008a, which is based on the type of target to which attributes, via the metaphor,
are being applied, and which again is complementary at every level with a form-based
typology such as the one presented here.
Absolutely no claim is made as to the naturalness of the categories presented here;
formulaic, lexical, and idiomatic metaphors are, in particular, wholly impossible to
separate on any cognitive or functional criteria. This typology is presented in order to
align this project with terminology used in the extant literature, to outline how different
issues tend to arise with metaphorical utterances of different syntactic types, and to
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structure a discussion of issues with respect to metaphor at varying levels of
conventionalization and entrenchment. Issues related to the dividing line (if, indeed, any
can be said to exist) between metaphorical and non-metaphorical utterances are dealt with
in §s 2.3.6 and 4.2.2.
Examples used in this section are taken from either the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA) (Davies 2008), with the citation providing the year and file
name, or from Parts I and II of the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English
(SBCSAE) (DuBois 2000, DuBois et al. 2003), in which case the citation provides a
transcript and line number. All examples not accompanied by a corpus citation are
contrived, unless otherwise indicated.
2.1.1 Lexical Metaphor
Lexical Metaphor refers to metaphorical meanings which are carried by individual words.
Typically, this metaphorical meaning is highly conventional for the word in question. The
following sentences all contain examples of lexical metaphor, the lexical metaphor itself
appearing in italics2:
(1) Whoa- that’s deep.
COCA 2003, ‘Crime Spree’

(2) She’s hot.
COCA 2007, ‘Brooklyn Bar Serves Opera on Tap’

(3) Who could doubt a sweet little old lady?
COCA 1996, ‘The Deep End of the Ocean’

2

In example 1, the speaker is responding to the preceding line, “Although a cartoon I feel

he shares a universal theme: We are all searching for love. No?” Deep is in the sense of
‘philosophical’, or ‘emotionally truthful’.
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Lexical metaphor, based on the notion of the metaphorical use of individual words, is a
somewhat artificial category, from a perspective on language that admits units larger than
the word into the lexicon (which is done by most any model, if grudgingly, at least in the
case of certain idioms): what is the special status of words, when meaning is directly
attached to linguistic form at levels both above and below that of individual words? Gray
areas emerge quickly in other ways, as well: are there one, or two lexical metaphors
contained in the sentence, uttered of an attractive woman, She’s painfully hot? In
shoulder the burden, is shoulder a lexical metaphor, or just a portion of an idiom?
The distinction, if theoretically fuzzy, has been extremely useful for corpus work on
metaphor, as individual words are so eminently searchable. Studies that look at all
occurrences of a particular word in a corpus (see Deignan 1999a on deep, Tissari 2001 on
love, and Musolff 2004 on heart, for example) are able to look at the relationship
between metaphorical and literal meanings of a word, as well as at the overall distribution
of metaphorical uses. Like drilling a core out of a glacier, the approach can easily miss
something important, but it provides a precise and focused insight into a metaphorical
system.
2.1.2 Idiom
The most commonly accepted definition of an idiom is that it’s an expression with a set
meaning, that doesn’t follow the rules of compositionality: knowing the meaning of all
the elements in it, and knowing the rules of how those elements combine, won’t get you
the overall meaning of the expression. Core examples of idiom include expressions such
as the following (italics added):
(4) All right, so Jack had jumped the gun a little, buying this thing.
COCA 2008, ‘Just Breathe’
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(5) Each time you think you’ve got one thing figured out, they throw you a curveball.
COCA 2002, ‘Rebranding the Hyena’

(6) It’s raining cats and dogs out there, tonight.
COCA 2007, ‘Guy in the Sky’

(7) But that’s neither here nor there.
COCA 2009, ‘Evie Ever After’

(8) …she was going to blow the whistle on him to the state medical board.
COCA 2006, ‘Kill all Lawyers’

For all of the examples above, a speaker of English who had been previously exposed
to all of the constituent words, but never to the overall expression, would interpret the
utterance literally- and, therefore, incorrectly.
Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow (1994) make the critical observation that idioms are a
prototypically defined category: there is no criterion or set of criteria by which a given
utterance can be included or excluded from the category (see also Erman & Warren 2000,
Wray & Perkins 2000). Idiomaticity, rather, is a continuous variable, measured along,
they propose, six parameters, no single one of which need necessarily be satisfied in
order for a given utterance to be considered idiomatic.
1) Conventionality:
The overall meaning of the expression is ‘set’. The gestalt meaning of the
expression is not, or at least not entirely, formed by combining the constituent
syntactic and semantic elements. There is, rather, a conventional interpretation for
the expression as a whole. Examples (4) through (8) above all exemplify a high
degree of conventionality; items low in conventionality are almost unequivocally
non-idiomatic.
2) Inflexibility:
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An idiomatic expression tends to bear, with its meaning intact, little syntactic
alteration. Consider the alternations in the following idiomatic expressions:
(9) He let the cat out of the bag.
COCA 1995, ‘Discussion of a politically correct comic book on The Lone Ranger and Tonto’

(9a)

The cat was let out of the bag by him.

(9b)

He let the cats out of the bag.

(9c)

He let the dog out of the bag.

(10) …the West Germans took the bull by the horns, changed the currency and
stabilized the economy.
COCA 1990, ‘Economic Forecasts’

(10a) The West Germans will have taken the bull by the horns.
(10b) The West Germans took the elk by the antlers.
(11)

People seem to be having second thoughts.
COCA 2008, ‘(NEWS BREAK) # GIGOT: We're back with more on the Illinois corruption
scandal’

(11a) People seem to be owning second thoughts.
(11b) People seem to be having third thoughts.
(12)

She kicked the bucket.
COCA 1997, ‘The Barn’

(12a) She kicked the buckets.
(12b) The bucket was kicked by her.
In each set, changes such as passivization, word substitution, or number/tense
alternation leave an utterance strange-sounding, non-sensical, or simply nonidiomatic.
Idiomatic expressions are, in fact, so fixed that they stay the same even as the
language changes around them. Thus dint, and chink, despite having largely
dropped out of everyday use for speakers of English, remain in the expressions
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Chink in one’s armor and by dint of. The issue plays out in interesting ways with
respect to figuration- if the literal meaning of muster, for example, is lost to the
typical speaker of English, then muster up the courage can’t be considered
metaphorical- a metaphor, after all, needs a literal basis.
3) Figuration
There is some figurative connection between the expression’s literal and
figurative meanings. This connection could be metaphorical (as in Take the bull
by the horns or she’s fishing for information), but it need not be: She has me
pulling my hair out and I’m scared stiff, for example, depend on hyperbole, rather
than metaphor.
4) Proverbiality
Idioms tend to describe some salient aspect of life, a recurrent situation of
particular social interest: for example, telling a secret (spill the beans, let the cat
out of the bag) or getting married (tie the knot, get hitched)3. Most interestingly,
idioms inherently reflect and shape our conceptualizations of these situations.
They also, inherently, explain these situations, either shaping or reflecting (or
both) how we view them: beans, once spilled, aren’t easy to get back into a

3

For this reason, idioms are commonly used for purposes of euphemism and

dysphemism, which provide agreeable and disagreeable (respectively) ways for talking
around topics of recurring social interest which are also taboo: sexuality, for example, or
bodily functions.
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container. When one gets hitched, one loses ones power of independent
movement.
5) Informality
Generally, idioms have a high association with informal speech registers.
Nunberg, Sag & Wasow assert that one is likelier to say something like talk about
beating a dead horse in causal speech with friends than, say, in a job interview, or
in speaking to one’s partner’s parents.
6) Affect
Affect ties in with proverbiality, and in particular with how social acts get
conceptualized via idioms: an idiom generally takes a certain evaluative stance
towards the thing that it’s describing. Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow assert that those
things we feel relatively neutral about, we’ll usually describe literally- buying
tickets, or reading a book, for example. Situations towards which we have strong
feelings (getting married, lying, telling secrets, exerting control, scenarios
involving authority, etc.) tend to be those things that we prefer to use idiom to
describe.
A certain expression might be not at all proverbial or informal, but because it has a high
degree of both conventionality and inflexibility, it remains a good example of an idiom. If
all of these parameters apply to a great degree, then it’s a prototypical idiom. The fewer
that apply, and the lesser the degree to which each applies, the more peripheral it is (for
example, tax and spend and right to life, which are high in conventionality and
inflexibility but low in figuration, or render unto Caesar and Procrustean bed, which are
high in proverbiality and affect, but also high in formality).
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Nunberg, Sag & Wasow point out that prototypical idioms also tend to involve
transitive verbs, generally taking the form Verb + argument (thus, e.g., spill the beans, let
the cat out of the bag, crack the whip, etc.). The authors note that research on idioms
tends to focus on these to the exclusion of non-phrasal idioms such as smoking gun, red
herring, and pain in the neck. These last examples point, as well, to the fact that there is
no clear line between idiomatic and lexical metaphors: each of the above functions
essentially as a nominal with a set metaphorical meaning. Issues pertaining to the
organization of this dissertation aside, there’s no reason to expect any particular utterance
to fall neatly into one category or another.
2.1.3 Formulaic Metaphor
The term ‘formulaic metaphor’ is generally used to refer to metaphors that have a highly
conventional interpretation, and almost invariably to metaphors of the form ‘x is y’. Their
overall meaning draws not from the wide range of possibilities for meaning that arise
when a source is applied to a target, but rather a single, narrow interpretation. Take the
following examples:
(13)

Men are dogs.
COCA 2009, ‘Aussie Rules’

(14)

For a boy she’s kind of cute, but for a girl she’s a dog.
COCA 2000, ‘Fiction Crushed’

(15)

She’s a fox.
COCA 2009, ‘Star Tracks’

(16)

That surgeon is a butcher.
(Turner & Fauconnier 2002)

Of all of the possible attributes of dogs that the first could be being attributed to men in
example (13)—loyalty, a keen sense of smell, hairiness—it’s strictly a dog’s sense of
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selfish opportunism that makes the transfer across domains. We cannot attribute this
strictly to a single conventionalized metaphorical meaning associated with dog: in
example (14), an entirely different aspect of dogs—their lack, by human standards, of
physical attractiveness—is highlighted. (14) and (15) provide another interesting and
surprising contrast: the set of possible interpretations for the two utterances overlap to
high degree, and yet in practice, the interpretations to which any native speaker of
English will leap are precisely opposite. It appears to be the case, for such expressions,
that their conventionalized meaning isn’t linked strictly to the source domain term, as in
lexical metaphors, but rather to the overall mapping.
In many cases, the meaning of such expressions is highly contrary to what might be
expected. Turner & Fauconnier (2002) note, of example (16), that while butcher is a
specialized profession and that a particular butcher (just like a particular surgeon) might
fall anywhere on a scale from incompetent to highly skilled, the surgeon in the example is
clearly being called incompetent. Turner & Fauconnier argue that such examples show
the weakness of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in treating all metaphorical mappings as
applying the systematicity of a given source domain to target domain: here, the blend of
two domains gives rise to an idiosyncratic interpretation without clear precedent in either
of the two contributing domains.
2.1.4 Conceptual Metaphor
Conceptual Metaphor, outlined in §1.1.1, was originally advanced in Lakoff & Johnson
1980. Included here for the sake of terminological clarity, conceptual metaphor does not
refer to a type of utterance, but rather to an underlying metaphor that sanctions any
number of actual utterances. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, for example, is a conceptual metaphor.
40

Each of the following examples (drawn from Lakoff & Johnson 1980) instantiates the
metaphor.
(17)

We’re just starting out together.

(18)

We’ve decided to go our separate ways.

(19)

We’ve come so far- we can’t turn back now.

2.1.5 Novel Metaphor
Metaphors can be innovative in one of two ways: they can explore a new aspect of an
existing source-target mapping, or they can posit an altogether novel connection between
domains. Both forms are highly valued in the domains of wit and wordplay, as well as in
literature (where, indeed, formulaic, lexical, and idiomatic metaphor tend to be
denigrated as cliché). Consider the following examples:
(20)

He was like a little Australian sheepdog, running around.
SBCSAE Text 6, lines 794-799

(21)

Those tables are museums, could you please, chill out in the uh, art work
here.
SBCSAE Text 6, lines 523-527

(22)

Human nature does not possess free will. It is like a horse. Ridden by God
or the Devil. The rider possesses the will. The horse obeys.
SBCSAE Text 25, lines 175-183

Example (20), spoken by a woman who is making fun of her male partner for flirting
with other women, is a novel instantiation of a well-established conceptual metaphor:
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS

(which, as Kovecses 2002 points out, tends to constrain

interpretations towards negative characteristics of the animal used as a source). Here, the
specific equation of a man to a ‘little Australian sheepdog, running around’ suits perfectly
the particular, current discourse needs of the speaker: to portray her partner’s flirting in a
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rather undignified light. Its participation in a well-established metaphor, however, means
that it’s easily interpretable by other participants in the conversation, needing little set-up.
Examples (21) and (22), on the other hand, are wholly one-shot mappings,
constructed on the fly for the purposes for the current conversational topic. (21), spoken
by a parent to an overly rambunctious child, represents a clever bit of wordplay on the
part of a speaker who uses the first clause to set up the second. (22) is a more extended
metaphor, a simile which is then elaborated in several ways.
In some cases, of course, one-shot mappings catch on and become established
metaphors. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the first citation of ‘virus’ in the
computing sense, from a 1984 article on computer security, as following (virus n. 2d. In
Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from
http://dictionary.oed.com):
(23)We define a computer ‘virus’ as a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by
modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself.
From this point (or from whatever the initial coinage was), the metaphor propagated
across speech registers and discourse communities to become, eventually, the default
mode for speaking of malicious software. Not only are the quotation marks no longer
necessary, but the metaphor has in fact become so pervasive and automatic that it’s
generally used with little if any awareness of its metaphorical status—an extremely
common process in language change.
From the perspective of on-line processing, little (if anything) separates a lexical
metaphor from an idiom, no boundary separates either from formulaic metaphors, and the
difference between novel and conventionalized metaphors is one of degree, not kind.
There is an association, however, between each of the categories above, and certain
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properties of metaphor, such that a complete theory of metaphor must, in order to account
for the phenomena at hand, account for each type of metaphor. The sections that follow
will refer repeatedly to the typology provided here, as various aspects of metaphor in
language are explained as emerging from a usage-based model.
2.2 Conventionalization, Entrenchment, and Metaphorical Systems
Schemata are defined by Langacker (1987, 1988) as abstractions over semantic,
phonological, or otherwise symbolic units, which can in turn sanction specific
instantiations of the schema (as, for example, the word tip instantiates the phonological
CVC schema). Bybee (1995) defines schemata as “emergent generalizations” over
“[forms] having similar patterns of semantic and phonological connections” (p. 430).
Schemata form over units that tend to both co-occur and re-occur, with items that
consistently occur alongside one another emerging, via repetition, as salient units of
speech and in turn as the stored units of language.
In the application of a schema-based view to metaphor, the units which co-occur are
domains of thought corresponding to Lakovian conceptual domains, which emerge from
categories of experience. These units are semantic, as opposed to phonological,
morphological, or syntactic, and the co-occurrence is simultaneous rather than sequential
(as in the common co-occurrence of do not or going to). They are no less governed than
schemata at other levels, however, by principles whereby frequency affects storage.
Speakers, as they engage in language in any mode, encounter linguistic metaphors.
As metaphors are encountered, each individual token of use encountered is stored. Figure
2.2.1 is a representation of the sum of stored linguistic metaphor tokens for a hypothetical
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speaker of English who, prior to reading §2.1 of this dissertation, had never before been
exposed to metaphor4.

Figure 2.2.1
Linguistic Metaphor Tokens

As tokens accumulate, they are stored on the basis of similarities with other items.
Based on similarities between lexical metaphors, then, ‘clouds’ of stored tokens begin to
4

Note that Figure 2.2.1 presents each item as being stored separately, with no

connections to other items. This is a convenience in demonstrating the process, and
should not be taken to imply a processing stage in which token of use are stored, but not
yet connected to other items. In practice, each token of use is attached to (and affects)
representations at multiple levels as it is encountered.
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develop, as similar items are stored in close proximity to one another within the
conceptual space. Utterances can be similar to one another in many ways, and it’s unclear
that any possible parameter can be excluded here. The most relevant types of similarity
for metaphor, however, seem to be semantic (based on categorizations of the source
domain and categorizations of the target domain) and syntactic (based on the surface
form, in terms of constituent elements, of the expression itself). Similarity judgments
forming along one parameter in no way exclude categorizations forming along another
with the resulting categorizations (and, eventually, schemata) being highly redundant.
Figure 2.2.2 indicates categorizations, over the tokens of use encountered in Figure 2.2.1,
along semantic similarities. At the same time, as we shall see, categorizations are also
made over syntactic similarities (see Figure 2.3.4, below).
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Figure 2.2.2
Categorizations based on Semantic Similarity
A.
utterances referring to people
B.
utterances based on animals
C.
utterances based on animals and referring to people
D.
utterances referring to relationships

C, it should be noted, is here effectively the set of items that are common to A and B.
This should not be taken to imply a hierarchical organization, such that C is a special case
of either A or B, or that in on-line processing C is a function of logical operations upon A
and B. Rather, items are added to each category independently (and redundantly).
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Schemata form as speakers, within categorizations, make connections over individual
tokens of use5.

Figure 2.2.3
Conceptual schema: PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS

Figure 2.2.3 shows a schema emerging over the categorization shown in Figure
2.2.2(C), in which humans are being equated to animals. Based on semantic properties in
common to all items within the cluster of tokens, the speaker generalizes a pattern6.

5

The system for diagramming schemata as connections over tokens of use is borrowed

from Bybee (1985, 2001).
6

The number of distinct tokens necessary for a schema to form is an open empirical

question, and the presentation of §2.2 should not be taken as implying that (for any given
x) x tokens accumulate within a category before a schema can be formed. Once a schema
does emerge, subsequent tokens are linked to the schema.
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Tokens are analyzed based on the schema, with specific elements in the clause being
equated to one of the two semantic elements7.
At this stage, a cross-domain domain mapping has effectively formed. Further tokens
of utterances equating people to animals will be analyzed according to the schema, each
iteration strengthening the schema as its type frequency increases. In proportion to the
strength of the schema, new tokens’ semantic acceptability will be judged according to
their semantic proximity to, as well as the strength of, the prototype, and processed more
quickly than items not sanctioned by a schema or sanctioned by a less entrenched schema
(Pierrehumbert 1994, Vitevich et al. 1997, Hare et al. 2001, Bybee & Eddington 2006,
Wilson 2009). Most critically, the schema becomes a template for creating new
utterances. Speakers referring to given topics metaphorically are likely to choose source
terms based on the relative strengths of attested metaphorical schemata that involve the
target. Within a speech community, other language users will have encountered the
pattern at similar levels of frequency, and a metaphorical utterance produced based on a
schema deeply entrenched for a speaker is likely to be deemed semantically acceptable,
and interpreted with ease, by a listener for whom the schema is similarly entrenched. At
the point that such a schema has become entrenched across many speakers, and pervasive
within a speech community, a Lakovian Conceptual Metaphor has essentially formed
(here, PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS). Critically, however, the direction of causation is precisely
7

An explicit comparison need not be made on order to serve as a basis for similarity

comparison, as it’s not words that generalizations form over, but domains. In the horse
obeys, from example (22), people are described as horses implicitly. A comparison of
horses to people is made nonetheless.
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the reverse of what is proposed in Conceptual Metaphor Theory: in the account outlined
here, conceptual metaphors are accounted for, rather than merely proposed8.
Instantiations don’t just follow from underlying conceptual metaphors, they are, rather,
integral to the process by which such mappings arise.

8

The model outlined here takes the perspective of an individual language user, with a

history of use of the language developed through exposure to tokens of use. Schemata at
all levels, including conceptual, form as language users make generalizations over
recurring patterns. A metaphor can’t be property said to exist until a schema such as the
one in Figure 2.2.3 has emerged, but in that case, what metaphor motivated she’s a dog or
the horse obeys in the act of language use to which our speaker was exposed? Another
schema, in another language user’s mind. Every speaker recreates the language anew,
based on exposure to the language: the only option, unless language is to be treated as an
abstract system rather than as a being rooted in the mind of an individual.
It does seem worthwhile, however, to point out that from a diachronic perspective,
there is a chicken-or-the-egg question to be addressed: there must have been some
original emergence of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS (or of any other schema). But how it could
it arise, when there were no utterances for it to form over? There are two options: the first
is that a schema can emerge due to reanalysis of tokens of other schemata. The other is
that analogical reasoning can and does create wholly novel metaphorical utterances
(although existing schemata will some play a role in determining its acceptability), over
which schemata then form.
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2.3 Properties of Metaphor
§2.3 looks at key properties of metaphor and of metaphorical systems, accounting for
how these properties are accounted for in a usage-based approach.
2.3.1 Idiosyncratic Interpretations, Autonomy
A metaphorical schema, once formed, is not a static entity. Frequency effects are ongoing, and metaphorical schemata differ from one another in strength (as the experiments
outlined in Chapter 5 will demonstrate) by virtue of speakers’ continued exposure to
language, and to tokens that instantiate different schemata. Moreover, frequency effects
have an on-going effect on the internal complexity of a schema. The frequency of
instances of a schema can lead to their entrenching away from the sanctioning schema
overall, taking on properties not associated with the more general schema—as Bybee
(2001: 125) notes, the “frequency of a form weakens associations with other forms.” A
particular linguistic form can, by virtue of its high token frequency, become entrenched
in its own right, losing connections to other forms sanctioned by a particular schema and
acquiring a degree of autonomy (Bybee 1995, Hay & Baayen 2002).
Autonomy goes hand-in-hand with the reassignment of constituent structure that
accompanies high-frequency items. Repetition conditions chunking: elements that
consistently co-occur develop, over time, constituent structure (Haiman 1994) such that
the reoccurring string becomes a unit of use and storage. In a network model, schemata
form over connections (semantic, phonetic and syntactic) between utterances, on the
basis of shared or similar elements. As a form develops constituency due to the effect of
chunking, internal elements contribute less to the overall meaning of the expression, and
become less salient. As items internal to a frequent collocation come to participate less
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and less in the overall meaning of an expression (accompanied, in many cases, by
phonological reduction), high-frequency connections lose the basis upon which
connections to similar forms are made (Bybee & Scheibman 1999, Beckner & Bybee
2009). Connections to other instances of the schema fade, a direct processing route forms,
and the form takes on properties not consistent with the schema in which it once
participated (or once participated in to a greater extent). Bybee & Scheibman (1999) note
the effect with the high-frequency collocation be supposed to, which has taken on a
function and meaning increasingly distinct from other forms containing supposed.
We see the effect in an example such as men are dogs. Dog, used as a source term
applied to men, has a conventionalized meaning of sexual promiscuity and lack of
loyalty. This departs notably from what might be expected as an interpretation for the
metaphor. For a speaker of American English who participates in the common culturally
shared conception of dogs as loyal companions, and who has a fully formed schema for
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS

whereby salient traits of animals are applied to humans, the most

intuitive interpretation of men are dogs would be that men are loyal, steadfast
companions: the inverse of the meaning intended here. On the other hand, she’s a dog has
the specific meaning that the woman referred to is physically unattractive. She’s a fox
means the opposite. Even within the tendency for PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS to profile
negative aspects of animals (and therefore of people) —a feature of the schema, emerging
over tokens such as those cited here —the interpretation for each example is
unpredictable. In each case, the frequency of the specific form (dog and fox) as used in
reference to a particular target has caused the form’s connection to other, related forms to
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weaken, and its particular representation to become strengthened, such that the
interpretation for the form in question is largely idiosyncratic.
Note that it makes little difference whether these examples are described as lexical
metaphors or formulaic metaphors. All three examples look, on the surface, like textbook
lexical metaphors, with a single word carrying a set figurative meaning. The contrast
between men are dogs and she’s a dog, on the other hand, suggests that both are more
akin to the surgeon is a butcher, with a set interpretation arising out of the application of
a particular source domain term to a particular target term. All cases are analyzed as
particular forms abstracting away from the sanctioning conceptual schema, such that they
take on a degree of autonomy.
2.3.2 Lexical Strength
Here, in the notion of autonomy, we find accounted for the idea of a metaphor’s lexical
strength. Svanlund (2007), as outlined in §1.1.6, notes that the ability of particular words
to evoke concepts from a source domain is not wholly dependent on the strength of
overall cross-domain mappings. The conventional figurative meanings of lexical
metaphors, Svanlund asserts, tend to be associated more with individual words than with
the underlying Conceptual Metaphors. Metaphor is conventionalized at the level of broad
cross-domain mappings, in the form of schemata that emerge as abstractions over similar
utterances. Individual words, however, can, by virtue of the frequency with which they
are used to refer to given targets, entrench away from schemata in which they participate.
As a result, the conventionalized metaphorical meaning of an individual word increases
inversely to its connection with the schema overall, such that when a given word has a
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fixed figurative meaning it may or may not be predictable based on the cross-domain
mapping overall.
Over time, as a word is used with a certain figurative meaning (or meanings), the
particular mapping evoked by the word takes on a degree of autonomy from the
sanctioning schema. At this point, the figurative interpretation for a word can become
highly idiosyncratic, and difficult to predict based on the sanctioning schema. In the dog
examples above, for example, two specific mappings that make use of the word dog as a
source term are entrenched independently of the overall schema PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, as
well as of the narrower schema PEOPLE ARE DOGS.
On the other hand, however, even extremely entrenched figurative meanings for
individual words can remain highly consistent with schematic metaphorical mappings in
which they participate. Sweetser (1990), for example, points out an overall pattern in
semantic shift for words with a base meaning rooted in sight and vision, motivated by a
metaphor whereby understanding a thing is conceptualized as being able to see it clearly
(corresponding, in CMT, to IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS): point of view, crystal clear,
illuminate, transparent, opaque, muddy, clear-sighted, bright, brilliant: all have highly
entrenched figurative meanings motivated by the above conceptual metaphor. In the case
of each of these, entrenchment doesn’t seem to have led the particular aspect of the
mapping instantiated by the word too far astray for the metaphorical mapping overall. On
the other hand, the high degree of entrenchment for the representations whereby these
words are equated to set metaphorical meanings is itself indicated by the fact that these
are ‘go-to’ words for evoking the overall mapping: while other words and phrases from
the source domain (e.g., ‘shine a light on’ or ‘invisible’) are likely to be interpreted,
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based on the strength of the overall schema, in a way consistent with the IDEAS ARE
PERCEPTIONS mapping,

the frequency with which terms like illuminate are selected leads

to their being entrenched as the default terminology for evoking sight to describe thought.
Thus, as the metaphorical use of a word becomes conventionalized, the particular
figurative meaning of the word gains in strength relative to the metaphor that licenses the
overall mapping9. This idea has a clear correlate elsewhere as well.
2.3.3 The Career of Metaphor
The Career of Metaphor Hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner 2005) asserts that when speakers
are exposed to novel metaphorical utterances, they process them as comparisons: the
listener draws analogical connections between the source and target domain, drawing
inferences based on a comparison of the structure of the source to the target, and
interprets the source term in the context of the target by mapping the relevant structure
from the source onto the target. As the metaphorical use of a word becomes
conventionalized, however, processing shifts away from comparison, and towards

9

The issue invites the question of whether, for some highly entrenched figurative

meanings for words and constructions, there is any connection whatsoever to the broader
metaphorical schema that originally motivated the figurative meaning of the word. The
question of whether autonomy can be absolute (even to the point that metaphorical
motivations can’t be reconstructed), and if so at what point this can be said to occur, is an
important one, and a major direction for future research. The finding that metaphorical
autonomy can indeed be complete would mirror findings at other levels of linguistic
structure.
54

categorization. The concept that is drawn from the base is generalized to form a new
category, based on traits common to both the literal and figurative meanings of the term.
At this stage, the term in question has taken on a set figurative meaning, at the core of the
newly constructed category.
Thus, an utterance of men are dogs would prompt, for a listener who had never been
previously exposed to it, an attempt to use analogical reasoning to map the relevant
feature of dogs onto men. A listener who had a sufficiently high amount of previous
exposure to the metaphor, however, would have constructed a category over the
subordinate categories MEN and DOGS, characterized by an abstract structure common to
both (OPPORTUNISTS?). This figurative meaning of dog is the prototype of the abstract
category.
Bowdle & Genter (2005) test this hypothesis in the context of the assumption that the
grammatical form of similes (x is like y) and metaphors (x is y) is intimately connected
with how each is processed: similes, which look like literal comparison statements, bias
processing towards a comparison of attributes, metaphors towards categorization. The
first of two experiments they conduct demonstrates that, for sentences containing
figurative uses of a word, participants tend to prefer phrasing the sentence as a simile
when the figurative use is novel, and as a metaphor when the figurative is conventional.
The second indicates that novel figurative uses of a word are processed more rapidly in
simile form, conventional uses in metaphor form.
The predictions made by the Career of Metaphor Hypothesis, with respect to
processing for novel and conventional figurative uses of a word, align precisely with
those of the schema-based approach, and the two theories are wholly consistent with one
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another. A listener exposed to a novel figurative use of a word will align (based on the
target being referenced and the source being drawn upon) the use of the word with the
most appropriate metaphorical schema, based on semantic proximity to relevant
schemata. The word is then interpreted within the context of the cross-domain mapping
licensed by the schema selected, with multiple competing interpretations at hand. A
speaker exposed to, for example, a comparison of a woman to an otter would find PEOPLE
ARE ANIMALS

the most proximate schema, but within the schema would still be faced

with any number of possible interpretations (She’s clever? She’s a strong swimmer? She
has a sleek coat?).
For a conventionalized usage, however, the listener doesn’t need to refer to the
overall mapping to interpret the word, as a figurative meaning is entrenched for the word
itself. The overall schema is activated, and interpretation of the word may or may not be
wholly consistent with the schema overall. The word can be reanalyzed on the basis of
the schema if context suggests that such is necessary. But the most rapid route to
processing is via the representation for the figurative meaning attached to the word itself.
Exposed to example 15, she’s a fox, interpretation according to the conventionalized
figurative interpretation involving physical attractiveness is the default. Context,
however, can prompt reanalysis based on PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS (e.g., I can’t imagine
how she got out of that situation- she’s a fox).
Critical support for the role of frequency in affecting how metaphorical uses of words
are processed was garnered in a follow-up experiment also reported in Bowdle & Gentner
(2005). Repeating a design similar to the first experiment, the follow-up preceded the
sentence-form preference portion of the experiment with an initial phase that exposed
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subjects to figurative uses of the relevant source terms, such that the initial phase
produced, artificially, conventionalization for the figurative uses of the source terms. The
results of the first experiment were reproduced, with conventionalization produced by
repeated exposure. Conventionalization is here aligned with repeated exposure to—which
is to say, the frequency of— the form being used with a given metaphorical meaning.
2.3.4 Idiomaticity
At the same time that categorizations form based on semantic similarities, they also form
over syntactic, form-based ones—in the figure that follows, based on the occurrence of
the copula, like, or a transitive verb:
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Figure 2.3.4
Categorizations based on Syntactic Similarity
A. [ N] is [N]
B. [N] is like [N]
C. [N] [transitive V] [N]

Schemata arising over such categories are fundamentally objects of syntactic
representation: they specify a template for a construction in the form of positions that are
filled with a set word, or a member of a set class of words. Syntactic schemata (Barlow &
Kemmer 1994, Goldberg 1995, 2006, Taylor 1998, Croft 2001) also, however, contain
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semantic and pragmatic information. Constructions bear an overall meaning that puts
constituent elements into set semantic roles, and are accompanied by constraints on
usage. As §2.3.3 outlines, the schema arising over both items in A and over literal
categorization statements has a strong association with conventionalized mappings, the
schema over B and literal comparison statements with innovative, novel ones.
Where a specific mapping becomes partially or wholly autonomous, taking on
conventionalized properties that are not predictable based on the overall conceptual
schema that forms over the mapping, it often does so in the context of a set expression.
Blow the whistle on x, for example, participates in a broad conceptual schema whereby
perceptual saliency is conceptualized in terms of audibility (that’s a loud tie, that outfit
screams ‘available’), but has a specific meaning of revealing a wrongdoer that isn’t
wholly derivable from the broader schema. Alongside the semantic idiosyncracy comes
syntactic inflexibility: while limited operations on blow the whistle in terms of tense are
allowed, the words must occur in a fixed order with no intervening elements, and there
are strict restrictions on the preceding and following word10. The effect reflects what has
been described by Company Company (2006) as the “cancellation of syntax” (p. 97),
whereby, due to the role of frequency in shaping syntactic structure, subjective
expressions can lose, over time, their normal syntactic capacities (see also Travis 2006).
All of the items in 2.3.4(C) are participants in a broad schema with the abstract form
[N] [transitive V] [N]. Jump

10

the gun and blow the whistle, while each representing in itself a

The alternate form whistle blower is most certainly related to the blow the whistle on

x—but is itself another entrenched, relatively inflexible expression.
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fixed construction, also exemplifies a sub-schema that has close associations with idiom:
[V] the (adj) [N] (e.g., spill the beans, hit the ceiling, blow the lid off, etc.).
In a connectionist model, schemata (at least until they become autonomous) operate
as activation networks (McClelland & Elman 1984, Carr & Thompson 1996). Any
instantiation of a schema, once formed, triggers activation of the schema overall. The
intersection of metaphorical and syntactic schema means that a single utterance (such as
blow the whistle) can activate both a cross-domain mapping (PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE IS
AUDIBILITY)

and constructional pattern ([V] the (adj) [N]). Metaphorically motivated

idiom is essentially the class of utterances that activates both a narrow, highly
autonomous cross-domain mapping and a highly fixed syntactic construction—an
argument elaborated in Chapter 3.
2.3.5 Families of Metaphor, Internal Structure of Mappings
A principal feature of CMT is that conceptual metaphors form families of related
metaphors, with the structure of a source domain providing a coherent way of
conceptualizing the target domain. A cross-domain mapping sanctions the use of
concepts and terminology from one domain to describe parallel, if more abstract, ideas in
the target. Critically, such mappings are uneven in how they draw on the source: in
practice, linguistic metaphors don’t generally sample terminology and concepts evenly
from the domain, but rather draw repeatedly on particular items11.
11

The impression of unevenness in how a metaphor samples a source domain can also

arise as a result of how broadly a source-target mapping is interpreted, or directly from
the misstatement of a metaphor’s range. Clausner & Croft (1997), for example, argue that
THE CONVINCINGNESS OF AN ARGUMENT IS THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF A
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One reason for this is the entrenchment of set metaphorical meanings in particular
words and phrases. The repeated use of a word or construction to evoke a particular
aspect of a source domain causes the form in question to take on a degree of autonomy
from the sanctioning schema, in the sense that the entrenchment of the form itself is
accompanied by a concomitant weakening of the form’s connection to the metaphorical
schema governing the mapping. The entrenched form takes on a relatively fixed
figurative interpretation. The stronger the representation for the entrenched form, the
more accessible it becomes, and the likelier a speaker is to choose it when selecting a
vehicle term from the source domain. We see the end result in a word like illuminate,
upon which frequency effects have operated to create a default term for evoking the
source domain PERCEPTION in reference to IDEAS. We can contrast illuminate with
brighten, which has a roughly equivalent literal meaning, but doesn’t carry the same
automatic metaphorical meaning of ‘cause to understand’. Illuminate participates in the
schema IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS, but has a highly fixed and idiosyncratic interpretation
within that schema (hypothesized here to be a function of the high token frequency of its
use in reference to perceptions). While the schema is activated when the word is used
BUILDING is

a more accurate statement of the scope of the metaphor licensing

expressions such as is that the foundation of your theory and the argument is shaky than
the form in which it was posited by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), THEORIES AND
ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS.

Grady (1997), on the other hand, asserts that THEORIES

AND ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS is

not a basic-level metaphor, but rather arises at the

intersection of other, core-level mappings: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and
PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT.
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figuratively, speakers don’t need to use the overall schema to reconstruct anew its
metaphorical meaning every time that the word is used or uttered in a figurative sense:
the word invokes a direct connection between a particular concept within the source
(increasing lighting making something more visible) and a particular concept within the
target (making an idea more easy to understand). While a metaphorical use of brighten
will evoke the same source domain (PERCEPTIONS), and even the same concept within the
source domain (increasing lighting), the word does not have an entrenched metaphorical
meaning, and therefore, for a listener, its metaphorical meaning must be interpreted based
on the schema. The example here pertains to individual words, but the same effect applies
to longer units—the effect noted for illuminate happens also, for example, with shed light
on x.
Not only isolated words and constructions, however, are given preferential treatment
within a schema. Within the overall cross-domain mapping, some aspects of the source
and target domain are consistently invoked, while others go unexplored. The issue of
unexplored aspects of a mapping, described by Grady (1997: 270) as “the poverty of the
mapping”, is one that has proven difficult within metaphor theory. If there is a crossdomain mapping whereby IDEAS ARE FOOD, such than an idea can be half-baked,
conjectures ruminated upon, and information digested, then why are ‘my ideas are
completely boiled’ and ‘the information tasted terrible’ strange? If STRONG EMOTIONS
ARE MADNESS (such

that one can be ‘mad with hate’ or ‘out of one’s mind with grief’),

then why aren’t interventions for insanity used to refer to the calming of emotions?
Questions such as these put the cart before the horse, getting the direction of causality
precisely wrong. Metaphorical mappings don’t pre-exist utterances; they’re not static
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structures that reside deep in one’s linguistic competence, allowing and disallowing
various utterances. It’s true that such a schema, once formed, can be used to interpret and
coin novel metaphors—interpretation will be more rapid, and coinages more frequent, in
proportion to the strength of the schema, which is a function of its type frequency. The
schema, however, does not as a rule pre-exist metaphorical utterances, it forms as an
abstraction over them. Novel metaphor can explore new aspects of a mapping, but by its
nature, a schema forms over entrenched forms and conventionalized schemata, which
will invariably ‘outcompete’ non-entrenched forms as speakers cast about for words and
constructions of which to make metaphorical use. The experiments outlined in Chapter 5
point to this effect, but are geared towards addressing frequency effects as they pertain to
overall mappings, rather than to the entrenchment of forms themselves. This prediction of
the usage-based account with respect to competition among forms sanctioned by the same
schema presents a clear direction for future research.
Models of metaphor that treat metaphors as a priori constructs treat special cases of a
metaphor as entailments: language users, having applied the systematicity of one domain
to another, make logical inferences about the target based on the source (for example, that
if IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS, then to increase perception must be to increase a person’s
understanding). As noted above, a usage based-model is bottom-up, rather than topdown: while the idea of entailment may apply in some cases of novel metaphor, ‘special
cases’ are in most cases more appropriately treated as schemata in themselves. More
general schemata form over the tokens comprising the special case, as well as other
tokens instantiating the more general schema.
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Lakoff, Espenson & Schwartz (1991) posit the metaphor SUBJECTS ARE AREAS,
whereby areas of research are conceptualized as areas of space. Within this overall
mapping is the special case that RESEARCH IS EXPLORATION (see Figure 2.3.5 for
examples). Within RESEARCH IS EXPLORATION, moreover, are two further subcategories:
metaphors according to which making discoveries is seeing new land or objects, and
metaphors according to which a field, once surveyed, can then be used for agriculture.
Just as we might ask why brighten isn’t used instead of illuminate to describe making
something more understandable, we can pose the question here as to why, if SUBJECTS
ARE AREAS,

all sorts of properties of areas of land— whether they’re hilly or flat, for

example, or whether they have access to fresh water—don’t apply. RESEARCH may be
EXPLORATION,

but the explorers in question don’t seem to be paying attention to many of

things that explorers of new areas of land pay attention to— native flora and fauna, for
example, go unnoticed in this system of metaphors.
Again, the resolution is that the cross-domain mapping doesn’t pre-exist tokens of
use, it emerges as a schema over them. This applies at the level of a schema emerging
over a set of tokens, but also to a larger schema, encompassing several sub-schemata, that
emerges as an abstraction over all constituents. Figure 2.3.4 gives a schematic
representation for SUBJECTS ARE AREAS; all examples are from Lakoff, Espenson, &
Schwartz (1991).
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Figure 2.3.5
Family of Related Metaphors
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A single utterance can activate schemata at multiple levels. ‘They unearthed new
evidence’ activates DISCOVERIES ARE SEEING NEW LAND OR OBJECTS, but also
RESEARCH IS EXPLORATION

and SUBJECTS ARE AREAS. ‘He is working in many areas’,

however, activates only the master schema, SUBJECTS ARE AREAS.
2.3.6 Metaphor as a Continuous Variable
“Some metaphors”, notes Deignan (1999a: 107), “are more metaphorical than others.”
Metaphors tend to lose strength over time as they become conventionalized, such that any
particular metaphorical utterance can be placed along a scale from more metaphorical to
less metaphorical. It’s a difficult aspect of metaphor to deal with for researchers looking
at metaphor use in natural language, as identifying instances of metaphor in discourse
necessitates placing a dividing line between metaphorical and non-metaphorical
utterances—choices forced at the periphery are difficult, because ‘metaphorical’ and
‘non-metaphorical’ aren’t categories, they’re endpoints on a continuum. In such cases, as
Cameron (1999) points out, explicitness of criteria for an operational definition of
metaphor used in a study must serve the function that a clear and objective dividing line
between metaphorical and literal language cannot12.
Even within specific categories of metaphor, utterances can be placed along a
continuum which ranges from literal to metaphorical. Shank (2007), in a study analyzing
semantic extension on tactile verbs with figurative meanings relating to perception,

12

Deignan (1999a) and (Sanford 2009a) outline many of the issues associated with

corpus work on metaphor, and specifically separating metaphorical utterances from nonmetaphorical ones for the purpose of a corpus study.
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isolates all tokens of the four verbs touch, handle, hold, and feel from a corpus of spoken
English, placing them along a continuum from literal uses, referring to physical
manipulation, to more abstract and figurative uses, referring to intellectual understanding.
Sanford (2008b) reports a study in which one group of subjects was given the task of
rating a series of idioms on a scale from 1 to 5 relating to how metaphorical they
perceived the idiom to be. A second group of subjects had their spoken performance of
the same idioms monitored, and the length of the main verb in each idiom (eg., spill in
spill the beans, and also in the control utterance spill the peas) monitored. The correlation
between the two sets of results, following a control for the reduction effect from the
frequency of the phrases themselves, indicates a verification of the hypothesis that an
idiom’s degree of metaphoricity directly effects the phonological reduction of internal
elements. It also, implicitly, validates the gradedness of metaphor for idioms, as
corroborated by both methods of measuring metaphoricity. A host of other studies on
idiom (Nunberg 1978, Cacciari & Glucksberg 1995, Bosman 1999) have placed idioms
along a continuum relating to their degree of novelty, and analyzability—both highly
related to the extent to which they activate underlying cross-domain mappings.
The gradedness of metaphor is not a feature well handled by most theories of
metaphor: whatever the proposed cognitive underpinnings of metaphor are—crossdomain mapping, integration network, statement of categorization—the process either
does or does not take place. Here, a form’s degree of metaphoricity is taken as a function
of its degree of autonomy from its sanctioning schema. Lexical metaphors, formulaic
metaphors, metaphorically predicated idioms, and other metaphorical utterances at any
level of conventionalization: in each of these cases, an utterance is metaphorical to the
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extent that it activates an underlying mapping. Such activation depends on the strength of
the form’s connection to the metaphorical schema governing the mapping, and the
strength of the form’s connection to the schema varies alongside its degree of autonomy.
The more frequent a form, the weaker its connection to the sanctioning schema, and the
less it activates the underlying schema.
2.3.7 Metaphor Processing and Age
Within a language user’s mind, schemata form over tokens of use, and gain strength in
proportion to the number of exemplars. Within a given speech community, speakers have
been exposed to the frequencies of metaphorical tokens of use at similar levels, and
accordingly have roughly congruent schematic structures. The correlate, of course, is that
the less time that a speaker has had to be exposed to metaphorical tokens of use, the less
their cross-domain mappings will correspond to those of a language user who has had
more time to accumulate exemplars. For a language user whose experience with language
was sufficiently brief, few enough exemplars would have been encountered, for many
clouds of tokens, to allow the formation of schemata. And language experience is most
brief, naturally, for those who joined the community of language users most recently:
children.
Metaphor comprehension in children has been a fairly well-documented area,
numerous studies confirming the early emergence of metaphorical understanding in
children, but also a strong correspondence between age and the ability to comprehend
metaphor. Such studies have generally focused on factors which lead to erroneous
metaphor interpretation in children. Billow (1975) draws a distinction between similarity
metaphors, in which the referent is equated to something else on the basis of a shared
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quality (e.g., ‘hair is spaghetti’) and proportional metaphors, which establish an
analogical relationship among four items, one of which is left implied (e.g.‘my head is an
apple without any core’, in which ‘head’ is to ‘apple’ as ‘brain’ is to ‘core’). While
understanding of both types of metaphor improve with age, the understanding of
similarity metaphors emerges first, and is already well-developed by the ages of 5-7.
Proportional metaphors, on the other hand, emerge considerably later, at ages 9-13.
Billow concludes that the comprehension of metaphor emerges alongside higher
cognitive structures and the systems of classification necessary to understanding
analogical relationships between categories. Similarly, Nippold and Sullivan (1987)
suggest that the capacity for understanding metaphor is tied directly to the emergence of
analogical reasoning, the ability both to solve proportional analogy problems and to
comprehend proportional metaphors emerging as early as age 5 and progressing parallel
to one another thereafter. Broderick (1990) notes that while there is undeniably an
improvement in metaphoric comprehension between early childhood and adulthood,
these are “related to general improvements in overall comprehension ability rather than to
the emergence of specific metaphoric capacities such as relating psychological and
physical domains” (p. 65).
Vosniadou et al. (1984) address not only the early emergence of metaphorical
understanding in children, but the extent to which children draw on an array of cues, both
linguistic and situational, in order to draw inferences regarding the meaning of
metaphors, accessing a matrix of contextual information in order to test alternate
hypotheses as to the meaning of a figurative phrase. Comprehension difficulties arise in
response to a lack of predictability (in relation to linguistic context) of the metaphor, as
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well as overall difficulty of the metaphor itself. Older children are better able to cope
with both sets of confounding factors than are preschoolers. Siltanen (1989) notes that the
more difficult a metaphor, the more comprehension depends on context: while older
children depend less on context than younger children, difficult metaphors are better
understood at all ages when a greater amount of context (in this case, a longer story) is
provided. A child who hadn’t been previously exposed to a metaphor needed more
context to figure it out.
Waggoner and Palermo (1989) call attention both to the importance of context to
children’s understanding of metaphors, and the prerequisite to metaphor comprehension
of familiarity with the domain used as a referent by the metaphor: very young children
understood best those metaphors which pertained to emotions of which they had the most
understanding (the negative emotions fear, sorrow, and anger). In the authors’ study,
while competence at comprehension of psychological metaphors increased with age at
least as far as the college level, above-chance levels of performance were observed in the
youngest of the study’s participants (5 years old). Seitz (1997) points to the emergence,
by the age of 6, of the use of linguistic knowledge to apply already present metaphorical
capacity (seen in younger children mostly through visual perception of metaphorical
relations) to psychological concepts.
Evans and Gamble (1988) found that most errors in metaphor comprehension were
tied to attribute saliency: where children fail to explain a metaphor in a way similar to
how an adult would, it is often because they single out different aspects of what is
important about concepts. The authors assert that “what comes readily to mind for young
children regarding certain words is quite different than for older children and adults. For
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example while older children and adults listed ‘fight in wars’ and ‘carries weapons’ as
important characteristics of soldiers, young children mentioned ‘marches’, ‘wears a black
and red uniform’ and ‘stands straight’” (p. 435). In the partial mapping from source to
target domain which takes place in innovative metaphors, such variability can make a
great deal of difference on interpretation: whereas an adult might interpret a metaphor
involving a soldier as highlighting the soldier as one who fights, a child would tend to
focus on the physical attributes of a soldier.
Metaphorical ability, in short, emerges early on, but children don’t generally interpret
metaphors in the same way that adults do until considerably later. What’s notable, in the
case of errors, is that children do interpret metaphors, they just don’t necessarily do so in
the same way that adults from the same speech community do. Whereas such findings are
explained in the research outlined above in terms of the development of various cognitive
capacities that precede various types and levels of complexity of metaphor use, it would
seem just as reasonable to explain such errors in terms a lack of exposure to the
metaphorical systems motivating the target interpretations. Palermo (1986:132), noting
the issue, sums it up as follows:
There is little question that a metaphor such as “Bees are the buccaneers of buzz” would not have
the same meaning for a child of 5 as for Emily Dickinson who created it. The child, however, may
fail to understand the metaphor, not because he or she does not have the cognitive capacity,
structure, or cognitive processes to comprehend metaphors, but because the child does not have
the knowledge of buccaneers that is the key to comprehending the message about buzzing bees
that Dickinson was trying to convey.

Not only individual words, but also metaphorical systems and families of metaphorically
motivated idioms, are themselves culturally specific, and thus acquired (Lakoff &
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Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987a). If metaphorical systems develop, within a language user,
as abstractions over stored tokens of use, then it’s wholly expected that while young
children might have the capacity for cross-domain mappings, they wouldn’t have accrued
sufficient language experience to have developed the specific schemata to facilitate the
mappings that allow an adult speaker to use and interpret a given metaphor in roughly the
same way as other speakers within the community. Children enter the metaphorical world
inhabited by adults slowly, as they form, through exposure to individual metaphorical
forms that comprise tokens of use, schemata governing the cross-domain mappings that
comprise a culture’s shared system of metaphors.
2.4 Conclusion
My proposal is that metaphorical systems, contrary to what is popularly believed, don’t
underlie and license metaphorical tokens of use. Rather, they emerge over them in the
form of schemata that link cognitive domains. Many essential features of metaphorical
systems, especially as they pertain to conventionalization, have been noted elsewhere, but
not followed to the conclusion that metaphorical systems are emergent in nature, arising
over the fact of language in use. Such features of metaphor follow naturally from this
conceptualization of metaphor.
Even for highly productive metaphors, a large proportion of instantiating tokens are
accounted for by a handful of highly entrenched forms. This phenomenon, as well as the
existence of subcases/inferences for overall mappings, speaks to the way in which
schemata form over actual tokens of use: metaphors aren’t entities that govern an evenly
distributed range of possibilities, some of which are mysteriously absent from language
in use. Metaphors are abstractions formed over uneven input. Such mappings correspond
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to conceptual metaphors, and entrenched forms to lexical, formulaic, and idiomatic
metaphors.
Idiosyncratic, conventionalized meanings for lexical, formulaic, and idiomatic
metaphors are a result of the autonomy of forms with a high degree of entrenchment
relative to an overall schema, resulting in a weakening of the connection between the
entrenched form, and other forms sanctioned by the schema. A metaphorical form’s
degree of autonomy corresponds inversely to the extent to which it will be perceived as
metaphorical by the speakers of a language.
The metaphorical systems that are shared across individuals within a culture are a
result of shared membership within a speech community, and roughly approximate levels
of exposure to metaphorical tokens of use over which emerge conceptual schema that
govern cross-domain mappings. The ability to use and process metaphor according to
cultural norms for adult speakers results from children not having been exposed to
sufficient tokens of use for many metaphors to be firmly entrenched.
There are, notably, many features of metaphor that a usage-based approach does not
account for. Metaphorical aptness, in particular, is only partially explained. The strength
of a schema, and of metaphorical forms within it, are important aspects of why a speaker,
in casting about for a metaphor, settles on one mapping over another, and within the
mapping, one form over another. There are other important factors, however, as well.
Sanford 2008a combined a corpus-based study in which all instances of metaphor were
isolated from a corpus of approximately 40,000 words and coded as to their target
domain, with a survey instrument in which participants were asked to rate the
concreteness (for the purposes of the study, being easily understood, clearly defined, and
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easily conceptualized) of each of the categories used for coding the target domains in the
corpus. The study found a significant positive correlation between concreteness and the
frequency of a given category being referred to metaphorically, indicating that the
concreteness of a referent is a clear factor in speakers’ deciding whether or not to refer to
it metaphorically. The more concrete a referent is, the less likely it to be referred to
metaphorically. Furthermore, the concreteness of the source relative to the target is a
clear factor in choosing a source domain, such that targets are almost invariably less
concrete than sources. Such constraints aren’t accounted for by the usage-based theory,
but neither are they outside of its purview: they feed, and are in turn reinforced by
frequency effects, such that a mapping or form with an advantage in aptness will be
rapidly conventionalized or entrenched.
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Chapter 3: Idiom: Syntactic Schemata, Graded metaphor
3.0 Introduction
Chapter 2 of this dissertation presented the argument that metaphors are conceptual
schemata that form over cross-domain mappings, as language users encounter
metaphorical tokens of use. The conventionalization of metaphorical cross-domain
mappings is asserted to result from the entrenchment of such schemata, and Lakovian
conceptual metaphors (of the form X IS Y), it was argued, describe entrenchment at this
level. The frequency effects described in Chapter 2 pertain to such mappings overall,
with individual instantiations of metaphors processed through alignment with
metaphorical schemata. Each experienced token of use, once aligned with a schema,
strengthens the mapping overall. Chapter 5 will present a series of experiments that tested
the claims related to metaphorical entrenchment which were made in Chapter 2,
demonstrating that a language user’s previous exposure to metaphorical tokens of use
(assessed for the purposes of the experiment using large corpora of English which are
assumed to be valid reflections of individual English speakers’ history of the language)
has a demonstrable effect on how novel token are processed. This chapter elaborates on
entrenchment at the level of individual instantiations of a metaphor, a level of
conventionalization that has far greater precedent in the literature on metaphor. Idiomatic
metaphors are described here as arising from the association of high-autonomy
metaphorical mappings with syntactic constructions.
Idiom exists, by its nature, at the intersection of the study of figurative language and
of syntax effects, and has proven a singularly problematic issue in both areas of inquiry.
For a generative model of language, in which linguistic performance emerges as the
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operation of rules upon the lexicon, idioms are oddballs, in that they are lexical units
larger than individual words. At the same time, however, they’ve generally been viewed
as the exception that proves the rule: idioms may be strange bedfellows for conventional
lexical units such as words and morphemes, but aside from containing multiple words,
they’re otherwise unsurprising members of the lexicon (Chomsky 1965, 1980, Jackendoff
1992). According to this view, when speakers interpret an utterance such as let the cat out
of the bag or jumped the gun, they retrieve them wholesale from the lexicon, where the
expressions are stored alongside their stock figurative meanings (‘reveal a secret’ or
‘begin too early’).
As many researchers (Barlow & Kemmer 1994, Nunberg, Sag, Wasow 1994,
Goldberg 1995, Croft 2001, Wray 2002) have pointed out, however, this concept of
idiom falls short of accounting for important aspects of idiom: First, there is no clear
distinction between idiom and non-idiom, such that ‘normal’ language operates according
to compositional principles, and the set of idioms in a language operate according to
another set of rules. Second, many idioms do bear some internal structure, such that the
overall meaning of the expression is distributed over semantic units smaller than the
expression as a whole. Once relegated to a dusty annex of the lexicon, idiom has come to
serve as a core around which functionalists have built an understanding of grammar.
Within syntax, idiom has demonstrated the impossibility of drawing a clear distinction
between lexical items and rules which operate upon them. For metaphor, idiom
demonstrates the interaction of conceptual schemata and constructional templates, as well
as the impossibility of treating metaphoricity as a binary category.
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3.1 Syntactic Schema
Generative theories of syntax have tended to draw a line between the ‘normal’
language and idiomatic speech.
(24)The cat is asleep on the television.
(25)I let the cat out of the bag.
The meaning of a sentence such as example (24) can be modeled as a function of the
predictable operation of grammatical rules and semantic principles. On the other hand, a
sentence such as (25) seems to demand a different, and by definition abnormal, route to
interpretation in that the gestalt meaning of the expression is not what one would expect
based on the application of morphosyntactic rules to lexical units.
As the tools of corpus linguistics have been brought to bear on language, and as
corpus data have reliably demonstrated both the paucity of ‘normal’ sentences and the
preponderance of repetition in discourse, theories of syntax have reoriented around
accounting for phenomena previously considered peripheral. Within the constellation of
research that analyzes sentence-level patterns as syntactic schema, or constructions
(Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor 1988, Barlow & Kemmer 1994, Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow
1994, Goldberg 1995, Croft 2001), analysis of clause- and sentence-level structure
embraces idiomaticity and idiosyncracy as fundamental features of language. As the tools
developed to account for idiomatic speech are applied to more canonically compositional
sentences, a syntactic model emerges that accounts for both types of sentences using the
same apparatus.
Syntactic constructions, as defined by Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor (1988), are objects
of syntactic representation that also contain semantic information. Constructions are
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lexical, in that they directly relate a form to a semantic content: Goldberg (2006) asserts
that the essential feature of a construction is to have an overall meaning or function not
entirely derivable from internal elements13. They’re also, however, complex in that they
contain discrete, identifiable internal elements which are themselves lexical units.
Critically, constructions are variable in their degrees of fixedness.
(26) kith and kin
(27) That’s neither here nor there.
(28) pain in the butt
(29) I don’t want to play baseball at all, let alone play in the rain.
(30) He sneezed the napkin off the table.
At one end of the continuum are highly fixed expressions such as (26) or (27), all
elements of which must occur, and which must furthermore occur in a set order, in order
for the string to carry its constructional meaning. The slightly less fixed construction seen
in example (28) (pain in the X) allows for variations only within a small set of words
(neck, butt, and informal synonyms for butt) to fill the final slot. Towards the other end of
the continuum one finds constructions such as Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor’s (1988) let
alone construction, licensing expressions such as the one seen in example (29), and
relatively open sentence templates such as that seen in example (30) (from Goldberg
1995). The former, the let alone construction, imposes semantic roles on the elements
preceding and following let alone, demonstrating as well the extent to which grammar
can be highly idiosyncratic for a given construction. The latter demonstrates the caused
13

Bybee (2006), in an account of constructions more explicitly consistent with a usage-

based account, defines constructions as automated sequences or processing units.
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motion construction. The construction licensing this last example is highly productive,
allowing for the creation of a potentially limitless number of new sentences, and highly
schematic, in that it allows for variation, within a class defined by a category or set, as to
elements filling particular roles within the construction. It is the template itself, however,
rather than the verb, contributing the idea of caused motion.
With any change in syntax, there is some difference in meaning: Goldberg (1995)
demonstrates the effect with examples such as (31) and (32):
(31) I loaded the truck with hay.
(32) I loaded hay on the truck.
From whence, if not the construction itself, comes the idea that the truck is fully
loaded in the former, but not necessarily so in the latter? From the word with? on? The
difference between basic sentence patterns and canonical idioms is only the degree of
idiosyncraticity. In every case—from the most fixed expressions, to general sentence
patterns, to the thousand shades of gray that fall between—grammatical patterns are
associated directly with semantic content. There’s no point on the continuum, in short, at
which the realm of the idiomatic ceases and ‘normal’ language begins.
Syntactic constructions are grammatical schema (Barlow & Kemmer 1994, Bybee &
Thompson 1997, Taylor 1998, Dabrowska 2001). Constructions form as abstractions
generalized over multiple instances of utterances, forming prototypically defined
categories around clusters of similar tokens of use, with schematic patterns strengthened
alongside the frequency of exposure to tokens of use instantiating the schema. The
acceptability of incoming forms is assessed based on similarity to entrenched schemata,
and stronger schemata are more easily accessed and more productive.
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With all syntactic patterns, from the most restricted to the most general, viewed as
lexical pairing of form to meaning, the domain of the idiomatic is extended to cover all of
a speaker’s syntactic knowledge, as shaped by the speaker’s previous exposure to
multiple-word patterns. Canonically idiomatic phrases, however, are clustered far
towards the fixed end of the continuum, where the entrenchment of highly restricted
patterns and of relatively fixed strings leads to constructions the overall meaning of
which is far narrower than (and, in many cases, highly divergent from) the set of possible
meanings, based on their constituent elements.
3.2 Idiom: syntactic & metaphorical schemata
The essence of idiom is the tension between metaphorical and syntactic schema.
Within the theory of metaphor outlined in Chapter 2, metaphorical autonomy occurs
where some instances or aspects of metaphorical mapping become partially or wholly
autonomous from an overall sanctioning metaphorical schema, taking on
conventionalized properties that are not predictable based on the overall conceptual
schema that forms over the mapping. Where this happens in association with a relatively
fixed construction, we find prototypical idioms: utterances with a figurative basis
(supplied by a metaphorical schema), a conventionalized meaning (a function of
autonomy for some aspect of the mapping from the overall mapping), and a form that
bears little lexical or syntactic alteration without its meaning being changed (as a function
of the fixedness of the construction underlying the expression).
(33) keep it under your hat
(34) zip your lips
(35) spill the beans
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(36) let the cat out of the bag
The family of idioms represented in examples (33) through (36) revolves around the
idea of revealing or keeping information through verbalization, with information
conceived of as a physical entity within a container. A considerable hierarchy of
metaphorical schema are here involved: the highly general IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (Lakoff,
Espenson & Schwartz 1991) is emergent over idioms such as examples (33) through (36),
as well as a wide host of other utterances at varying levels of entrenchment (such as
examples (37) through (40)).
(37) I grasped her arguments.
(38) This idea is stuck in my head.
(39) I gave her the idea.
(40) I get it.
Within this more general schema, (33) through (36) all exemplify THE MIND IS A
CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS (Lakoff,

Espenson, & Schwartz 1991): information is an object

in a container (the mind), and verbalizing the information is to have the information
escape the container. Over expressions such as (33) and (34) emerges the generalization
that KEEPING A SECRET IS PREVENTING AN OBJECT FROM ESCAPING A CONTAINER, over
expressions akin to (35) and (36) that REVEALING INFORMATION IS ALLOWING AN
OBJECT TO ESCAPE FROM A CONTAINER (both

sub-schemata that would be treated, in

Conceptual Metaphor Theory, as entailments of IDEAS ARE OBJECTS). Each example
individually illustrates a specific mapping which has become partially autonomous, with
a conventionalized interpretation not wholly predictable based on either the most general
or most narrow of the schema over them.
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At the same time, however, examples (33) through (36) exemplify syntactic
constructions. Each is a narrow sentence template that bears some, but not much, lexical
and syntactic alternation with its meaning intact. (34) admits ‘button’ in the role of ‘zip’,
and variations in tense and person are possible for all four, but passivization is
questionable in all cases, and lexical substitutions quickly erode the meaning of the
expression for all examples. (35) and (36) are prime examples of the transitive ‘x the y’
construction, closely associated with idiomaticity.
As has been argued throughout, the strength of a schema, whether semantic or
syntactic, is dependent on the sum of a language user’s history of exposure to tokens of
use. Activation itself, however, is tied to short-term factors: once activated by an
utterance instantiating a given schema, an utterance sanctioned by the same schema will
be more rapidly processed (Bock 1986, Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland 2000 , Poplack
1980, Scherre & Naro, 1991, Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig 1995, Gries 2005,
Szmrecsanyi 2005). Based on the immediate preceding context of a given idiomatic
utterance, a language user might be expected to be ‘biased’ towards an interpretation of
idiomatic meaning based either on the utterance’s affinity to tokens instantiating the same
syntactic schema, or towards tokens instantiating the same conceptual schema.
Longer-term factors certainly come into play as well: the strong entrenchment of a
specific mapping, or of a relatively fixed string of words, relative to an overall schema,
leads to some degree of autonomy. Schemata form as connections—essentially routes of
activation—are made between tokens on the basis of shared properties. With autonomy,
connections between a given mapping/string and other tokens sanctioned by the overall
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schema weaken, such that the extent to which the schema is activated depends on the
degree of autonomy for the string/mapping in question.
A metaphorical idiom represents both an entrenched mapping, and an entrenched
string: in both regards, it has some degree of autonomy from its immediate sanctioning
schema. For both syntactic and conceptual schemata, autonomy, schema strength, and
priming together determine the role of sanctioning schemata in on-line processing.
Conceptual schemata enable the distribution of idiomatic meaning out over constituent
elements, while syntactic schemata are associated with the reanalysis of idiomatic
meaning based on constructional similarity to other idioms.
3.2.1 Conceptual schemata and compositionality
The issue of the compositionality of idioms weighs two alternatives as to how
language users process idiomatic utterances: when people use idioms, do constituent
elements contribute to the overall meaning, or are the overall meanings of idioms
retrieved intact from the lexicon? The nature of idioms as utterances with unpredictable
meanings has steered researchers in idiom understandably towards the latter. In an
expression such as he jumped the gun, how could the individual words he, jump, the, and
gun, possibly combine to form the meaning ‘begin too early’? What word in the
expression he kept me in the dark contributes the notion that knowledge is being willfully
kept from someone? Issues such as these have led to the canonical view of idiom that
while expressions such as these may once have been formed compositionally, they are
now essentially irreducible units. From a synchronic perspective, idioms may look on the
surface like normal sentences, but in fact words internal to the idiom play no role in
contributing to the overall meaning of the expression.
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Nunberg, Sag & Wasow (1994) argue that a great deal of misunderstanding has arisen
out of the misguided conflation of conventionality and conventionality (see §2.1.2). The
conventionalization of meaning which accompanies idiomatic expressions needn’t lead to
an assumption of noncompositionality because this conventionalization of meaning may
well be attached to individual words within an idiom, rather than to the idiom as a whole.
While acknowledging the existence of a large number of idioms which are not, in fact,
analyzable (being low on each of the above three scales), the authors assert that the bulk
of phrasal idioms are, in fact, idiomatically combining expressions (ICEs): “idioms
whose parts carry identifiable parts of their idiomatic meanings” (p. 496). The
compositionality of such expressions is evidenced by the fact that individual words
within them can be modified (leave no legal stone unturned), quantified (touch a couple
of nerves), emphasized via topicalization (those strings, he wouldn’t pull for you),
omitted in elliptical constructions (my goose is cooked, but yours isn’t), or referenced
anaphorically (we worried that Pat might spill the beans, but it was Chris who spilled
them), each of these operations indicating that speakers assign identifiable meanings to
the word involved (all examples from Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow 1994: 500-502).
The view that an idiom’s meaning can be distributed over its parts is supported by
several lines of evidence. McGlone, Glucksberg, & Cacciari (1994) assert that constituent
words in an idiom take on phrase-specific meanings. In a series of experiments which
assessed subjects’ comprehension of idioms, it was ascertained that while subjects
understand familiar idioms more rapidly in their canonical form than in a variant form,
variant idioms are understood as quickly as their literal paraphrases (e.g., he bit off less
than he could chew as quickly as he did not challenge himself). The authors interpret the
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results as indicating that variant idioms are processed in essentially the same manner as
literal speech: compositionally. They suggest that “the words that form familiar idioms,
by repeated usage, come to incorporate at least part of the figurative sense that they have
when embedded in idioms” (p. 181), a process aided by “transparent conceptual relations
between an idiom’s constituents and that idiom’s meaning” (p. 182): thus, provided the
right context, a word’s figurative/idiomatic sense is activated, its meaning contributed to
the expression in which it occurs14. Billig & MacMillan (2005) provide a corpus
perspective on the compositionality of idioms, their study on the use of the expression
‘smoking gun’ in political discourse providing evidence that the use of a linguistic
metaphor musn’t necessarily become any more automatic as it becomes
conventionalized, but rather that the metaphor underlying the idiom can continue to be
‘negotiated’ in discourse—exploring new aspects of the systematicity of the source
domain as it applies to the target domain—in the same way that novel metaphors do.
They point, as one example, to the following rhetorical move which takes place around
smoking gun (p. 473):
A Downing Street spokesman insisted the so-called smoking gun, evidence of a continuing
concealed weapons programme, was not the only justification for war set out
in Resolution 1441.
(Guardian, 27 January 2003)

14

Cameron & Deignan’s (2006) concept of a metaphoreme, “non-literal expressions with

a relatively fixed form and highly specific semantics and pragmatics” (p. 1), is useful in
accounting for such contextual and social effects. Such aspect of metaphor being
accounted for in a schema-based model of supported by Goldberg’s (1995) inclusion of
pragmatic information in syntactic constructions.
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One might note the addition of ‘so-called’, as the government spokesman distances the government
from the idiom, casting suspicion over the legitimacy of its usage… The shift is from the smoking gun
as an object, which only has to be seen or heard to be believed, to a rhetorical claim that was to be
dismissed and whose upholders were to be construed as holding discreditable and irrational motives.
The use of quotation marks, or the addition of ‘so-called’, helps the shift back from apparent
objectivity to contestable rhetoric.

The extent to which an overall (however conventionalized) idiomatic meaning can be
attributed to the individual parts of a metaphorical idiom is attributable to the role of an
active metaphorical schema in motivating the meaning of the idiom, the mapping
providing a basis for analyzing out meaning over constituent elements. The autonomy of
the specific mapping instantiated in an idiom nonetheless means that overall idiomatic
meaning is not wholly derivable from these internal elements.
3.2.2 Syntactic schema and reanalysis
The fact that idioms instantiate not only semantic, but also syntactic schemata, means
that a given metaphorically motivated idiom is connected to a network of semantically
similar items, and also to a network of syntactically similar items. Examples (41) and
(42), for example, both represent highly entrenched instances of more general schemata,
both semantically and syntactically.
(41) You’re pulling my leg.
(42) You’re yanking my chain.
The two utterances also share a more general schema: again, both semantic (HAVING
A JOKE AT SOMEONE’S EXPENSE IS TO PULL SOMETHING OF THEIRS

would seem to be as

accurate a statement as any of this relatively unproductive schema) and syntactic (where

86

‘You’re pulling/ yanking my leg/chain’ is prototypical’, but a great deal of lexical
variation remains possible with meaning intact). 15
Where a strong (relative to the strength of the specific mapping) metaphorical
schema, or priming of the metaphorical schema, causes activation of an overarching
conceptual schema, the idiom in question is analyzed on the basis of qualities shared with
semantically similar utterances, and the figurative meaning of the idiom is distributed out
over internal elements. When, on the other hand, the same factors come into play for a
relatively fixed syntactic schema instantiated by an idiom, an idiom is analyzed primarily
on the basis of its connection to syntactically similar utterances, and conceptual schemata
are eclipsed by syntactic ones, leading in many cases towards a shift in meaning.
(43) Shit or get off the pot.
(44) Fish or cut bait.
The figurative meaning of example (43) (with its decidedly un-mysterious
etymology) means something along the lines of ‘do something, or get out of the way.’
(44), on the basis of its constructional similarity to (43), is generally analyzed as meaning
the same thing, despite saying something rather different: ‘be helpful in some way’ (i.e.,
if you’re not going to fish, could you cut bait for those of us who are?). This is a result of
15

In this case, (42) seems in fact be a coinage on the basis of the pattern established by

much older (1888 is first usage in its current sense cited by the OED) example (41). The
OED cites the 1975 usage, in the Washington Post, “If he told you his elephant story
anywhere but his own home, you might think, as he puts it, that he was ‘pulling your
chain’”. By 1986, we have today’s form intact: “Looks like somebody out there's sure
trying to jerk our chain, doesn't it?”
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a syntactic schema eclipsing a semantic one, in this case attributable in large part to the
weakness of the connection between the utterance and the image schema that motivates
(or, it may well be more accurate to say in this case, once motivated) its meaning.16
Something similar happens with (45) and (46):
(45) Don’t jump the gun.
(46) He jumped the shark.
Example (45) dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, a variation on ‘beating
the pistol’, an expression referring to a false start in athletic events. (46), on the other
hand, is far more recent: the first instances in the Corpus of Contemporary American
English (Davies 2008) are from 2001. The origin of the phrase lies with the 1950s
television series ‘Happy Days’, in the autumn of which ‘The Fonz’ jumps a shark on
waterskis. ‘Happy Days’ remains popular in syndication, and the expression was coined
more recently in reference to a ridiculous, last-ditch effort to increase ratings for a series.
Not soon afterward, however, instances of ‘jump the shark’ synonymous with ‘jump the
gun’ begin to emerge, as the semantics of the expression were reanalyzed on the basis of
constructions similarity to ‘jump the gun’. Idiomatic meaning changes, over time, for
similar reasons in exx. (47) through (48):
(47) We’ve got this in the hole.
(48) It’s in the bag.
(49) He’s in the tank for Obama.
In example (49), ‘in the tank’ is shown in a usage meaning ‘firmly in the camp of’.
The expression dates back, again, to early 20th century athletics, when ‘to go in the tank’
16

Thanks to Gabriel Waters of the University of New Mexico for examples (50) and (51).
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meant to intentionally lose a boxing match. The expression was extended to sacrificing
oneself for some greater good, usually in a political arena, but later came to be reanalyzed
on the basis of features shared with expressions such as those seen in examples such as
(47) and (48), where the y in ‘the x is in the y’ refers to something that it’s well, right, and
good for x to be in.
The effect of syntactic priming can be found in the highly productive [Verb + ing] the
(adj) [N] schema, corresponding to dysphemism for masturbation.
(50) beat the bishop
(51) jerk the chicken
(52) stroke the salami
On the basis of priming from expressions such as (50) to (52), nearly any instantiation
of the schema that doesn’t have an otherwise entrenched meaning (although tactile verbs
are preferred in the verb slot) is interpreted as referring to masturbation: a joke driving,
for example, the on-line ‘Euphemism Generator’, a site which returns Xing the Y
expressions in response to the click of a button.
3.3 Are Idioms metaphorical?
The traditional view of the relationship between metaphor and idiom is that
metaphors play only a historical role in motivating idiomatic meanings: that expressions
such as he spilled the beans or they went behind my back are merely the fossils of dead
metaphors, and metaphor plays no role in the on-line processing of idioms (Aitchison
1987, Cooper 1986, Cruse 1986, Strassler 1982, Glucksberg, Brown & McGlone 1993).
At the opposite extreme, Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes the assertion that
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metaphorical mappings are no less active in structuring idiomatic expressions than they
are in structuring less conventionalized expressions (Lakoff 1993).
Nunberg, Sag & Wasow note that “idiomatic meanings are generally derived from
literal meanings in conventionalized, but not arbitrary, ways” (p. 503). Metaphor, for
many idioms, provides the motivation for idiomatic meaning, with the literal meaning of
the idiom sharing event structure and thematic roles with the figurative meaning. In (53),
the meaning of the idiom is not the same as the literal meaning of the string, and yet the
situation to which it refers figuratively “preserves certain properties of pulling, and an
affected object that participates in the idiomatic activity in a way that is similar in certain
key respects to the way strings are pulled” (p. 504).
(53) pull strings
(54) kick the bucket
Hamblin & Gibbs (1999) note that even within relatively opaque idioms such as (54),
the figurative meaning often preserves key aspects of the event structure associated with
the literal meaning of the verb (preventing, in this case, the possibility of interpreting the
idiom as referring to a slow death).
With respect to example (53), it’s the invariance principle (by which those aspects of
the systematicity of the source domain which are mapped to the target domain maintain
the ‘cognitive typology’—inferences, salient aspects, thematic roles, etc.—of the source
domain, provided that these don’t conflict with the target domain) which, according to
CMT, provides the apparatus by which aspects of the literal meaning of the expression
are mapped to the figurative meaning (Lakoff 1992). At the same time, within a family of
idioms referring to the same target domain, the relationships which define the family are
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structured by the application of the invariance principle to a given target domain and the
central metaphor which defines it (Lakoff 1987).
The claim that metaphor motivates idiomatic meanings has been made most directly
by Gibbs (1990, 1994, Gibbs & O’Brien 1990, Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sykes, & Barr
1997), who, working within the framework of CMT, has offered several forms of
experimental evidence to the hypothesis that underlying metaphors constrain the meaning
of idioms: most notably, Gibbs & O’Brien 1990, which reports an experiment in which
the high degree of consistency in different subjects’ mental images for the same idiomatic
expressions, as well as the consistency of subjects’ mental images across different idioms
which are hypothesized to be predicated on the same metaphor, are interpreted as
evidencing the metaphors which underlie and motivate the meaning of common idiomatic
expressions. Gibbs (1994) describes the analyzability of a given idiom as being closely
related to its metaphorical underpinnings. The extent to which an idiom is analyzable
directly follows from the degree of the saliency of elements internal to the idiom: for
example, “many speakers view the phrase fall off the wagon as being less decomposable
than pop the question because the meaning that fall contributes to fall off the wagon is not
as salient as the meaning that pop contributes to pop the question” (pp. 278-279). The
metaphors which underlie such idioms both 1) increase the analyzability of idioms by
contributing to the salience of words within the idioms, because metaphorical mappings
facilitate speakers’ ability to find the connection between an idiom’s literal and figurative
meaning (p. 279), and 2) are facilitated by an idiom’s analyzability, because the easier it
is for speakers to separate out individual components, the easier it is for the them to
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identify such components with corresponding elements from the source domain (pp. 285,
291).
Sanford (2008b) corroborates Gibbs’ key claims regarding the metaphorical nature of
idiom in a study that finds a phonological reduction effect on words internal to idiomatic
utterances, positing such reductions as evidence of underlying metaphoricity. The study
monitors subjects’ performance of the stimuli used in Gibbs & O’Brien (1990) to find a
shorter duration for main verbs in metaphorically motivated idioms (for example, kick in
kick the bucket) relative to literal counterparts (kick in kick the dog). These findings were
interpreted as evidence of metaphors underlying the idioms being active in on-line
processing, with the metaphor licensing high predictability for the main verb (Sanford
2008b, p. 5):
According to the predictability-based account of word-level reduction, words which are
highly predictable based on their context carry a low semantic load, which is reflected in
production by shortening (Bolinger 1991, Fowler & Housum 1987). Elaborating on this view,
Gregory et al. (1999) assert that frequency-based and probability-based effects are in fact
different facets of the same phenomenon: speakers’ probabilistic knowledge of their own
language reflected in their production of it, such that highly probable—whether said
probability be due to high frequency or predictability—words are reduced in duration.
Metaphors, by their nature, use the systematicity of highly cognitively structured domains to
structure the conceptualization of less concrete domains. The image schema which forms the
basis for an idiom such as let the cat out of the bag is highly structured to the extent that let is
highly predictable based on the remainder of the string. The same conceptual metaphors,
then, that Gibbs & O’Brien (1990) view as governing the high degree of consistency in
speakers’ mental images for idioms, should also be expected to provide a high degree of
‘contextual probability’ which, Gregory et al. assert, will license word shortening. Such a
finding [is] consistent with research which has linked the predictability of words in idiomatic
expressions to the same idioms’ ease of processing (Cacciari and Tabossi 1988), an effect
described by Cronk, Lima & Schweigert (1993: 69) as “the biasing context of the phrase
itself.”
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Gibbs & O’Brien’s (1990) study demonstrates that speakers can recover underlying
metaphorical motivations for idioms, and the consistency of speakers’ mental images
supports the positioning of such motivations within a conceptual system shared across
speakers of a language. Sanford 2008b demonstrates that underlying metaphorical
schemata are automatically activated during on-line processing, with a corresponding
effect on surface expression. Moreover, the study found a meaningful relationship
between the degree of phonological reduction and its perceived metaphoricity, such that
the main verbs of metaphorically idioms were reduced in proportion to their degree of
metaphoricity. In a preliminary survey instrument, a separate group of subjects was asked
to rate, on a numerical scale, the extent to which the utterances used in the experiment are
metaphorical. These responses were averaged, across subjects, to arrive at a mean
‘perceived metaphoricity’ rate for each of the utterances used in the performance task.
The study reports a meaningful relationship between metaphoricity and phonological
reduction, such that in a regressive model, the two factors of metaphoricity and frequency
(both treated as continuous variables) account for the observed reduction in the length of
the main verb more accurately than frequency alone. Two separate metrics, in short, of
the continuous variable metaphoricity were applied (perceived metaphoricity, and
phonological reduction on the main verb). Both indicated that idiomatic utterances range
along a scale from more to less metaphorical, with the relationship between the two sets
of measurements indicating the viability of treating metaphoricity as a continuous
variable and the viability of both approaches for measuring it.
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The notion of metaphoricity as a continuous variable has direct repercussions on the
debate to as the metaphorical status of idioms, pointing to a resolution shy of Lakoff’s
claim that conceptual metaphors are as active in idioms as in novel metaphors, but well
beyond the traditional view that idioms as a class are non-metaphorical, their meanings
retrieved as an irreducible whole from the lexicon: idioms can be a little bit metaphorical.
A particular idiom’s degree of metaphoricity is a function of the extent of its autonomy
from the sanctioning schema, which in turn depends on the entrenchment of the specific
aspect of the mapping instantiated in the idiom relative to the entrenchment of the overall
metaphorical schema.
3.4 Conclusion
Any model of language seeking to account for language as it exists in the world,
rather than as it exists in minds of language researchers, must account for the recurring
patterns that comprise much of language. Many essential insights into syntax have
emerged from the study of idiom, which exemplifies the way in which form can be
attached directly to meaning at any level: not only individual morphemes and words, but
also strings. Idiom can and should play a similar role for the study of metaphor,
demonstrating how metaphorical schemata can be entrenched at a variety of levels, and
how metaphorical schemata interact with syntactic schemata.
A usage-based approach to metaphor accounts for key features of metaphor. Bybee
(2001: 7) says of morphologically complex words that “New forms can be produced by
reference to existing forms, but most multimorphemic words are stored whole in the
lexicon”. Idioms, similarly, are ready-made metaphors: their meaning can, in many cases,
be analyzed out on the basis of ‘reference to existing forms’, but the idiom itself, with a
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set metaphorical interpretation, is entrenched discretely from an overall metaphorical
mapping. The extent to which an idiom activates such a mapping is a function of the
degree of autonomy for the sub-schema instantiated in the idiom itself. Idioms as a class
are neither metaphorical nor non-metaphorical, but rather run along a broad continuum
from highly metaphorical to non-metaphorical, based on autonomy from the overall
metaphorical schema. Highly idiosyncratic interpretations for metaphorical idioms are
associated with a high degree of entrenchment for the specific mapping profiled in the
idioms relative to the entrenchment of the overall mapping, while idiomatic analyzability
is associated with the inverse. Finally, metaphorical idioms cannot be wholly understood
as highly entrenched instances of metaphorical mappings, nor can they be analyzed
entirely as syntactic constructions: it is out of the interaction of these two types of
schemata that the rich properties of idioms emerge, and a complete understanding of
figurative idioms is possible only when this dual nature is embraced.
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Chapter 4: Metaphorical Frequency
4.0 Introduction
This chapter outlines the corpus methodology used for the purposes of determining the
frequency of metaphorical mappings, which is prerequisite to analysis of the experiments
reported in Chapter 5.
Two methods for assessing the frequency of metaphorical mappings in a corpus are
presented here, both based on the use of ‘key terms’, elicited in a survey instrument, as
search items: a small-corpus method that codes instantiations of key terminology at
multiple levels, and a large-corpus method that uses a similar method but restricts coding
to a single level, and searches only for simile forms. The small-corpus method uses a
corpus of 3,749,000 words—large by many standards, but the high frequency of
metaphor in discourse notwithstanding17, the relatively low frequency of individual
metaphors in discourse makes a corpus of this size necessary for making meaningful
assessments of metaphorical frequency. This corpus is small, at any rate, relative to the

17

Sanford 2008a asserts, based on a study that hand-coded ten conversations from the

Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, &
Thompson 2000, Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, Thompson, & Martey 2003, Du Bois &
Englebretson 2004, Du Bois & Englebretson 2005) for all instances of metaphor, that one
out of every 11.9 intonation units is or contains a metaphorical utterance. An intonation
unit is defined by DuBois et. al (1993: 17) as “a stretch of speech uttered under a single,
coherent intonation contour”, and appears (generally) as a single line of text within the
corpus.
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much larger (385+ million-words) corpus used in the large-corpus method. The largecorpus method is used as the basis for analysis of the experiments presented in Chapter 5;
both methods are presented here as exploratory contributions to best practices for
determining the corpus frequency of metaphorical mappings.
4.1 Metaphors Used in the Study
For the purposes of the experiment outlined below, it is desirable to use a group of
underlying metaphors that fit the following three criteria:
1) Each metaphor is generally accepted as a productive cognitive entity that
sanctions instantiating metaphorical utterances.
To this end, all metaphors used are taken from the Master Metaphor List (MML) (Lakoff,
Espenson, & Schwartz 1991). The MML is described by its compilers as an “attempt to
compile in one place the results of metaphor research since the publication of Reddy’s
The Conduit Metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. [The] list is a
compilation taken from published books and papers, student papers at Berkeley and
elsewhere, and research seminars” (p. 1). While the list is far from complete (comprising,
by the best estimates of its compilers, about 20% of conceptual metaphors currently
reflected in the English language), those entries which are included represent conceptual
metaphors that are widely accepted as such within the community of metaphor
researchers, and which are relatively uncontroversial with respect to their formulation18.

18

‘Relatively’ is the key term. The formulation of labels for cross-domain mappings is

notoriously contentious; it’s unlikely that there is any wholly undisputed mapping in the
literature (see footnote 8 in chapter 2 for one of many possible examples). Many readers
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A sample entry from the MML follows:
BELIEFS ARE BEINGS WITH A LIFE CYCLE
The belief lives on.
That belief died out years ago.
That belief was born of the early philosophers.
Source Domain: beings, life cycle
Target Domain: beliefs
Special case 1: BELIEFS ARE PLANTS
1. Development of a Belief is Growth of a Plant
This is just the seed of a belief.
This belief stems from my basic morality.
This belief is an offshoot of my faith.
This belief has been growing in me for years.
This belief has taken root in my mind.
This is a flourishing belief in this culture.
I planted the belief in his mind.
2. Basis of a Belief is Rooting of a Plant
Related metaphors: MAINTAINING EXISTENCE IS SUPPORTING
This is a deeply rooted belief.
This belief is rooted in fact.
3. Encouraging a Belief is Cultivating a Plant
I cultivated a belief in my infallibility among my subordinates.

The entry is typical in that it provides a statement of a metaphoric at a general level, then
moves on to providing ‘special cases’: sub-metaphors, essentially, of the overall
metaphor. Examples are provided at each level.
2) All of the metaphors exist at approximately the same level with respect to
metaphorical hierarchies.
Families of metaphors are characterized by hierarchical relationships, such that many
metaphors have sub-metaphors. The basic-level metaphor EMOTIONS ARE ENTITIES
WITHIN A PERSON (‘I

was filled with rage’), for example, encompasses another metaphor

whereby emotions are conceptualized as liquids within a person (‘he poured out his

will disagree with the formulation of individual metaphors posited by the MML. The use
of mappings proposed by the MML for the purposes of this study is advanced as the least
of many evils, rather than as a perfect solution.
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hate’). EMOTIONS ARE LIQUIDS itself has the special case of emotions being viewed as
liquids in the eyes (‘his eyes were full of love’). Thus:
Level 1:

EMOTIONS ARE ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON

Level 2:

EMOTIONS ARE LIQUIDS

Level 3:

EMOTIONS ARE LIQUIDS IN THE EYES

This property of metaphorical systems, also demonstrated by the BELIEFS ARE BEINGS
WITH A LIFE CYCLE metaphor

(above), is consistent with schemata more generally.

Describing phonological schemata, Bybee (2001: 32) writes that
schemata may be formed at many different levels of generality. The representation of particular
word, such as send, would be a very specific or local schema. A schema for the rhyme –end$ is at a
more general level of representation. Then there could be a more general schema for –Vnd$, and a
still more general – vowel-nasal-voiced stop$, or even more general –vowel-sonorant-stop$, and so
on. The presence of any of these levels of generality for a schema does not preclude the existence of
others.

A specific metaphorical utterance can instantiate any number of schemata, with more
local schemata themselves instantiating more general ones. For a meaningful comparison
across all of the metaphors used in the experiments, it would seem to be desirable for all
of the metaphors used to exist at a similar schematic level. All metaphors participate, to
some extent, in more general metaphorical systems. To as great an extent as possible,
however, all of the metaphors selected for use in the experiments are relatively isolated,
neither instantiating more general metaphors, nor having clearly patterned special cases.
3) The metaphors come in matched pairs that can be meaningfully compared.
The independent variable is, in all three experiments, frequency. A categorical analysis of
the experiments demands that the metaphors used as the basis for the stimuli come in
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matched pairs, as close to one another as possible, with each pair comprising a more and
less frequent metaphor (see below for pairs used; the methods used for determining
frequency, as well as the frequencies for each of the metaphors used in the study, are
presented in §4.2).
On this basis, pairs of metaphors were selected which share a single target domain
(e.g., WAR), but draw on different source domains (e.g., COMPETITION, RACING). The
approach allows a direct comparison of stimuli, instantiating each of the mappings, that
are identical except for a single word or phrase, the difference determining whether the
stimulus instantiates a more or less frequent metaphor (e.g., he argues like a soldier vs.
he argues like a racer).
Based on these three criteria, the ten metaphors selected for use in the study are as
follows (examples from the Master Metaphor List are provided below each entry):
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Competition
COMPETITION IS WAR
COMPETITION IS RACING
· The debate team brought out their big guns.
· The arms race.
· The other team sent in the cavalry against us. · We’ve been playing chess for years, and he’s finally
pulling ahead of me.
· They battled over the chess board every week. · He’s a better writer than I am, and he’s widening
the distance.

Hope
HOPE IS A CHILD
· He fostered hope that the project would
continue.
· She nourished the hope that he would return.
· I’m nursing a hope for a better life.

HOPE IS LIGHT
· The clouds were a glimmer of hope that rain might
come.
· He has bright hopes.
· I have a very dim hope that he’ll recover.

Ideas
IDEAS ARE WRITING
· The mind is a wax tablet.
· His words didn’t register.
· I made a mental note of it.

IDEAS ARE FOOD
· His idea was half baked.
· Let me chew on that for a while.
· It’ll take some time to digest that information.

People
PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES

PEOPLE ARE PLANTS

· I’m all charged up and full of energy.
· He got a charge out of it.
· I need a jump start on Monday mornings.

· She’s a late bloomer.
· He’s a budding artist.
· She’s let herself go to seed.

The Mind
THE MIND IS A MACHINE
· He has a screw loose.
· I could see the wheels turning.
· He churns out ideas.

THE MIND IS A BODY
· His mind is strong and supple.
· In the summer, the mind tends to go flabby.
· His mind is decaying.

4.2 Corpus Methods
For the purposes of the three experiments, it was necessary to determine the overall
frequency of a number of metaphorical mappings. The only fully satisfactory method for
doing this would be to manually search a corpus for all examples of metaphorical
utterances, counting the number of instantiations of each mapping. Any corpus small
enough, however, to realistically allow for this approach, is also small enough that the
findings will be highly skewed by the content of the corpus. The Santa Barbara Corpus of
Spoken American English, for example (a corpus of about 249,000 words, at the upper
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limits of what might be realistically hand-coded), comprises 60 discourse segments—
mostly informal conversations, but also including other types of events at varying levels
of formality. In a corpus of this size, many possible target domains are under- or unrepresented, while others are over-represented. One file out of the 60, for example, deals
with the work of being a farrier. The ratio of 1:60 presumably far exceeds the actual
frequency with which the topic of shoeing horses is discussed in the English language
overall. Accordingly, metaphors whereby, for example, horses are referred to as children
(‘horses … just haven't been disciplined enough. They're just, it’s like a kid, they're
just… are ornery’, SBCSAE 1, lines 854 – 860), or regularly occurring care of a herd is
referred to as a ‘seasonal dance’ (SBCSAE 1, line 930), are over-represented as well. The
larger the corpus, the more problems such as these are mitigated.
The increase in corpus size, however, is accompanied by an increasing reliance on
automated searches in order to access the corpus. In the case of determining the
frequency of a given metaphorical mapping, the problem becomes (given the high
productivity of some metaphorical mappings, licensing possible instantiations in any
number of linguistic expressions) finding the right search terms. What words ought to be
used, for example as search terms in seeking PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS in a corpus? An
arbitrary selection from the wide variety of words and expressions that can be used to
refer to animals (gorilla, that mutt, Spike) and to people (him, the bartender, Stacey) will
provide only an extremely narrow sampling of the domain. The unevenness of
metaphorical mappings (see §2.3.5) also means that any given selection is likely to yield
a skewed impression of the overall frequency of a mapping.
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One possible strategy is to use generally recognized key terms which are often carried
over from a given source to a given target. Deignan (2005: 75), for example, adopts the
following strategy:
For my corpus investigation of ARGUMENT IS WAR, I took the following key words from the description
in Metaphors We Live By [Lakoff & Johnson 1980]: attack (noun, verb), defen(se), defend, shoot
down. I also examined citations for the words (to) fire, battle, and guns, which emerged as significant
collocates of the key terms in the corpus, as well as inflections of all these words.

Difficulties arise when the goal is to compare results for two (or more) different
metaphors, without ending up with an apples-and-oranges comparison. With the search
results depending so critically on the choice of search terms, observed differences may
reflect, more than any other variable, how well the researcher has plumbed their own
intuitions about the basic terms of the source domain.
The goal here, accordingly, is to arrive at objectively achieved search terms to be
used in assessing the corpus frequency of metaphorical instantiations of each metaphor.
Metaphorical terminology is drawn from the source domain, and so it is source domain
terminology which must be used as search terms. A preliminary study, outlined in the
following section, is used to attain basic terminology for each of the Lakovian source
domains used in the experiments19. Two different corpus approaches, while varying in
19

As Deignan (1995, 2005) points out, terms which are basic to a domain are not

necessarily identical to those which are most frequently used metaphorically.
Nonetheless, the extent to which those terms most basic to a domain are used
metaphorically is hoped to provide a rough measure of the overall frequency with which
a given domain is activated as a source.
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overall approach, basic terminology selected, and information coded, will share the
method of ‘fishing’ for source domain terms in a corpus. The more instances found, for
each domain, of instances of the 'key terminology' for that domain instantiating the
metaphor being sought, the more frequent the metaphor is considered to be.
Of the two corpus methods that are presented in the following sections, it is the largecorpus method outlined in §4.2.3 that is used to analyze the results of the experiments
reported in Chapter 5. An overview of both methods is presented here, because 1)
important insights regarding metaphorical mappings are gleaned from the small-corpus
method, especially relating to the overall frequency of terms from a given domain being
used metaphorically, and 2) both approaches represent valuable contributions to the field
of corpus research on metaphor. While the large-corpus, simile-based method returns
results more suited to the study presented here, it is lacking in some regards that are
addressed by the small-corpus approach. Methods drawn from both approaches will be
valuable in future research on a usage-based approach to metaphor, and to corpus
research on metaphor more generally.
Preliminary to both methods is a survey used to ascertain search terms.
4.2.1 Key terms timed survey
A timed survey task was used to arrive at ‘basic’ concepts and vocabulary for each of the
ten metaphorical source domains, to be used as search terms in each of the frequency
methods outlined below. The approach is based on both the methods and theoretical
underpinnings of classic prototype theory (Rosch & Mervis 1975, Rosch 1978), which
maintains that when subjects are asked to list features or examples of a category, those
features/examples which are listed most frequently, and which tend to occur higher on
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lists, correspond to those examples/features which are closest to the core of a
prototypically defined category20. The guiding assumption of the approach used here is
that the terms which are listed most frequently by participants correspond to concepts that
are basic to speakers’ understanding of a given domain.
40 students, undergraduates enrolled in introductory coursework in Linguistics at a
large research university and offered a small amount of extra credit in exchange for
participation, were used as participants in the task. Participants were all adult native
speakers of American English.
The survey instrument began with the following instructions, adapted from Rosch &
Mervis (1975):

This is a very simple experiment to find out the things that people think are most important in defining
a concept. For example, for bicycles you might think of things they have in common, or that you
associate with them, like wheels, handlebars, riding, or Schwinn. For dogs, you might think of things
like barking, fur, or terrier.

There are 10 pages that follow, and each one has a word at the top that describes a concept. For each
page, you’ll have a minute to write down all the words you can think of. Any word that you think is an
important part of the concept is a good answer. You can write down anything that you think of, but try
not to just free associate- for example, if bicycles just happen to remind you of your father, don’t write
down father.
20

A similar method has been previously applied to finding words basic to a concept in

studies such as Diaz-Guerrero, Rogelio, & Szalay (1991), which adapted the
methodology to analyze cross-cultural conceptions of race.
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Okay- I’ll give you two minutes for each word. When I say ‘go to the next word’, read the word
printed in bold and write down words that you think are an important part of that concept. Write as
many words as you comfortably can, until you’re told to go to the next page.

The following ten pages, presented in one of five different random orders to each
participant, each bore a heading corresponding to one of the ten metaphorical source
domains used in the experiments (COMPETITION, RACING, LIGHT, CHILDREN, FOOD,
WRITING, PLANTS, BATTERIES, MACHINES,

and THE BODY). The instructions were read

aloud, and then participants had two minutes to write a relevant list for each domain.
In analysis, those words occurring on the most participants’ lists for each domain
were isolated. For LIGHT, for example, the five terms which occurred on the most
participants’ lists were, in descending order of frequency, sun, bright, bulb, lamp, and
dark. ‘Ties’, those items occurring on an equal number of participants’ lists, were broken
on the basis of which term averaged a higher ranking across all subjects’ lists.
Words differing only in inflection were considered to be the same word, and the most
common inflectional form was used in the experiments21.
4.2.2 Small-corpus Method
The corpus used for the key terms method was a combined corpus, comprising the
Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (MICASE) (Simpson, Briggs, Ovens, &

21

e.g., leg and legs both came up under ‘The Body’, and were counted as the same

word—the plural form was used in the experiments because it was more frequent.
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Swales, 2002), a 1.8 million-word corpus of interactive and monologic speech, occurring
with an academic setting, from a variety of academic disciplines at the University of
Michigan; the Buckeye Corpus (Pitt, Dilley, Johnson, Kiesling, Raymond, Hume, &
Fosler-Lussier, 2007), a 300,000 word-corpus comprising 40 speakers conversing freely
with an interviewer; parts I, II, III, and IV of The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken
American English (Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, & Thompson 2000, Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer,
Thompson, & Martey 2003, Du Bois & Englebretson 2004, Du Bois & Englebretson
2005), a 249,000-word collection of recordings of people from a variety of locations
within the United States engaged in natural discourse in a variety of genres; and the
Switchboard Corpus (Godfrey & Holliman 1997), a 1.4 million-word collection of about
2,400 two-sided telephone conversations on set topics among speakers from across the
United States. The combined corpus, then, was 3,749,000 words. This size corpus was
optimal for providing a large enough sample to be useful (representing a wide variety of
speakers, registers, and discourse genres) while also returning a small enough number of
tokens that they could reasonably be hand-coded.
For the purposes of the small-corpus method, the five most frequently occurring
words from the key terms experiment, for each metaphorical source domain, were used as
search terms (for example, the search terms used for WAR were death, gun, bomb,
soldier, and tank). Coding took place at three levels. Search returns were initially coded
as to whether or not they were consistent with the domain of interest. This subset of the
returns was then coded as to whether or not the usage was metaphorical. A final round of
coding identified, from all metaphorical uses of the key terms, usages that instantiate the
target metaphors. Each category is explained in more detail below.
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The category ‘Total uses consistent with the source domain’ is a tally, for each search
term, of uses that are used to evoke (whether literally or figuratively) the source domain
of which they are being used as a diagnostic.
One function of the category is to exclude, for polysemous forms, everything other
than the sense being sought. For ‘tank’, one of the search terms for WAR, the category
excludes items such as example (55), while allowing for items such as example (56).
(55)

I think it was an old, see the oil here? Isn't that an oil tank?
SBCSAE Text 29, lines 148 – 150

(56)

well they were and in fact they were so well dug in that uh when we sent
our tanks around behind them they couldn't get turned around in time
Switchboard Text 2130, lines 135 - 136

The category is also applied rather critically in the case of search terms that have a
semantic range which is not limited to the domain the frequency of which is being
assessed. For ‘green’, one of the key terms for plants, the category excludes uses such as
example (57) in which ‘green’ is used in a way that has have nothing to with PLANTS.
(58), on the other hand, is included as an instance of the search term which is consistent
with the domain.
(57)
actually they came out with a European racing green uh Miata that's a
limited edition
Switchboard Text 2526, lines 272 - 274

(58)
…everything's in bloom you know everything's green here till about
October and then we lose it all…
Switchboard Text 2307, lines 182 - 183

Example (56) is tallied under ‘Total uses consistent with the source domain’ for WAR,
example (58) under the same category for PLANTS.
The category ‘Total metaphorical uses of source terms’ is a subset of ‘Total uses
consistent with the source domain’. The category tallies, for all instances of a search term
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that are consistent to the domain for which information is being sought, those uses which
are used metaphorically. Criteria for metaphoricity are taken from Sanford 2008a22:
i) the systematicity of one domain is applied to another domain,
ii) an incongruity exists between domains, and
iii) a literal interpretation of the utterance (in a sense compatible with context) is not
possible.
This category counts all instances of the search term invoking the relevant source
domain, irrespective of the target to which is being applied.
(59)
…yeah I'm sure they will I mean with uh the way things are going I mean
uh it's going towards a more green type of thing…
Switchboard Text 4107, lines 127 – 129

(60)
…actually I'm uh quite a beginner I'm very green I just got my first set of
clubs this year for Christmas but I have uh gone out to the driving range once or
twice…
Switchboard Text 4260, lines 28 - 29

In (59), the source term ‘green’ is being used as a lexical metaphor that evokes PLANTS,
with a conventionalized meaning tied to environmental sustainability. (60) is tallied under
‘Total metaphorical uses of source terms’ (as well as ‘Total uses consistent with the
source domain’) for PLANTS.
(60) is similar to (59), but here the conventionalized meaning ties people who are
novices at something to a young, developing, or unripened plant or plant structure. The

22

This dissertation argues directly against a view of metaphor as a binary category,

arguing that metaphoricity is, rather, graded in nature, with no line separating
metaphorical from non-metaphorical utterances (see §2.3.6). The criteria here are used
entirely as operational criteria for the purpose of the corpus component of the study.
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source of 6 is PLANTS and the target is PEOPLE. Accordingly, (60) is tallied under ‘Total
instantiations of target metaphor’ for PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, while (59) is not.
Table 3.1 presents the results of the small-corpus method for each category. 11,910
tokens were coded in the small-corpus study; of these 7,525 were consistent with the
source domain therefore coded for metaphorical status.
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SOURCE

Total Uses Consistent

Total metaphorical

with Source Domain

uses of source terms

WAR

67

11

RACING

37

10

LIGHT

387

66

CHILDREN

496

3

FOOD

1300

18

WRITING

1575

3

PLANTS

1085

16

BATTERIES

1

0

MACHINES

1260

24

THE BODY

1317

247

Total instantiations of target metaphor

COMPETITION

HOPE

IDEAS

PEOPLE

THE MIND

IS WAR

0

IS RACING

10

IS LIGHT

7

IS A CHILD

0

ARE FOOD

0

ARE WRITING

2

ARE PLANTS

11

ARE BATTERIES

0

IS A MACHINE

0

IS A BODY

4

Table 4.1: Small-corpus method results by domain

Results for all search terms are combined into a single figure for each category. The
67 tokens that are tallied under ‘Total uses consistent with the source domain’ for WAR,
for example, is a total of tokens found for each of the five search terms that were used for
the domain WAR. The full results, by individual search terms, can be found in Appendix
1.
The right-most columns of Table 3.1 provide frequencies, for each of the ten target
metaphors, of key terms from each source domain being used in way that instantiates the
metaphor. The search terms are being used to ‘sample’ the corpus, and the method does
not aim to find all tokens of each metaphor in the corpus. This figure is an indicator,
rather than a direct measure, of the frequency of each metaphor in the corpus.
For all five source domains, there are 0 tokens of the source being applied to one
target domain, and between 2 and 11 tokens of the source being applied to another (i.e.,
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the number of tokens for each of the ten metaphors is between 0 and 11). This in an
interesting pattern, and points to two things: one is the possibility that the approach is not
sufficiently fine-grained to detect metaphors at relatively low frequencies, and that the
use of more search terms and/or a larger corpus would be desirable in achieving more
precise results. Two, a corpus approach reveals that many of the metaphors thought, by
metaphor researchers, to be common, are in fact difficult to detect in spontaneous use.
This finding reflects those found in Sanford 2008a, which hand-coded ten conversations
from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English and found Lakovian
conceptual metaphors for emotions to be almost completely unattested, and underscores
the necessity of grounding metaphor research in empirical methods.
4.2.3 Large-corpus method
In the second corpus approach, a much larger corpus was searched for similes
instantiating the target mappings. Similes are defined here as x is like y expressions that
fit the criteria for metaphor offered above. The major advantage of using similes in
trawling corpora for figurative language is their eminent searchability: the addition of like
to figurative search terms creates a much smaller set of returns, as well as a set of returns
which contains a far higher percentage of target mappings. As an example, a search for
shark in the 385+ million-word Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies
2008) yields 3383 hits, of which only a small portion can be expected to be figurative— a
sampling of the first 100 hits yielded four figurative uses. like a shark, on the other hand,
yields 62 hits, 60 of which are figurative. The approach therefore makes a far larger
corpus accessible for study.
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Several lines of research support the idea that metaphors and similes are functionally
equivalent: the career of metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner 2005) described above,
for example, suggests that both similes and novel metaphors are processed analogically.
Chiappe & Kennedy (2000) argue that the two forms are functionally equivalent when
they are not purposefully used to contrast one another. In experimental research that does
argue for a difference between the two as to processing (Aisenman 1999, Haught 2005),
subjects’ preference for one form over another seems to be more dependent on the
specific source domain terminology used, rather than on the cross-domain mapping itself.
The view is taken here, following Conceptual Metaphor Theory, that both similes and
metaphors prompt cross-domain mappings (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
The corpus used for this method was the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA) (Davies 2008), a corpus of 385 million words. With respect to content, the
corpus is equally divided across the years spanning 1990 to 2008, and also between
spoken language, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic texts.
The simile form favors the use of nouns as source terms. In the similes method, the
six most frequently occurring nouns from the key terms experiment, for each
metaphorical source domain, were used as search terms (for example, for WAR the search
terms used were ‘soldier’, ‘gun’, ‘bomb’, ‘army’, ‘general’, and ‘tank’). The search was
for ‘like x’, (where x is the source term), with between 0 and 5 words between ‘like’ and
x. This method was used to ‘fish’ for similes which instantiate the given source-domain
mapping, with a given token coded as such provided that it met all of the criteria listed in
§4.2.2 for metaphor, and could be plausibly read as an instance of the target mapping.

113

(61) is an example of a simile tallied as a token for COMPETITION IS WAR, based on a
search for ‘like… general’ (general being one of the six key terms for WAR in the largecorpus method). (62), on the other hand, is not included as a token of COMPETITION IS
WAR, because

it does not refer to COMPETITION. The ‘he’ of example (62), in addition, is

an army captain, meaning that there is no semantic incongruity between domains in the
example (an army captain is being compared to an army general, both the target and
source occurring with the domain of WAR, and more specifically, within a military
command hierarchy).
(61)

Huxley approached the controversy like a military general, out to upstage
an older enemy.
COCA 1995, ‘A sea horse for all races’

(62)

He loved to repeat his orders as much as he loved to pose like a general
standing in his jeep.
COCA 1990, ‘Interior Landscapes’

Table 3.2 presents the results of the large-corpus method, totaling results for
individual search terms within the mapping overall. Full results, by individual search
terms, can be found in Appendix 1.
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Target

Source

COMPETITION IS…

WAR

111

RACING

19

LIGHT

16

A CHILD

0

FOOD

42

WRITING

26

PLANTS

244

BATTERIES

27

A MACHINE

38

A BODY

6

HOPE IS…

IDEAS ARE…

PEOPLE ARE…

THE MIND IS…

Total similes instantiating target mapping

Table 4.2: Large-corpus method results by domain

In the large-corpus method, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS vs. PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES
provided the largest difference in frequency between mappings sharing a target (the
former occurring nearly ten times as often), owing mainly to the high frequency of
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS.

All of the search terms for PEOPLE ARE PLANTS returned some

results; people are compared to trees and flowers, specifically, with a very high degree of
frequency (140 tokens and 68 tokens, respectively). The only mapping unattested in the
large-corpus method is HOPE IS A CHILD, with HOPE IS LIGHT also coming in at a
relatively low number of tokens.
4.3 Synthesis
The validity of both approaches was assessed based on the extent to which they agree in
their findings. A high degree of agreement would indicate that both approaches are
accurately measuring the frequency with which given metaphorical mappings are
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instantiated in natural discourse, while a low degree of agreement would indicate that one
of the two approaches is serving as a better measure than the other23. The degree of
agreement between the two approaches was determined using Pearson’s correlation (r) on
the total number of instantiations found for each target mapping (the values in the
rightmost column of both tables above). This test yielded r = .43, indicating a moderate
degree of agreement between the two approaches (where 1 would reflect a perfect
correlation, and zero a complete lack of correlation)24.
Despite the moderate degree of agreement between the two approaches, the two
approaches yielded different findings with respect to which of the two items were more
frequent: for three of the five pairs of metaphorical mappings (those referring to
COMPETITION, IDEAS,

and THE MIND), the small-corpus method yielded a different

ranking than the similes method. Given the need, for the purposes of the experiments
reported in the following chapter, to categorize metaphorical stimuli into experimental
and control groups based on frequency, a decision is necessary as to which method to
make use of.
23

Alternately, of course, this might be interpreted to mean that neither of the two

methods is accurately reflecting the overall frequency of metaphorical mappings. For the
reasons outlined below, the large-corpus method is taken as a better operationalization of
metaphorical frequency.
24

The test reflects a comparison of the results for mappings overall (e.g., COMPETITION

IS WAR

vs. COMPETITION IS RACING, rather than results for individual search terms. A

comparison for individual search terms is not possible, as the same set of search terms
were not used in the two approaches.
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The large-corpus method is used to analyze the results of the three experiments
reported in Chapter 5 for two reasons. First, the results of the large-corpus method are
less dependent on the particular search terms chosen. In the small-corpus method, there is
a great deal of variation in the results for each of the search terms used for a particular
mapping (See Appendix 1). For IDEAS ARE FOOD, for example, 22 of the 26 instantiations
found are for the search term ‘bread’. That the omission of this single term could so
drastically change the results suggests that the generalizability of the results for each
search term is low. The results from the similes study tend to be more consistent across
the six search terms used for each mapping25. Second, because of the larger size of the
corpus and because of the higher rate of returns for figurative usages returned by the
similes method, the results of the large-corpus method are far more fine-grained. The
most telling case of this is that there are far fewer instances of null returns (in which the
method yields no tokens of a particular mapping) for a given search term or mapping.
The small-corpus method does, however, demonstrate a utility that the large-corpus
method does not. The smaller size and different approach enables coding at more levels,
providing information on 1) the overall frequency of a particular domain being raised in
discourse and 2) the overall frequency of a particular domain being invoked as a
metaphorical source domain. By sampling a larger portion of the language, the size of the

25

A related issue is that the findings of the small-corpus method are highly influenced by

the frequency of high-frequency idiomatic expressions (reflecting entrenchment, as
opposed to conventionalization). In the results for COMPETITION IS RACING, for
example, six of the ten token are instances of ‘track record’.
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corpus used in the simile-based approach provides more powerful and dependable results
than the small-corpus method. The use of a smaller corpus, on the other hand, enables
coding at a level of detail which is generally not possible when a large corpus is being
used.
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Chapter 5: Experiments
5.0 Introduction
A series of experiments tests three key predictions of the view of metaphorical crossdomain mappings as cognitive entities upon which frequency effects operate in language.
According to the view of metaphor outlined here, every time that an individual is exposed
to a metaphorical utterance, it represents a token of use. ‘Clouds’ of tokens form around
cross-domain mappings that are common in a language, as speakers are exposed to
metaphorical systems in use. Schemata emerge around common metaphors as speakers
generalize across tokens of use, leading to conventional cross-domain mappings and
stock metaphorical interpretations. Additional tokens of use further entrench the schema.
Metaphors with particular target domains in common (for example, LOVE IS MADNESS,
LOVE IS A JOURNEY)

are, in some sense, in competition with one another. Speakers make

on-line choices, in language use, regarding what source domain to use to refer to a
particular target domain. These decisions are based on a host of factors, including the
concreteness of the source domain (Stefanowitsch 2005, Sanford 2008a), and are
dependent on the speaker’s previous exposures to each metaphor. These choices, across
time and across many speakers, contribute to the overall frequency, in the language, of
each metaphorical mapping.
The dependence of schema formation and entrenchment on frequency means that
schematic strength is directly tied to numerical probability: if x is the set of all
metaphorical utterances to which a speaker has been exposed, and y the subset of
metaphors that instantiate a particular cross-domain mapping, then y over x is the
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probability (in a historical, rather than predictive, sense), for that speaker, of a given
metaphor occurring.
The literature on frequency effects in language (Bybee 1985, Moder 1992,
Pierrehumbert 1994, Dabrowska & Szczerbinski 2006, Wang & Derwing 1994) speaks to
three main effects from frequency (see §1.1.4). Accompanying an increase in token
frequency (i.e., an increase in the tokens of use to which to the typical speaker of a
language is exposed), there is an increase in:
1) Accessibility. The more frequent a schema, the more rapidly it is accessed.
Following from this, the speed at which stimuli instantiating a schema are
comprehended increases as well.
2) Acceptability. Speakers make decisions as to the acceptability of utterances based
on the frequency of the utterance and/or its similarity to frequent utterances.
3) Productivity. High type frequency (in combination with the openness of the
schema) determine the likelihood that the schema will be applied to new items.
The experiments reported below test these effects for metaphor, evaluating metaphorical
mappings as cognitive representations that are acted upon by linguistic frequency. These
experiments demonstrate an effect from frequency not at the level of lexical
entrenchment for figurative meanings for individual words and expression, but for
schemata that have emerged over multiple stored tokens of use from the sum of a
speaker’s history of language exposure. As language users encounter novel utterances,
they are processed through a process of analogy to existing schemata, with proximity to
and the strength of such schemata having a direct effect on how novel utterances are
processed.

120

These effects have not previously been tested for metaphor; doing so requires some
rethinking of experimental methods by which they can be addressed. The methods
outlined below build on experimental approaches to confirming these effects at other
levels of linguistic structure, as well as experimental work addressing other aspects of
metaphor.
5.1 Experiment 1: Acceptability
The first experiment is an acceptability-judgment task in which participants are presented
with sentences the meaning of which is predicated on an underlying metaphor, and asked
to rate each sentence on a scale from 1-5 with respect to its acceptability as a sentence. It
is hypothesized that sentences instantiating more frequent cross-domain mappings are
deemed more acceptable than sentences instantiating less frequent ones. The effect
assumes an approximately similar level of frequency for the instantiations themselves,
accomplished here by using novel comparisons (presumed to have a token frequency of
‘0’ in participants’ history of exposure to metaphor).This is predicted to occur as a result
of acceptability judgments being made on the basis of previous exposure: the more that
speakers have been exposed to the metaphorical schema (a particular source-domain
mapping) sanctioning a particular utterance, the more likely they are to determine a
sentence instantiating the schema to be acceptable. The results of the experiment will be
interpreted as supporting this hypothesis if, as a group, the stimuli instantiating more
frequent metaphors are judged to be more acceptable than the group of stimuli
instantiating less frequent metaphors.
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5.1.1 Methods
18 students from the University of New Mexico (11 males and 7 females) participated
in the experiment. The participants were native speakers of English between the ages of
18 and 30 and were offered a small amount of extra credit for their participation by the
instructors of their introductory linguistics classes.
Stimuli (see Table 1) comprise 40 sentences: for each of five frequent/infrequent
metaphor pairs, there are eight stimuli. Four instantiate the more frequent metaphor,
applying terminology from a given source domain to a given target domain (e.g., ‘When
it comes to people, kids are like small plants’, instantiating PEOPLE ARE PLANTS), while
the other four sentences use source terminology from the less frequent metaphor (‘When
it comes to people, kids are like AAA batteries’, instantiating PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES).
Stimuli occur in matched pairs, embedding words triggering either infrequent or frequent
mapping in otherwise identical sentences.
All stimuli are of the form ‘When it comes to z, x is like y’. The simile form (i.e., the
use of like) was used to prompt a figurative interpretation, and specifically to avoid a
sentence being read as a literal categorization statement, so that numerical ratings for
each stimulus reflect the acceptability of the figurative mapping rather than the felicity of
the statement as a literal assertion. The functional equivalence of novel similes and novel
metaphors is supported by Gentner & Bowdle’s Career of Metaphor Hypothesis (2001,
2005), as well as by Chiappe & Kennedy (2000), who note that metaphors and similes
have the same strength for speakers when used in isolation.
The introductory clause of each stimulus sets up a clear target domain; the main
clause identifies something from the source domain (e.g., AAA batteries), likening it to
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something analogous in the target domain (kids). In selecting source domain terminology,
words were selected from the key terms survey which represented domain-specific
terminology (i.e., words such as fun or boring, which do not have a meaning linked to
any specific domain of thought, were excluded) and of which there were at least five
occurrences across subjects in the key terms survey. From these, four words were
selected that represented a variety of concepts from the domain- for example, in writing,
the words selected represent an object on which one writes (paper), the act of interpreting
something written (reading), a person who habitually writes (author), and a unit used in
written language (sentence). All the terms used in the stimuli for the experiment, in that
they are drawn from the key terms survey, are words representing semantic associations
that the population sampled have relating to the source domain; the stimuli embed these
terms, which label core concepts from the domain, into semantically coherent English
sentences.
To prevent biasing the stimuli in either experimental group towards either a more
straightforward or difficult-to-interpret form, all stimuli were written previous to the
corpus component of the study. The researcher therefore did not know, at the time that
the stimuli were composed, which metaphors were more frequent and which were less
frequent.
Subjects were given the following instructions for the experiment:
The following is a list of items. Each one is a sentence that compares something to something else. What I’m
interested in is your thoughts, as a speaker of English, on how acceptable it is.
You’ll be ranking these items on a scale that runs between ‘not acceptable’ at one end, and ‘very acceptable’
at the other. You’d rate an item as highly acceptable if you think that it’s something you might expect a
speaker of English to say, and it’s clear what the sentence is saying. You’d rate it as ‘not acceptable’ if you
think that it’s not a sentence that a speaker of English would ever say, and it’s unclear what the sentence
means.
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Directions For each item below, rank it according to how acceptable you think it is. A ranking of ‘1’ will
correspond to items that you think are not at all acceptable. A ranking of ‘5’ will correspond to items that you
think are very acceptable. You can rank items anywhere along the scale, from 1 to 5.

Participation was untimed. Stimuli were presented on a two-page instrument, printed to
present the stimuli in one of five different random orders to each participant.
5.1.2 Results
Figure 5.1 provides the results of Experiment 1. Averaging across both participants
and stimuli, acceptability ratings were .25 higher (5% higher on the 1-5 scale) for the
frequent group than for the infrequent group of stimuli. In the subject analysis, a paired ttest of mean acceptability ratings demonstrated that participants judged frequent items to
be significantly more acceptable than infrequent items, t(17) = 3.72, p = <.005.

Figure 5.1
Experiment 1 Summary

Table 1 presents a more detailed view of the results of Experiment1. The table is divided
into two main data columns, with more frequent mappings on the left and less frequent
mappings on the right. Pairs of mappings, reflecting a more and less frequent
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metaphorical cross-domain mapping, are presented side by-side, so that the more frequent
mapping is on the left, the less frequent mapping in the column adjacent.
The ‘stimulus’ columns provide, for brevity’s sake, only the main clause- the first
part of the sentence is ‘When it comes to z,’ where z is the relevant target domain. For all
ten of the stimuli in the first set, for example (relating to PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and
PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES),

the sentences begin with ‘When it comes to people, …’. In the

second set (relating to COMPETITION IS RACING and COMPETITION IS WAR) the sentences
begin with ‘When is comes to competition, …’. Thus, for example, the complete form of
the first stimulus below is ‘When it comes to people, she’s like a bush.’
‘Frequency’ provides the corpus frequency for each source-target mapping, based on
the results of the corpus component of the study. The ‘acceptability’ (Acc.) column
provides, for each stimulus, the mean acceptability rating across all 18 participants. A
higher number corresponds to a higher degree of acceptability. Stimuli are grouped into
the source-target mappings that they instantiate, with the final row in each grouping
reflecting an average for the mapping overall. The members of each frequent-infrequent
pair appear side by side; the right-most column subtracts the ‘Infrequent’ values from
values for the corresponding ‘Frequent’ values. Positive values are therefore in line with
the predicted experimental effect; negative values are not. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses to the right of the average rating, across participants, for each
stimulus. The frequency (F) column provides (both here, and also in the data tables for
each of the other two experiments) the corpus frequency of each mapping, from the largecorpus study, in order to allow the reader to compare the mean results for each group of
stimuli with the frequency of the sanctioning mapping.
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Frequent

Infrequent

Frequent –
Infrequent

Stimulus:
Freq.
Acc.
Stimulus
When it comes to
When it comes to [TARGET],
[TARGET], _____.
_____.
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS
/
BATTERIES
she’s like a bush.
1.94(1.1) she’s like a Duracell.
houses are like pots are
houses are like flashlights are
3.94(1.1) for batteries.
for plants.
cities are like gardens
cities are like electronics are
are for plants.
3.5(1.2) for batteries.
kids are like small
plants.
3(1.6) kids are like AAA batteries.
PEOPLE ARE
PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES
244
PLANTS (summary)
3.1 (summary)
COMPETITION IS WAR
/
RACING
they’re like armies.
3.5(1.4) they’re like race cars.
winning is like killing
winning is like coming in first
the enemy.
3.22(1.2) place.
this company is like
World War 2.
3(1.5) this company is like NASCAR.
this place is like a
battle.
3.72(1.5) this place is like a race track.
COMPETITION IS
COMPETITION IS
111
WAR (summary)
3.36 RACING (summary)
THE MIND IS A MACHINE
/
BODY
reading is like
electricity to a
machine.
3.78(1.1) reading is like blood to a body.
study strategies are like
study strategies are like the
gears.
3.61(1.1) organs.
creativity is like the
3.56(1.3) creativity is like the heart.
engine.
intelligent is like
mechanical.
2.06(1.1) intelligent is like muscular.
THE MIND IS A
THE MIND IS A BODY
MACHINE
(summary)
38
(summary)
3.25
IDEAS ARE FOOD
/
WRITING
he’s like a cook.
2.61(1.1) he’s like an author.
my thoughts are like
lunch.
2(.9) my thoughts are like sentences.
his mind is like a piece of
his mind is like a plate.
2.44(1.1) paper.
going to school is like
eating.
2.39(1.3) going to school is like reading.
42
IDEAS ARE FOOD
IDEAS ARE WRITING
(summary)
2.36 (summary)
HOPE IS A LIGHT
/
A CHILD
mine is like an
illumination.
2.94(1.1) mine is like a baby.
my pastor is like a
lamp.
3(1.6) my pastor is like a parent.
his encouragement is
his encouragement is like a
like a light switch.
3.61(1.2) child’s toy.
hers is like a bright
3.61(1.2) hers is like a young child.
light.
HOPE IS A LIGHT
HOPE IS A CHILD
16
(summary)
3.29 (summary)
TOTAL
3.07

Table 5.1
Experiment 1 Data
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Freq.

27

19

6

26

0

Acc.

2.17(1.3)

-0.23

2.22(1.2)

1.72

2.5(1)

1

2.78(1.5)

0.22

2.41

0.6775

3.67(1.3)

-0.17

3.83(1.5)

-0.61

2.78(1.4)

0.22

3.44(1.4)

0.28

3.43

-0.07

3.61(1)

0.17

2.61(.8)

1

3.5(1.4)

0.06

2.11(1.2)

-0.05

2.96

0.295

2.78(1.5)

-0.17

2.67(1.4)

-0.67

3.39(1.1)

-0.95

2.22(1.3)

0.17

2.77

-0.405

2.28(1.1)

0.66

3.11(1.3)

-0.11

2.28(1)

1.33

3(1.3)

0.61

2.67
2.85

0.6225
.25

Turning to judgments of individual item pairs, there were exceptions to the general
pattern for two of the groups of stimuli (relating to COMPETITION and to IDEAS). In
explaining these results, it seems likely that participants found some of the sentences for
COMPETITION IS RACING

and IDEAS ARE WRITING to be more or less literal: sentences

predicated on these mappings rated high in acceptability because the terminology of
competition applies literally to racing (i.e., winning isn’t just like coming in first place, it
is coming in first place) and because ideas are literally expressed in writing.
Large differences, for a given pair of stimuli, between the stimulus instantiating the
more vs. the less frequent mappings tend to be accounted for by the higher-frequency
item ranking extremely high in acceptability, as is the case for houses are like pots for
plants, his encouragement is like a light switch, and her [hope] is like a bright light
(which rank 3.94, 3.61, and 3.61, respectively, against an average rating of 2.96 across all
stimuli). Those pairs of stimuli which run most contrary to the hypothesized effect are
winning is like killing the enemy/winning is like coming in first place, my thoughts are
like lunch/my thoughts are like sentences, and his mind is like a plate/his mind is like a
piece of paper. In all three cases, item instantiating the less frequent metaphor has an
average acceptability at least .5 (10% of the 1 -5 scale) higher than that for the item
instantiating the more frequent metaphor. The extremely high ranking for winning is like
coming in first place accounts in large part for the high average ranking for COMPETITION
IS RACING

overall, being the exemplar for the problem (outlined above) that sentences in

this category tend to read as literal assertions. The second two pairs of stimuli are both
members of the IDEAS ARE FOOD/IDEAS ARE WRITING group. my thoughts are like lunch
received one of the lowest ratings in the survey rating (a 2- only she’s like a bush ranked
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lower, at 1.94). Based on informal follow-up questions, this is apparently because people
felt that the interpretation was too open-ended: lunch doesn’t assign any attributes to
food, and it was therefore difficult to transfer any meaning to thought. his mind is like a
plate was outranked by his mind is like a piece of paper due to the high ranking (3.39) of
the latter, most likely due its similarity to the highly conventional X’s mind is (like) a
blank slate.
Figure 5.2 shows the results of the study by participant. For 15 of the 18 participants,
mean ratings for the frequent stimuli were greater than or equal to mean rating for the
infrequent group. The large portion of participants for which frequent stimuli were more
acceptable than infrequent stimuli, as well as the closely matched curves for frequent and
infrequent stimuli, attest to a clear difference across the two levels of the independent
variable ‘frequency’.

Figure 5.2
Mean acceptability rating by participant
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Figure 5.3 shows the results of experiment 1 by stimulus. Within each group of
metaphorical stimuli (as defined by target domain), each pair of stimuli is numbered one
through four, in the order in which they appear in Table 1.

Figure 5.3
Mean acceptability rating by stimulus

For 12 of 20 stimuli, and for three of the five groups of stimuli, frequent stimuli were
deemed more acceptable than corresponding infrequent stimuli. A by-stimulus analysis is
not significant, t(19) = 1.49, p = .08. In these results (as in Experiments 2 and 3), a bysubject paired t-test provides a more meaningful interpretation of the results than either a
comparison of averages or a by-stimulus t-test. This is the case because no threshold
separates the two levels of the independent variable frequency. In each matched pair of
stimuli, the frequent item is higher in frequency than the infrequent item (and as a result,
the ‘frequent’ group of stimuli is of higher average frequency than the infrequent group).
It is not the case, however, that all of the frequent items are higher in frequency, nor the
infrequent items lower, than any particular figure (indeed, many of the ‘infrequent’
stimuli instantiate metaphors that are more frequent than other metaphors in the
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‘frequent’ category, and vice-versa). A by-stimulus t-test is primarily a test of whether or
not there is clear difference, with respect to the independent variable, between the two
groups- in this case, there is not. For this reason, a by-subjects analysis is of much greater
utility than a by-stimulus analysis in interpreting the data, for all three experiments.
The clear difference in acceptability between the two levels of the independent
variable (frequency) observed here provides support for the entrenchment of
metaphorical mappings as schema which operate on the same principles as schema
posited at other levels of linguistic structure.
5.1.3 Discussion
These results are interpreted as providing strong support for the proposed hypothesis,
that metaphorical utterances will be judged to be more acceptable by speakers when they
are predicated on underlying metaphors to which they have had frequent exposure. The
data reported here correspond to experimental findings which have been reported for
other levels of linguistic structure, that grammatical judgments aren’t absolute, but
probabilistic, based on speakers’ previous experience with language (Pierrehumbert
1994, Vitevich et al. 1997, Bybee & Eddington 2006). In the case of speakers’
acceptability judgments regarding metaphorical stimuli, participants appear to be making
determinations as to semantic felicity—essentially, how easily an utterance can be
associated with a literal meaning—rather than grammaticality. In both cases, however,
language users are making determinations as to how acceptable an utterance is based on
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its probability26. The less frequent the pattern underlying an utterance (whether said
pattern be a particular sequence of segments, a string of morphemes, or a particular
source-target metaphorical mapping), and therefore the less its probability, the less such a
pattern will have likelihood and strength of entrenchment as a schema. This lack of
participation in a highly entrenched schema corresponds to ‘oddness’ in an utterance- that
is to say, a lack of acceptability, whether such a lack of acceptability be labeled
grammatical or semantic.
5.2 Experiment 2: Comprehension Time
The second experiment is a computer-based comprehension-time (CT) task in which
participants were presented with metaphorical stimuli (e.g., ‘When it comes to love, he’s
a magician’) and asked to press a button when they understand the sentence. It is
hypothesized that sentences instantiating more frequent metaphors are processed more
quickly than sentences instantiating less frequent ones, as a result of frequent mappings
having been entrenched in speakers’ minds due to frequent activation. This hypothesis is
tested in two ways, with the experimental results interpreted as supporting the hypothesis
stated above if 1) there is an overall correlation between frequency and reaction time, and

26

Semantic factors are themselves important in syntactic schemata. Bybee & Eddington

(2006), in a study of Spanish verbs meaning ‘become’ and accompanying adjectives,
demonstrate that the token frequency of constructions has a direct effect on how speakers
rate the acceptability of sentences. Moreover, they show that expressions semantically
similar to highly frequent ones are also judged to be more acceptable, demonstrating that
semantic relations play a primary role in formation of exemplar-based representations.
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2) as a group, the stimuli instantiating frequent metaphors are processed more quickly
than the stimuli instantiating less frequent metaphors.
5.2.1 Methods
26 students from the University of New Mexico (14 males and 12 females)
participated in the experiment, a group different from those who participated in
Experiment 1. The participants were native speakers of English between the ages of 18
and 30 and were offered a small amount of extra credit for their participation by the
instructors of their introductory linguistics classes. Stimuli (see Table 5.2) comprise 30
sentences, occurring in matched pairs: for each frequent/infrequent metaphor pair, there
are six stimuli. Three instantiate the more frequent metaphor, applying terminology from
a given source domain to a given target domain (e.g., ‘Her mind has gears’, instantiating
THE MIND IS A MACHINE),

while the other three sentences are identical except that they

use source terminology from the less frequent metaphor (‘Her mind has muscles’,
instantiating THE MIND IS A BODY). Stimuli were constructed using terminology which
emerged as basic to the domain in the key terms survey, with the first pair of stimuli
constructed around the metaphorical use of nouns from the source domain, the second
around the metaphorical use of verbs from the source domain (although in some cases
applying them in present participle form), and the third around the metaphorical use of
adjectives from the source domain. The words selected for use in each matched pair were
analogous with respect to their role in the domain27. Stimuli were controlled for mean

27

For example, the words selected for PLANTS and BATTERIES are flower and

Duracell (a type of plant, and type of battery), growing and charging (things that plants
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lexical frequency, as assessed using the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(Davies 2008). While the mean lexical frequencies for the members of each stimulus pair
are in many cases unequal, there was no significant difference in mean lexical frequency
between the two groups of experimental items overall: t(14) = .9, p = .38. All stimuli
were written previous to the corpus component of the study, so that the researcher did not
know which metaphors were more frequent and which were less frequent at the time of
their being composed.
The experiment was computer-based, with all participants completing the experiment
on the same machine (a Macintosh G4 MacBook). The experiment was designed and run
using PsyScope X, and the machine’s track button was used as an input device. This
setup guaranteed timing accuracy to within 17ms (more than sufficiently accurate for the
relatively long reaction times recorded in the experiment).
Participants first read an introductory screen on which they were advised that they
would be presented with a series of sentences, and that they were going to be asked to
assess each sentences’ meaning. On beginning the experiment, participants viewed, for
each stimulus, the following series of screens: an initial screen advises them that for the
following screen, they are being asked to press a button as soon as they feel that they
understand the sentence. Once they press a button to advance to the screen containing the
stimulus, a screen appears containing the stimulus. Once the button is pressed a second
time, indicating the sentence has been read and understood, a screen appears which
prompts them to write in a brief description of the meaning of the sentence, and to press a
and batteries do, respectively), and small and rechargeable (traits that can apply to
members of the category).
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specific key (cueing the introductory screen for the next stimulus) when their description
is complete.
All trials began with a block of 5 ‘warm-up’ items, from which data were not
recorded, following which the stimuli were presented to each participant in a different
random order. For each stimulus, the time recorded was the time between the stimulus
appearing on the screen, and the button being pressed.
5.2.2 Results
Figure 5.4 provides the results of Experiment 2. Comparing results across the two
levels of the independent variable, corresponding to the average of responses for the more
frequent and less frequent items for each participant, the experiment bears out the
prediction that utterances instantiating more frequent metaphors are processed more
quickly than utterances instantiating less frequent ones. Mean reaction time for the
infrequent stimuli is 5865.2 ms, while mean reaction time for the frequent stimuli was
5371.2 ms—almost 500 ms less. These results are statistically significant for a bysubjects analysis, t(25) = 2.11, p = <.05.
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Figure 5.4
Experiment 2 Summary

Table 5.2 presents a more detailed view of the results of Experiment 2, averaged by
stimulus. Both Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4 reflect a preliminary cleaning up of the data in
which all responses under 100 ms (assumed to represent a ‘double-click’ from the
previous response) and over 100,000 ms (assumed to represent a distraction from the
experimental task) were excluded. Data were also excluded from items for which there
was a null response in the paraphrase (i.e., items for which participants entered nothing in
the field where they were prompted to explain the meaning of the sentence). A total of 35
responses (4% of the data) were discarded based on these criteria. Values for each item
are averaged across participants. The values in the right-most column are differences
yielded by subtracting values from the first column from values in the second. Positive
numbers in the right-most column are therefore in accord with the predicted phenomenon
that utterances instantiating frequent metaphors are processed more quickly than those
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instantiating less frequent metaphors. Negative numbers reflect instances where the
predicted effect is not borne out.
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Frequent

Infrequent

Stimulus
Frequency CT
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS/BATTERIES

Stimulus

He is a flower.
5361.1
She is a plant
growing.
5073.2
He is a small plant.
4573.7
PEOPLE ARE
244
PLANTS
5002.7
summary
COMPETITION IS WAR/RACING

He is a Duracell.
She is a battery charging.

This is the Iraq of
debates.
The applicants are
fighting in a war
for the award.
This chess match is
a bad war.
COMPETITION
IS WAR summary

This is the NASCAR of
debates.
The applicants are running in
a race for the award.

5714.6

5299.8

Her mind has gears.
His mind is a
machine
malfunctioning.
My mind is an
industrial machine.
THE MIND IS A
MACHINE
38
summary
IDEAS ARE FOOD/WRITING
Her ideas are wellcooked pizzas.
They ate my ideas
straight from my
mouth.
His idea is a tasty
piece of food.
IDEAS ARE
42
FOOD summary
HOPE IS A LIGHT/A CHILD

TOTAL

Frequency

He is a rechargeable battery.
PEOPLE ARE
BATTERIES summary

27

5535.6

5516.6
111
THE MIND IS A MACHINE/BODY

My hope is the sun.
Her hope is a lamp
illuminating the
room.
His hope is a bright
light.
HOPE IS A
LIGHT summary

Infrequent Frequent

19

5059.9

-301.2

6203.7
6979.8

1130.6
2406

6081.1

1078.5

6107.3

392.7

6859.8

1324.3

4171.9

-1127.9

5713

196.4

5193.6

672.4

4521.2

Her mind has muscles.

4730.5

His mind is a body exercising.

5578

847.5

4552.8

My mind is a strong body.
THE MIND IS A BODY
summary

4907

354.2

5226.2

624.7

6288.2

1928.2

6290.7

762.3

7030.1
6536.3

1287.2
1325.9

4601.5

4360
5528.5
5742.9
5210.4

6

Her ideas are poorly written
essays.
They read my ideas straight
from my mouth.
His idea is a fun piece of
writing.
IDEAS ARE WRITING
summary

26

7738.7

My hope is a baby.

6082.3

-1656.4

6087.7

Her hope is a child playing a
game.

5730.5

-357.2

5495.4

-251.7

5769.4

-755.1

5865.2

494.1

5747.1
16

This chess match is a fast
race.
COMPETITION IS
RACING summary

CT

6524.5

His hope is a young child.
HOPE IS A CHILD
summary

5371.2

Table 5.2
Experiment 2 Data
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The results corroborate, in several ways, the results gleaned from Experiment 1.
Three of the five groups of stimuli agree directly with the results of the acceptability
experiment. Mean scores COMPETITION IS WAR/COMPETITION IS RACING,
separated by a narrow margin in Experiment 1, are again close in Experiment 2. The final
group of stimuli, those instantiating HOPE IS A LIGHT/HOPE IS A CHILD, represent a
notable exception to the trend observed elsewhere: for this one group, the items
instantiating the less frequent metaphor has, across subjects, a lower mean
comprehension time. This may indicate that the frequency method used may not be finetuned enough to determine the difference in frequency between relatively low-frequency
metaphors, or it may indicate that below a certain threshold of frequency, no meaningful
differences in processing take place. When HOPE is excluded from the analysis, the
difference between the two groups increases to 645 ms, significance to t(25) = 2.96, p =
<.05. In general, for this experiment, little can be drawn from a comparison at the level of
groups of stimuli that share a target domain, or certainly of individual pairs of stimuli:
while there is no significant difference between the two groups of stimuli overall, with
respect to mean lexical frequency or phrase length, there are differences in these factors
for individual stimulus pairs (deviations that are mitigated as larger groups of stimuli are
compared).
Figure 5.5 represents the data from Experiment 2 in a chart that plots, for each of the
26 subjects that participated in the experiment, mean comprehension for the frequent
against the infrequent sets of stimuli. For 14 of the 26 participants, reaction time for the
infrequent items exceeded reaction time for the frequent items (a slim majority, following
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from the small margin separating the two groups). The difference between the two groups
was significant, as reported above.

Figure 5.5
Experiment 2; Comprehension Time by Subject

Figure 5.6 plots, for each stimulus pair, the mean comprehension time across participants
for the frequent vs. the infrequent stimulus.
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Figure 5.6
Experiment 2: Comprehension Time by Stimulus

In a by-stimulus analysis, the difference between the two groups of stimuli approached,
but failed to reach, significance, t(14) = 1.74, p = .051.
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5.2.3 Discussion
These results are interpreted as supporting the stated hypothesis that sentences
instantiating more frequent metaphors are processed more quickly than sentences
instantiating less frequent ones as a result of their having been entrenched by previous
usage. These findings mirror those such as Vitevich et al. (1997) and Hare et al. (2001),
which indicate for phonotactic and morphological sequences that processing speed is
more rapid when such sequences instantiate patterns which are frequent. This suggests a
common explanation for both sets of findings: that patterns to which subjects have had
frequent previous exposure are entrenched as schemata, and that increasing frequency is
accompanied by increasing speed of access. With respect to accessibility, frequency has
the same effect on metaphorical schemata as it has on schemata at other levels of
linguistic structure.
5.3: Experiment 3: Productivity
The third experiment is a timed sentence completion task in which participants are
presented with the first portion of a sentence which specifies an entity from a given target
domain, and they are prompted to write down as many metaphorical completions as they
can think up in a specified period of time. It is hypothesized that completions
instantiating more frequent metaphors will appear with more frequency, across subjects,
than completions instantiating less frequent ones, as a result of frequent mappings having
been entrenched in speakers’ minds due to frequent activation. This experiment will be
taken as supporting the hypothesis if there is a significant difference in the number of
completions instantiating frequent vs. infrequent metaphors, such that there are
significantly more completions instantiating the group of frequent metaphors identified in
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the corpus component of the study relative to the corresponding related infrequent
metaphors.
5.3.1 Methods
18 students from the University of New Mexico (8 males and 10 females) participated
in the experiment, a group distinct from those who participated in Experiments 1 or 2.
The participants were native speakers of English between the ages of 18 and 30 and were
offered a small amount of extra credit for their participation by the instructors of their
introductory linguistics classes. The five stimuli used in the experiment (see Table 3)
correspond to the five target domains (PEOPLE, COMEPTITION, THE MIND, IDEAS, HOPE)
that are attested in the ten metaphors (five matched pairs) the frequency of which were
assessed in the corpus component of the study. The initial portion of the stimulus sets up
a situation, describing literally an attribute of a member of a category defined by a
particular source domain (e.g, PEOPLE). The second portion of the stimulus, an
uncompleted simile of the form “[Target] is like ____,” prompts a figurative description
of the assertion made literally in the first portion of the stimuli. The first stimulus, then,
reads as follows:

Mary was tired, but she took a nap and is now feeling more awake.
Mary is like ________________.

The first portion of the stimulus makes a literal assertion, attributing a quality (awake) to
a member (Mary) of a category aligning with a metaphorical source domain (PEOPLE).
The second portion prompts the figurative use of a term to provide an alternate
description. The information being coded for analysis is the source domain of the terms
used to complete the sentence: a budding flower would be a use of terminology from the
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source domain PLANTS (and therefore of the mapping PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, while a
recharged battery would be an instance of BATTERIES (and therefore of PEOPLE ARE
BATTERIES)

28

.

Participants were provided with the following instructions:
When people use metaphors and similes, they compare one thing to another thing. For example, if I say
“My car is like an elephant”, I’m comparing my car to an elephant. I might to do this to indicate that
my car is large, or that it’s slow moving. I could also say the same thing, or something similar, by
using a different metaphor- for example, I could say “My car is like a boat.”
In this experiment, I’m interested in what things make good metaphors. On each of the following
pages, there is a brief description of a situation. At the end of the description, there is a sentence that
ends with a blank. I’d like you to try to come up with things that finish the sentence metaphorically.
For example, a description of a situation might be something like:
Michael and Lisa are very much in love, and they think about each other all the time.
They are like ________________.
To make the last sentence a metaphor, you could write something like ‘teammates’, or ‘magnets’, or
‘lovebirds’, or ‘people who are on a journey together’, or anything else you can think of.
When I say “Go to the next page”, read the description, and then write down all the metaphorical
completions that you can think of for the sentence that ends in a blank.
Start at the top of the page, and work your way down.

28

In an initial version of the experiment, the prompt portion of the stimulus took the form

of a metaphor rather than a simile, lacking the word ‘like’ (i.e., “Mary is ____”). Despite
instructions which directed participants towards figurative completions, metaphorical
completions were almost unattested in trials of the experiment in its original form. The
current version is much more successful in prompting figurative responses, which follows
from and provides support for Gentner & Bowdle’s (2001, 2005) assertion that the simile
sentence form prompts figurative processing.
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Subjects had two minutes to complete each page of the instrument. The five stimuli were
presented in a different random order to each participant. Data coded are the number of
items, totaling across all participants’ lists, items instantiating each of the two metaphors
(the frequent and the infrequent one) for each target domain.
5.3.2 Results
Figure 5.7 provides a comparison of the mean production tokens (a single instantiation,
within a list of completions for a given target domain, of a particular mapping) across all
participants, and all stimuli. The average number of production tokens is higher,
averaging across subjects, for the frequent than the infrequent metaphorical mappings
(7.8:2.8), which bears out the predicted experimental effect. These results are significant,
t(17) = 3.08, p = <.005.

Figure 5.7
Experiment 3 Summary
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Table 3 presents a more detailed version of the results of Experiment 3. There is a
single prompt corresponding to each of the five target domains; the ‘frequent’ and
‘infrequent’ columns correspond to the source domains which are used more and less
frequently in relation to the given target domain. The column labeled PT provides a sum,
across the 18 participants, of production tokens for each mapping.
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Prompt

Frequent

Infrequent

Metaphor

Mary was tired, but she took a nap and is now
feeling more awake.
Mary is like ________________.
John and Tyler are students, and they are
extremely competitive over who is better at math.
They have a test coming up, and both of them
want to do better than the other one on the test.
John and Tyler are like ________________.
Jessica is extremely intelligent.
Her mind is like ________________.
I just had a really good idea.
My idea is like ________________.
My friends and I are in a very bad situation, but
we’re starting to hope that things will get better.
Our hope is like ________________.
Average

F

Metaphor

F

PT

2

PEOPLE ARE
BATTERIES

27

5

111

2

COMPETITION IS
RACING

19

3

THE MIND IS A
MACHINE

38

23

6

2

IDEAS ARE FOOD

42

3

26

3

HOPE IS A LIGHT

16

9

0

1

90.2

7.8

15.6

2.8

PEOPLE ARE
PLANTS

244

COMPETITION IS
WAR

PT

THE MIND IS A
BODY
IDEAS ARE
WRITING
HOPE IS A CHILD

Table 5.3
Experiment 3 Data

Looking at the results across each of the five target mappings, it’s the case for three of the
five target domains that PTs for the more frequent mapping are lower than, or equal to,
PTs than for the infrequent mapping. In the two categories for which there are, as
predicted, more PTs for the frequent than for the infrequent mapping, the difference
across the two categories is extremely high relative to the other categories (23:2, 9:1). In
the three categories for which PTs for the infrequent mappings exceed PTs for the
frequent ones, the ratio is at most 5:2. This pattern accounts for the higher average PTs
for the category of frequent mappings.
As an example of the types of entries that were included as tokens of the target
mapping:
The prompt corresponding to PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES is:
Mary was tired, but she took a nap and is now feeling more awake.
Mary is like ___________.
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Across all subject’s lists, the two completions that were coded as instantiations of PEOPLE
ARE PLANTS

were ‘a fresh lettuce’ and ‘a daisy’. The five items that were coded as

instantiations of PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES were ‘a recharged battery’, ‘a charged battery’,
‘a device that needs to be recharged’, and two instances of ‘battery’. Metaphorical
completions that don’t instantiate either target metaphor abound (as they do across all ten
target metaphors), and responses such as the following were common: ‘a new penny’, ‘a
million bucks’, ‘a deer after being shot at’, and ‘a lightbulb’. So, too, were nonmetaphorical responses, such as ‘a person who had just slept for 24 hours’, or ‘a
workaholic freak’. Across all 18 subjects and all five target domains, the average number
of responses for each list was seven.
Figure 5.8 shows the results of experiment 3 by subject.

Figure 5.8
Results of Experiment 3 by subject

For 3 subjects, there were no PTs for either metaphorical category. For 7 subjects
there were no responses for the infrequent mapping and at least 1 for the frequent
mapping, while the reverse is true for only 1 subject. 14 subjects gave a pattern of
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responses in line with the predicted effect, productivity for the frequent category
exceeding productivity for the infrequent category.
A by-stimulus analysis fails to reach statistical significance, t(4) = 1.13, p = .16.
5.3.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 are in line with the predicted experimental effect,
providing direct support for the hypothesis that frequent metaphors are more productive
than infrequent metaphors. The difference in averages between the two groups, as well as
the by-subjects analysis, are highly consistent with the predicted effect that more frequent
metaphors will, relative to less frequent metaphors, more commonly serve as templates
for new constructions.
Overall support notwithstanding, in some cases results for specific frequentinfrequent metaphor pairs fails to corroborate the general pattern of frequent metaphors
being more productive than their less-frequent ones, pointing to two weaknesses in the
experimental design that should be addressed in follow-up experiments. First, the low
numbers of responses for each metaphor (eight of the ten having five responses or fewer),
even totaling across all participants, makes the results difficult to interpret. This issue is
inherent to the nature of the study- the prompts were very open-ended, and metaphorical
completions of all sorts, and in very high numbers, were attested. Only a small subset of
these (those completions, for each target domain, that instantiated one of the metaphors
the frequency of which was assessed in the corpus component of the study) were coded,
which necessarily means that only a small number of responses were recorded. A followup study, or any experiment with a methodology similar to the one reported here, would
do well to seek a much higher number of participants. Second, there was only a single
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prompt corresponding to each target domain, which made the results for each domain
highly dependent on the particular stimulus used. The results would be more powerful
were they averaged, for each domain, across a number of prompts for the domain. This
change will also be instituted in any follow-up studies.
5.4 Conclusion
The experiments reported here indicate that metaphorical entrenchment can and does
take place at the level of underlying metaphorical schemata. The corpus frequency of a
given mapping provides a diagnostic of speakers’ previous exposure to an utterance,
which is demonstrated here to be a factor in processing, with respect to acceptability
accessibility, and production. The finding that manipulation of utterances with respect to
the frequency of the metaphors underpinning them has a direct effect on processing
indicates that speakers’ previous exposure to particular metaphors influences their on-line
processing of such metaphors. Experiments 1 and 2 directly support the predictions that
instantiations of higher-frequency metaphors are deemed more acceptable and processed
more quickly (respectively) than instantiations of lower-frequency mappings. Experiment
3 confirms that higher-frequency mappings are more productive than lower-frequency
mappings, suggesting a strong role for the token frequency of a metaphorical mapping in
determining such productivity.
Both experiments 1 and 3 make use of stimuli in the grammatical form of similes,
rather than of metaphor. The functional equivalence of metaphors and similes, with
respect to processing, does not mean that metaphors and similes are identical, nor should
any statement made above be interpreted as claiming as such. As outlined in §2.3.4,
different grammatical forms have associations with different types of metaphorical affect
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and pragmatic function- the piloting of stimuli for all three experiments indicated that the
simile form is more effective than the metaphor form in biasing language users towards a
figurative interpretation. Croft & Cruse (2004) note that the categories of metaphor and
simile overlap to a great extent, but have distinct prototypes. Similes tend towards
restricted mappings, making a single, narrow assertion about the target, and
prototypically treat the source and target being treated as discrete. Metaphors tend
towards open mappings, inviting a limitless number of inferences about the target based
on the source, and prototypically ‘mix’ the source and target into a single conceptual
space. Nonetheless, several lines of research (Bowdle & Gentner 2005, Chiappe &
Kennedy 2000) support the view that novel similes and novel metaphors are processed in
essentially the same way, supporting the view from Conceptual Metaphor Theory that
both forms represent linguistic instantiations of cross-domain mappings. The most
relevant evidence, however, comes from the experiments reported here: Experiments 1
and 3 make use of grammatical similes as stimuli, while Experiment 2 uses grammatical
metaphors. All three experiments, however, point towards the same relationship between
processing for the stimuli, and the metaphorical schemata upon which they are based.
In several cases, results for specific pairs of domains point to cases in which the
metaphors used in the study were not stated at a level of schematicity that accurately
captures the productive range of the metaphor (a criticism elaborated in Clausner & Croft
1997), leading to stimuli that are questionable in their relation to an overarching schema.
In Experiment 2, for example, results relating to the source domain HOPE run contrary to
both the corpus study, and the other two experiments- apparently, because utterances
such as ‘my hope is the sun’, predicated directly on HOPE IS LIGHT, run contrary to a
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metaphor that might be more accurately described as profiling light sources as things that
nourish hope. PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES might be more accurately phrased PEOPLE RUN ON
BATTERIES,

leading to issues with the aptness of a stimulus such ‘kids are AAA

batteries’. Metaphors were drawn from the Master Metaphor List (Lakoff, Espenson, &
Schwartz 1991) for reasons elaborated in §4.1 (in short, if the metaphors on which the
experiments in based are in error, they at least aren’t flawed in a way that reflects
researcher bias). The issue underscores the need for all posited metaphors to be evaluated
closely against corpus usage; that the experiments found an effect despite such issues
points towards a significant effect outweighing issues relating to specific groups of
stimuli.
These results are interpreted as providing strong support for the view of metaphor
outlined here. Speakers’ repeated exposure to utterances predicated on a particular crossdomain mapping license the formation of a metaphorical representation—a
conventionalized link between two domains, corresponding to ‘X IS Y’ Lakovian
conceptual metaphors. For language users in the act of engaging in figurative speech,
previous exposure to metaphorical systems has a direct, measurable effect on the way in
which they use and process metaphorically predicated utterances.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
In traditional and generative models of language, the facts of language production are
dependent on underlying mental representations (Chomsky 1965, 1980, Peters & Ritchie
1973, Jackendoff 1974, May 1977, Lappin, Levine & Johnson 2000). Stored units and
rules (competence) together account for the facts of language as it is produced
(performance), with the goal of linguistic analysis being to posit the correct rules and
stored units to accurately and completely account for language as it exists in the mouths
of speakers. A speaker’s knowledge of language, in this view, wholly precedes any actual
use of language: the abstract structure of language exists in speakers’ minds, and it is this
abstract structure which is the essence of language. Language, whether realized in
production or not, exists as a complete system in the mind. When utterances are produced
and perceived, the underlying system—capital ‘L’ Language—is activated in order to do
so.
The perceived benefit, and indeed the elegance, of a system such as this one is its
perceived cognitive efficiency. Speakers don’t need to ‘worry’, so to speak, about
remembering all of the possible combinations of morphemes and words in a language.
They need not waste the storage space, because complex linguistic units such as
sentences and morphologically derived words can be formed on the basis of stored units
and rules. No matter how many times a given word or sentence is formed, the mind goes
through the same process of putting it together based on underlying structures. In this
processing-heavy approach to language, people are like calculators: instead of storing the
entire multiplication table, calculators compute the necessary values as needed. Instead of
memorizing all of the possible sentences in a language, humans put them together as
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necessary. Just as with early computers, processing is exploited to make up for a lack of
storage, and the beauty of language conceptualized thus is that a relatively small amount
need be stored.
A usage-based model of language (Bybee 1985, Givón 1984, Hawkins 1994,
Lindblom, MacNeilage, & Studdert-Kennedy 1983) turns such a conception of language
directly on its head, by ascribing primacy to the facts of language production itself. When
the regular in language is conceptualized as patterns generalized across actual tokens of
use, the utterance—an actual speech event—becomes, rather than just an output of an
underlying system, the unit upon which linguistic structure is predicated. Language, as it
exists in a system in speakers’ minds, emerges as an organic system as speakers are
exposed to language in use.
Storage is highly redundant. Not only are individual tokens of use stored, but stored
schemata can overlap and encompass one another, with representations for units at lower
levels in no way precluding representations at a higher level. A frequently occurring
string of words, for example, need not be built anew from its constituent elements with
each repetition. A sentence such as ‘How was your weekend,’ while analyzable in terms
of each of the four words comprising the sentence, can also be stored and processed as a
whole. If the generative model of language is analogous to early computers, then the way
that media is stored on many more recent personal computers provides a template for
thinking about a usage-based model: memory is cheap. With hundreds of gigabytes of
storage well within the means of a typical computer user, the existence of a particular
item of information at multiple levels (for example, a single song appearing multiple
times in a music library, as compilations containing the same song are uploaded) is in no
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way unacceptable. Storage is similarly cheap in the mind, with humans capable of storing
incredible amounts of information, and similar (and even far more extreme, in line with
the extent to which human memory exceeds that of a typical computer) redundancies
occurring. Such a model may lack the sparse elegance of a theory of language that draws
a sharp line between rules and the entities upon which they operate, positing utterances as
the output of a process whereby a regular (if highly elaborate) set of rules operates on a
limited set of stored entities. It has the great advantage however, of not treating language
as something set wholly apart from other aspects of cognition—and boasts its own
aesthetic in a vision of language as a self-organizing system. At every level, repetition
shapes how language is stored and processed. The recurring use of one domain of thought
to describe another creates conventionalized connections between cognitive domains.
For metaphor, the usage-based model handles well precisely those aspects of
metaphor which have raised the most eyebrows among critics of Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, and of cognitive theories of metaphor in general: that idiomatic and formulaic
metaphors are treated as essentially the same, that certain aspects of mappings are fleshed
out while others remain unexplored, and above all else, that metaphor researchers see
metaphor everywhere. Real metaphors do indeed underlie formulaic and idiomatic
utterances, but the extent to which they are activated in on-line processing is dependent
on the autonomy of the expression, and on the priming effect of the preceding context.
That some aspects of a mapping are attested in common utterances while others aren’t
follows from the nature of schemata as abstractions over tokens of use, rather than as a
priori constructs that sanction utterances. And while metaphor is indeed pervasive and
prevalent, not all metaphors are equally metaphorical. That many utterances profile a
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particular aspect of a mapping, with a conventionalized meaning often not predictable
based on the mapping overall, in no way detracts from the fundamental way in which
metaphor is a fundamental feature of human language and cognition.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory made the key insight, reflected in both further iterations
of CMT and in subsequent cognitive theories of metaphor, that metaphor is a conceptual,
rather than a strictly linguistic, system. In individuals and on a cultural level, the
systematicity of one domain of thought is used to structure another. This is a domaingeneral cognitive phenomenon, instantiated in, but not limited to, language. The usagebased approach to metaphor put forward here preserves this view of metaphor, but takes a
more dynamic view of the conceptual system that is the essence of metaphor: in that
metaphorical schemata are created and strengthened as metaphorical utterances are
processed, linguistic metaphor—the facts, as they pertain to figuration, of language in
use—has direct input into the conceptual system that motivates language. If it can be said
that linguistic metaphor is predicated on a more general conceptual system, it can as
easily be said that it is the conceptual system that is motivated and shaped by language.
Neither statement is entirely true. The cognitive structures that are metaphor emerge over
instances of linguistic metaphor in use, which are in turn produced, judged, and processed
on the basis of the emergent cognitive structure of metaphor.
The methods and tools developed within the frequency-based approach to language
are ideally suited to handling a property of metaphor which has been almost universally
observed, and almost universally underexplained: the conventionalization of crossdomain mappings, which has been described here as the strengthening of conceptual
schema that operate across cognitive domains. Along the way, other key features of
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metaphor are explained as well. The automatic and idiosyncratic interpretations
associated with lexical, formulaic, and idiomatic metaphors are a function of autonomy
for specific instances of a mapping, effected by a high degree of entrenchment for some
aspects of a mapping relative to the cross-domain mapping overall. Metaphorical
strength, the ability of a term to evoke a given source domain, decreases alongside
increasing autonomy. ‘Families’ of related metaphors are tokens of use over which
lexical connections have formed, based on shared properties with respect to source and
target domain. For metaphorical idioms, tokens of use instantiate syntactic schemata as
well, creating complex relationships among utterances with related meanings.
Both corpus and experimental research methods are essential to continued work on a
frequency-oriented approach to figuration. From a corpus perspective, the usage-based
approach to metaphor will be corroborated by studies on the model of, for example,
Poplack & Tagliamonte 1999, Krug 2000, Zilles 2005, Travis & Silveira 2009, and
Aaron 2006: studies that note variation in parallel linguistic forms, track differences in
frequency between the variants, and tie such differences to diachronic change as
frequency effects the displacement of one form by another (and to other change as well).
For metaphor, diachronic corpus-based studies demonstrating the usage-based model
would do so most effectively by tracking changes over time in the source domains used
to refer to a given target, tying such change to the variable frequency of the respective
mappings. Diachronic corpus methods are well-suited, as well, to inquiry into the
emergence of metaphorical autonomy, as forms begin as novel instantiations of frequent
(and, accordingly, productive) metaphorical mapping, and by virtue of high token
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frequency lose connections to other forms instantiating the same mapping and take on
idiosyncratic meanings.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) asserts that any given
metaphorical mapping is instantiated in a wide range of utterances. While this may be
true, corpus research on metaphor points towards a hugely disproportionate distribution
of forms across a mapping, a large number of tokens for a given mapping accounted for
by a small number of expressions (Sanford 2008a). A small-corpus study could
demonstrate, across a variety of mappings, how even for highly productive mappings a
large proportion of instantiating tokens are accounted for by a handful of highly
entrenched forms. Such a study would provide important support for the emergent nature
of metaphorical structures.
The experiments reported in Chapter 5 address ‘competition’, between overall
metaphorical schemata, based on differences in their degree of entrenchment (as assessed
by their type frequency in a corpus), such that more frequent mappings are more
accessible, more acceptable, and more productive than less frequent mappings. Another
explicit prediction of the model is a similar competition for forms within a schema. For
two forms sanctioned by the same metaphorical schema (for example, men are dogs and
she’s a dog), the form higher in token frequency should be processed more quickly, and
possibly be found more acceptable, by speakers of a language.
Moreover, since the frequency of the sanctioning schema is the same for all such
forms, their token frequencies can be used to make meaningful comparisons as to each
form’s degree of autonomy. Autonomy effects a weakening of the connection between a
form and its sanctioning schema. A sufficiently sensitive priming experiment should find
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a difference in the extent to which priming using forms of different frequencies speeds
processing for other forms sanctioned by the same schema (for example, the difference
between men are dogs and she’s a dog in priming my banker is a dog).
The results of experiment 3 (as reported in Chapter 5) broadly confirm the effect of
frequency upon metaphorical productivity. More powerful support, however, might be
gathered from a study taking the design reported here as a starting point, improving on it
(as recommended in §5.3.3) by exploring different approaches to how stimuli are crafted,
and seeking a much higher number of participants. For idiom, important support for the
dual nature of idioms as instantiations of metaphorical and syntactic schema would come
from a series of experiments seeking priming effects across utterances related by each
type of schema.
The effects noted in all three experiments might also be sought by comparing two
groups of subjects who differ in the frequency to which they have been exposed to a
given metaphorical mapping. This might be accomplished artificially (exposing subjects,
prior to the experiment, to utterances instantiating one of the mappings), but could also be
done by comparing participants from any given in-group to the greater language
community. A group of tutors in a university writing center, for example, are likely to
have had greater exposure than the general population to the metaphor whereby the
transition sentences between paragraphs, and other organizational indicators, are
described as ‘signs’ for the reader. An experiment demonstrating, for example, that the
tutors process utterances instantiating the metaphor more quickly than the control (nontutor) group would clearly indicate an effect from an individual’s personal language
history on metaphor processing.
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The usage-based model hypothesizes that highly fixed, idiosyncratic interpretations
for lexical, formulaic, and idiomatic metaphors result from a high degree of entrenchment
for particular forms relative to the entrenchment of overall metaphorical mappings. This
assertion could be tested using an experimental method prompting literal paraphrases for
such forms, analyzing responses for the extent, across responses, of variation from a
‘core’ interpretation. A corpus study analyzing the token frequency of such forms, and
the type frequency of overall mappings, would be used to inform the analysis of the
experimental results.
Methodologically, solid approaches to determining the frequency of metaphorical
mappings are prerequisite to the approach. Chapter 4 outlines two possible angles on the
problem; many more are possible, and at least a few, it is much hoped, would be capable
of more fine-grained results.
Over 30 years of cognitive and psycholinguistic inquiry into metaphor have provided
invaluable insight into metaphor, metaphorical processing, and metaphorical systems,
deeply enriched by a wealth of empirical data from experimental and, more recently,
corpus methods. Consequent theories of metaphor are valuable to the extent that they
account for this wealth of knowledge, even as they question fundamental assumptions of
previous approaches. One such assumption, an immense hindrance to the field as a
whole, is the view of metaphor as a ‘deep’ system of which language in use provides us
with glimpses. Moving forward, metaphor is more productively viewed as an organic,
dynamic system that emerges over and follows from language in use.
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Appendix: Frequency Tables
1.1 Key-terms (small-corpus) method
COMPETITION
Total Uses Consistent with
Source Domain

Total Metaphorical
Uses of source term

Total Instances of …

WAR

COMPETITION IS WAR

death

6

0

0

gun

2

0

0

36

6

0

1

1

0

tank

22

4

0

TOTAL

67

11

0

car

9

0

0

fast

6

0

0

bomb
soldier

RACING

track

COMPETITION IS RACING

16

10

10

NASCAR

6

0

0

competition

0

0

0

37

10

10

TOTAL

HOPE
Total Uses Consistent with
Source Domain

Total Metaphorical
Uses of source term

Total Instances of …

LIGHT
sun

HOPE IS LIGHT
193

0

0

bright

82

42

6

bulb

26

0

0
0

lamp

8

0

dark

78

24

1

387

66

7

small

4

0

0

innocent

0

0

0

play

7

3

0

young

482

0

0

playful

3

0

0

TOTAL

496

3

0

TOTAL
A CHILD

HOPE IS A CHILD

160

IDEAS
Total Uses Consistent with
Source Domain

Total Metaphorical
Uses of source term

Total Instances of …

FOOD

IDEAS ARE FOOD

fruit

118

6

0

meat

153

1

0

pizza

107

0

0

restaurant

442

0

0

eat
TOTAL

480

11

0

1300

18

0

WRITING
pen

IDEAS ARE WRITING
47

1

1

paper

491

0

0

pencil

37

0

0

500

2

1

book
word
TOTAL

500

0

0

1575

3

2

PEOPLE
Total Uses Consistent with
Source Domain

Total Metaphorical
Uses of source term

Total Instances of …

PLANTS

PEOPLE ARE PLANTS

green

141

8

5

flower

238

1

1

tree

500

6

4

leaf

194

1

1

water

12

0

0

1085

16

11

power

0

0

0

AA

1

0

0

AAA

0

0

0

rechargeable

0

0

0

TOTAL
BATTERIES

PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES

duracell

0

0

0

TOTAL

1

0

0

161

THE MIND
Total Uses Consistent with
Source Domain

Total Metaphorical
Uses of source term

Total Instances of …

A MACHINE

A MACHINE

computer

500

0

0

car

500

0

0

metal

18

24

0

robot

20

0

0

technology
TOTAL

222

0

0

1260

24

0

A BODY

THE MIND IS A BODY

leg

192

14

0

arm

161

17

0

head

407

54

0

hand

446

154

2

finger
TOTAL

111

8

2

1317

247

4
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1.2 Similes (Large-Corpus) Method
COMPETITION IS…
WAR
source term (x)
soldier

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

RACING
source term (x)

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

4

NASCAR

6

gun

16

race track

3

bomb

13

Indy 500

3

army

43

race car

3

general

24

racer

1

11

checkered flag

tank
TOTAL

111

1
19

HOPE IS…
LIGHT
source term (x)

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

sun

3

bulb
lamp

A CHILD
source term (x)

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

baby

0

5

kid

0

2

parent

0

day

2

school

0

illumination

0

toy

0

4

Playground

ray
TOTAL

16

0
0

IDEAS ARE…
FOOD
source term (x)
meat
restaurant

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

WRITING
source term (x)

7

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

pen

0
3

4

paper

dinner

11

pencil

0

bread

12

book

22

5

letter

0

2

author

chef
breakfast

42

1
26

163

PEOPLE ARE…
PLANTS
source term (x)
flower
tree
garden

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

BATTERIES
source term (x)

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

68

Duracell

3

140

electricity

7

8

charge

0

roots

10

energy

16

leaves

17

power

1

1

Energizer

0

soil
TOTAL

244

27

THE MIND IS…
A MACHINE
source term (x)
computer

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

A BODY
source term (x)

‘Like … x’ similes that
instantiate target
metaphor

22

blood

1

2

bones

1

cog

0

legs

0

car

12

arm

0

gear

1

muscles

3

robot

1

stomach

1

engine

TOTAL

38

6
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